From the United States Supreme Court
Officers do not need Probable Cause to Enter a Home when Entering due to a Belief that an Occupant is in Peril. In such Cases, the Standard for Entry is an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant faces serious danger.[1]
Case v. Montana, 2026 U.S. LEXIS 432 (1/2026).
This case began with an alarming phone call—from petitioner William Case to his ex-girlfriend J. H., both residents of a small town in Montana. Case told J. H. on the call that “he was going to kill himself.” Because Case sounded “erratic,” J. H. assumed he had been drinking. She tried to talk Case out of committing suicide, but “couldn’t reel him back”: With each passing moment, Case “became more methodical about what he was going to do.” Case said that he was “going to get a note”—presumably meaning a suicide note, for J. H. or others to find. And then J. H. heard a “clicking” sound, like the “cock[ing of] a gun.” J. H. told Case she was going to call the police, but that seemed only to antagonize him: Case replied “he would shoot them all too.” Finally, J. H. heard “a pop” followed by “nothing”—“just dead air.” She “yelled [Case’s] name a few times,” but got no response, leading her to think he had “pulled the trigger.” So she called 9-1-1 to report the incident and drove as fast as she could to Case’s home.
Three police officers, dispatched to do “a welfare check on a suicidal male,” met J. H. outside the house. They decided the situation was “very serious,” based both on what J. H. told them about the call and on what they already knew about Case. The officers were aware that Case had a history of alcohol abuse and mental-health issues; that he had previously threatened suicide at the school where he worked; and that he had once seemed to attempt “suicide-by-cop,” by confronting the police in a way that was likely to provoke a lethal response. So the three officers requested that the chief of police come to the scene. While waiting for him, they circled the house looking for signs of injury or danger. They knocked on the doors and yelled into an open window, but got no response. Shining their flashlights inside, they could make out empty beer cans, an empty handgun holster, and a notepad with writing on it, which they took to be the suicide note Case had mentioned to J. H. At that point, however, they saw no sign of Case.
Once the chief came, the officers conferred and decided to enter the house “to render emergency aid.” In the best-case scenario, they hoped to “talk [Case] down” and prevent any injury. But given J. H.’s account, the officers considered as well another possibility—that Case had already shot himself and might be “in there bleeding.” At the same time, they worried that if Case remained unharmed, their entry could spark a confrontation So they equipped themselves with long-barrel guns and a ballistic shield before going in.
The officers entered the house through the front door, about 40 minutes after they first arrived. They announced themselves loudly, and continued to call out as they walked through the home. Case did not answer; he was hiding in the closet of a bedroom upstairs. When one of the officers entered that room, Case threw open the closet curtain and appeared from behind it, holding “a black object” which looked like a gun. Fearing that he was about to be shot, the officer fired his own rifle. The bullet hit Case in the abdomen, and another officer rushed to administer first aid. An ambulance was called to take Case to the nearest hospital (where he recovered). Meanwhile, one of the officers found a handgun in a laundry basket next to the place where Case had stood.
The county attorney charged Case with assaulting a police officer. Case moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the home entry, arguing that the police had violated the Fourth Amendment by coming into his house without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the police officers were responding legitimately to an “emergency.” (cites omitted).
The Court noted at the outset: “The question presented is whether that standard means that officers must have “probable cause” for the intrusion, as they typically would when investigating a crime. We hold it does not… We instead hold just what we have held before: that the officers may enter if, but only if, they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant faces serious danger. Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 400, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650.”
A long held exception to the warrant requirement are those cases where officers make entry into a home where an occupant is in need of emergency aid. Law enforcement routinely responds to calls where an elderly person has not been heard from; suicidal persons; and persons believed to be in medical emergencies. These cases generally do not have a criminal component.
