On December 26, 2024, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Dimock v. City of Brooklyn Ctr.[i], which serves as an excellent review regarding home entry and the use of deadly force. The relevant facts of Dimock are as follows:
On August 31, 2019, Erwin B. Heisler called 911, saying that his grandson had threatened him with a knife and hammer. After answering questions for about one minute, Heisler hung up, saying “Oh, forget it.” From dispatch, officers learned that a 21-year-old man was fighting with his grandfather, that he had a hammer and a knife, and that Heisler called 911, said “Oh, forget it,” and hung up. Several officers arrived at Heisler’s house. Four officers—Brandon Akers, Cody Turner, Steve Holt, and Joseph Vu—approached the front door. Walking there, Officer Turner told Officer Akers that Kobe had stabbed himself earlier that year.
Opening the front door, Heisler stepped onto the front steps to meet the officers. Officer Akers greeted him and asked, “What’s going on tonight?” Obviously referring to Kobe, Heisler told the officers, “He’s going to be okay.” Officer Akers, a few feet from the front step, asked Heisler who was in the house. Heisler replied, his wife (Kobe’s grandmother), himself, and Kobe. Officer Akers said, “Ok. We gotta make sure that everybody’s okay before we leave. I get families have disturbances and stuff like that.” Peering through a window, Officer Turner pinpointed Kobe sitting in the front room. Heisler said “ok,” turned, and reentered his home. Officer Akers asked Heisler if Kobe had any weapons on him. Heisler responded, “No.” From inside the entryway, Heisler told his wife, “They just want to make sure everything is okay.”
Heisler stood silently within the entryway as the four officers entered the home. Officer Akers asked Heisler to speak with him outside. They walked out to the driveway. Officers Holt and Vu began speaking with Kobe in the front room. Also sitting there, Kobe’s grandmother had the weapons collected in a bag. She gave the knife to Officer Turner when he asked for it. Later, she gave him the hammer when asked. Officer Turner walked out to the driveway to speak with Heisler, who told Officers Akers and Turner that Kobe was afraid of being hospitalized.
Talking with Heiser, Officers Akers and Turner heard commotion from inside the house. The officers ran in there. Officers Holt and Vu were trying to restrain Kobe on a couch. It tipped over. Officer Holt rolled over the couch and out of the front door. Officers Turner and Akers deployed their tasers against Kobe, which did not immobilize him. Instead, Kobe got a knife in his hand (not the one that Kobe’s grandmother gave the officers). Kobe tried to run back further into the house. Officer Vu grabbed his legs. Kobe fell to the floor. Officer Holt reentered the house.
Officer Akers asked, “What’s he got, a knife?” Officer Turner shouted, “Knife, Knife, Knife!” It is disputed whether Kobe was stabbing and slashing at Officer Vu with the knife. Because the body-camera footage does not clearly resolve this dispute, this court infers that Kobe was only holding the knife. Officer Vu began to stand up. Viewing the facts most favorably to Dimock, Kobe began to stand back up to run away, with the knife in his right hand and one foot underneath him. To leave the room, Kobe would have had to run right by at least one of the officers. Kobe was directly in front of his grandmother, who was seated. Officer Turner fired three shots. Officer Akers also fired three shots. Their bullets killed Kobe.[ii]
It is important to note that, at this stage of the litigation, the court is required to resolve disputes of fact in favor of the plaintiff, therefore, additional facts could be developed later in the case.
Dimock’s mother sued on behalf of Dimock’s estate and alleged that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered the residence without a warrant and when they used unreasonable (excessive) deadly force. The district court held the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the suit against them. The plaintiff appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals first discussed qualified immunity. An officer is entitled to qualified immunity when he is acting in his discretionary capacity. The decision to enter a residence and to use force are considered discretionary decisions. For a plaintiff to defeat and officer’s motion for qualified immunity, the plaintiff must satisfy a two-pronged test. First, the plaintiff must show that the officer violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Second, the plaintiff must show that the law was clearly established such that every reasonable officer in the same situation would have known he was violating the plaintiff’s rights. The court explained
A right is ‘clearly established’ when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.'” Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5, 142 S. Ct. 4, 211 L. Ed. 2d 164 (2021). A clearly established right is dictated either by “controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority.'” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63, 138 S. Ct. 577, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018). Existing precedent can clearly establish a right, even if there is not a case “directly on point,” so long as existing precedent places the question “beyond debate.” Id. at 64. “The ‘clearly established’ standard also requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Id. at 63.[iii]
The court also noted that, according to Supreme Court precedent, they are allowed to first examine the second prong of the test for qualified immunity. If the plaintiff is unable to satisfy the second prong (that the law was clearly established), then the officers are entitled to qualified immunity and the court does not need to answer the first prong (whether the officers violated the plaintiff’s rights). This is what the court chose to do in Dimock’s case.