The Court walked though prior opinions where it had reached conclusions that law enforcement entry based on emergency aid was proper noting:
This Court first approved a warrantless home entry to render emergency assistance in Brigham City. There, police officers responding to a noise complaint observed through a kitchen window a physical altercation between an adolescent and several adults. As they watched, the teenager punched one of the adults in the face, “sending [him] to the sink spitting blood.” 547 U. S., at 406, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650. The officers immediately entered the home through a nearby screen door and, announcing their presence, caused the fight to cease. We unanimously approved the warrantless entry as “reasonable under the circumstances.” Ibid. And we explained what made it so: The officers had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant [was] seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” Id., at 400, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650.
Three years later, in Michigan v. Fisher, we reiterated what we had said in Brigham City about the “emergency aid exception.” 558 U. S. 45, 47, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410 (2009) (per curiam). The police in Fisher, also responding to a neighbor’s report, found a scene redolent of violence and danger. Three windows were broken, with the glass strewn on the ground outside; blood was smeared on one of the doors, as well as on the smashed-in hood of a pickup truck in the driveway; and, visible through a window, a man inside the house was “screaming and throwing things” at an unseen target. Id., at 48, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410. We held that the officers’ entry in those circumstances was “reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” just as it had been in Brigham City. 558 U.S., at 48, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410. Using the same standard articulated there, we concluded that the officers had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant of the home needed immediate aid. Id., at 47, 130 S. Ct. 546, 175 L. Ed. 2d 410 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 406, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650).
Finally, in Caniglia, we reaffirmed Brigham City even as we rejected a broader “community caretaking” justification for warrantless home entries. The police had gone to Edward Caniglia’s home after his wife reported that he was suicidal. Caniglia spoke with the officers on his front porch and agreed to go to a hospital for psychiatric testing. Then, once he had left, the officers went inside and took away two handguns he owned. The lower courts approved the entry on the ground that the officers were performing “community caretaking functions.” 593 U. S., at 196, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 209 L. Ed. 2d 604. But we declined to recognize such an “open-ended license” for law enforcement officers to enter private homes. Id., at 199, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 209 L. Ed. 2d 604. Citing Brigham City, we readily acknowledged that officers may enter a home to “render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” 593 U. S., at 198, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 209 L. Ed. 2d 604. But such emergency conditions were indeed necessary and, given the facts, the officers had never tried to defend their entry on that basis.
The Court noted that the probable cause standard that Mr. Case wanted was to restrictive on officers while the reasonable suspicion standard used by the Montana Supreme Court in refusing to suppress the firearm gave the police too much leeway in making entry. Case had argued that officers must have “probable cause to believe and occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.”
In its conclusion the Court noted that the probable cause standard is “peculiarly related to criminal investigations.”
The Court made clear that the emergency aid exception does not give officers a free hand to conduct a search beyond what is reasonably necessary to “deal with the emergency while maintaining the officers’ safety.”
It should be noted that Case argued that that the officers’ decision was improper as it could have provoked a suicide by cop confrontation. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted, “there is no basis for thinking that the officers would have gone into Case’s home just so he could instigate a gunfight… The decision of the officers to enter his home to prevent that result—even at some significant risk to themselves—was (at the least) reasonable… The Fourth Amendment did not require them, as Case now argues, to leave him to his fate.”
The Court concluded: “We repeat today what we have held before: An officer may enter a home without a warrant if he has “an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 400, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650. The officers’ entry satisfied that test. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment (even though not all the reasoning) of the Montana Supreme Court.”
In a concurring opinion agreeing with the result, Justice Sotomayor wrote that there may be cases when officers are dealing with persons who are in a mental health crisis or where a person is suicidal that it may be unreasonable for officers to make entry. Justice Sotomayor noted that there are lower court cases, which she cites, where action by officers escalates, rather than de-escalates the event.