I. The Warrantless Home Entry Claim
The court examined the legal principles regarding warrantless home entry and stated
Exigent circumstances may justify the officers’ entry into the home. Exigent circumstances exist when officers “have an objectively reasonable basis that some immediate act is required to preserve the safety of others or themselves.” Id. The reasonableness of an entry under exigent circumstances turns not on any officer’s subjective state of mind, but objectively on the circumstances surrounding the entry. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006). If the officers here had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that someone in the house needed immediate aid, then their entry into the house did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Quarterman, 877 F.3d at 797.[iv]
The court of appeals noted that they recognize that “domestic disturbances are highly volatile and involve large risks.”[v] In this case, the officers knew that Kobe Dimock had threatened his grandfather with a knife and a hammer. The court of appeals also stated
This court “has consistently found exigent circumstances where officers reasonably believe a gun or an armed individual presents a danger to others or themselves.” See Quarterman, 877 F.3d at 797 (collecting cases).[vi]
The court noted that Kobe did not have gun; rather, it was a hammer and knife that the grandfather had already taken away from him. However, the court also noted that he had threatened his grandfather with those weapons, and they also knew that Kobe had previously stabbed himself, which indicates that he has the potential for violence.
Dimock also argued that the officers could not reasonably believe Kobe was armed and dangerous because, during the 911 call, Kobe’s grandfather told the dispatcher to “forget it” because he (Kobe) will “be okay,” stating that Kobe did not have weapons at this point. The court of appeals disagreed and stated
[O]fficers can reasonably disbelieve individuals. Due to the nature of domestic disputes, “an officer need not take a putative victim’s statement at face value when assessing whether a suspect presents an ongoing threat to the victim.” Cotten v. Miller, 74 F.4th 932, 935 (8th Cir. 2023). (holding that officers were reasonable in entering a residence, even though the putative victim denied that there had been any domestic violence, and the officers had no evidence of weapons inside the residence).[vii]
In light of the legal principles discussed and the facts known to the officers at the time, the court of appeals held that, under existing caselaw, the plaintiff has not satisfied the second prong to defeat qualified immunity regarding the unlawful warrantless entry claim. Therefore, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
II. The Excessive Force Claim
The court then examined whether the officers used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they shot Kobe. The court examined the relevant legal principles and stated
The key question is ‘whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.'” Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2009).
“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. This court evaluates the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force by looking primarily at the threat present at the time the force is deployed. Banks v. Hawkins, 999 F.3d 521, 525-26 (8th Cir. 2021). Determining whether an officer used reasonable force “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including [1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S at 396. “The calculus of reasonableness must embody [*12] allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97; Swearingen, 930 F.3d at 987-88.
…Precedent puts officers “on notice . . . that they may not use deadly force under circumstances in which they should know that the suspect does not present an immediate threat of serious physical injury or harm.” Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2005). See also Nance, 586 F.3d at 611.
The Supreme Court emphasizes: “Specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where . . . it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 200 L. Ed. 2d 449 (2018). Because use of excessive force is an area of the law “in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case,” qualified immunity applies “unless existing precedent ‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.” Id. “An officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.'” Id. at 105.[viii]
The court then set out to apply the above legal principles to the facts of Dimock’s case. The court, noting that it must credit the plaintiff’s version of events at this stage of the litigation, stated that they will assume Kobe did not threaten or menace anyone with the knife after struggling with officers inside the residence. The court noted, however, that even crediting the plaintiff’s version of events,
[A] person at close distance holding a knife, even if not directing the blade at another person, could still cause “serious injury or death in a matter of seconds by repositioning himself and the knife.” Swearingen, 930 F.3d at 988.[ix]
The plaintiff argued that the officers knew of Kobe’s mental health issues and fear of being hospitalized and those facts should influence whether the officers acted reasonably in their use of force. The court stated
[T]he reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force does not always differ based on what the officer knows about a person’s mental state. Id. at 472 (holding only that “emotionally disturbed status may be relevant to the trial court’s determination of objective reasonableness“) (emphasis added). See also Hassan v. City of Minneapolis, 489 F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a suspect’s “mental state does not change the fact he posed a deadly threat to the officers and the public“).[x]
Thus, the knowledge that a person is emotionally disturbed could be relevant but does not alone dictate reasonableness, especially when officers have a reasonable belief that a suspect poses a deadly threat to the officers and others.
The court of appeals noted that it was undisputed that, in this incident, Kobe had struggled with officers, moved with a knife in his hand, had previously stabbed himself; further, to run out of the room, Kobe would have had to face at least one officer. The court of appeals then held that under these facts, the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong of the qualified immunity test to defeat the officers’ qualified immunity. In other words, based on caselaw at the time of the incident, every reasonable officer would not believe he was violating the Fourth Amendment by shooting Kobe.
The plaintiff argued that the force was unreasonable because the officers did not warn Kobe that they would shoot him. The court of appeals noted that officers must warn a person, when feasible. They also stated that failure to warn “does not automatically render the use of deadly force unreasonable.”[xi]
Since the plaintiff failed to satisfy the second prong of the requirements to defeat qualified immunity, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court granting the officers qualified immunity.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] No. 24-1728 (8th Cir. December 26, 2024)
[ii] Id. at 2-5
[iii] Id. at 6 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 8
[vi] Id. (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. at 10 (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. at 11-13 (emphasis added)
[ix] Id. at 13 (emphasis added)
[x] Id. at 14 (emphasis added)
[xi] Id. at 16