Justice Sotomayor wrote:
Studies show that individuals with serious mental-health conditions are disproportionately likely to be injured and seven times more likely to be killed during police interactions compared to the general population. 2 One report showed that over a 2-year period, “calls for help resulted in law enforcement officers shooting and killing the very people they were called on to assist” in 178 cases. 3 Another study found that police shooting incidents involving behavioral health concerns (suicidal behavior, substance use, or serious mental illness) were 2.1 times more likely to result in fatal injury than other police shooting incidents. 4 Further, individuals with a mental illness were “2.8 times more likely” to “be killed in their own homes” compared to those without a mental illness. 5
Given these risks, in some circumstances it may be more reasonable for officers to try different means of de-escalation before entering [*19] the home of a person experiencing a mental-health crisis. Officers could, for example, attempt to speak with the occupant from a distance or over the phone; contact family, friends, or neighbors to help intervene; call in specialized police units, such as negotiators or officers trained in crisis intervention; 6 or otherwise work with mental-health professionals to approach the occupant. 7 Officers called to respond to these kinds of situations should carefully investigate and assess the nature of the potential crisis and determine whether there is an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the occupant needs emergency aid inside before entering without a warrant. Once the decision is made to enter, moreover, the “manner” of the officers’ entry and their subsequent conduct inside must also be “reasonable.” Brigham City, 547 U. S., at 406, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650.
Justice Sotomayor concluded:
That conclusion, on the facts of this case, does not mean it will always be objectively reasonable for officers responding to a mental-health crisis to make a warrantless entry. A different mix of information might have led to the conclusion that the officers’ entry itself would put the occupant (and officers) at a greater risk of escalation and serious injury. Because the “objectively reasonable basis” test, as reaffirmed by the Court today, demands careful attention to the case-specific risks that attend mental-health crises, and requires officers to act reasonably in response, I join the Court’s opinion in full.
Justice Gorsuch also wrote a concurring opinion that cites to the common law as foundational to Constitutional principles. Justice Gorsuch cited to the fact that generally, even a citizen may “enter another’s house and property in order to avert serious physical harm.”
Points for Law Enforcement:
The emergency aid exception does not require probable cause but instead will require an officer to articulate facts and circumstances leading the officer to an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.
An “Objectively reasonable basis for believing” that an occupant faces serious danger” is more than reasonable suspicion but not probable cause.
In accord with Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, officers should weigh the facts and circumstances on the subject’s condition, i.e. suicidal/mental health crisis, and whether an entry is reasonable given the potential that a violent response may result.
In accord with Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, would de-escalation tactics from outside be a more appropriate response.
In accord with Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, once a decision to enter is made, the manner of entry must also be reasonable.
In accord with Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence, entry based on an exigent circumstance indicating a need to avert serious physical harm is a greater government interest than other forms of exigency.
Author’s note: Case law from around the country has recognized that officers generally have no duty to protect a person from their own suicide. It has also been recognized that an entry may impact the safety of officers due to violent resistance by the subject. As such, part of the tactical decision-making should include the HIPS principle on life/safety priorities:
Hostages
Innocent Persons at Risk
Public Safety Personnel
Subject Who Pose a Threat to Themselves
It is noted that the National Tactical Officers’ Association has added an “E” to the HIPS principle, recognizing that even the subject should not be put at risk of serious harm or death based on the recovery of evidence.
2 See H. Jun, J. DeVylder, & L. Fedina, Police Violence Among Adults Diagnosed With Mental Disorders, 45 Health & Soc. Work 81 (May 2020); A. Saleh, P. Applebaum, X. Liu, T. Stroup, & M. Wall, Deaths of People with Mental Illness During Interactions With Law Enforcement, 58 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 110, 114 (May-June 2018) (Saleh).
3 J. Gerberg & A. Li, When a Call to the Police for Help Turns Deadly, Washington Post, June 22, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ investigations/interactive/2022/police-shootings-mental-health-calls/.
4 J. Ward et al., National Burden of Injury and Deaths From Shootings by Police in the United States, 2015-2020, 4 Am. J. Pub. Health 387, 391-392 (2024).
5 Saleh 114.
6 See id., at 114-115; Brief for American Psychiatric Association et al. as Amici Curiae 18-25 (describing programs that involve sending teams of specially trained police to respond to calls about mental-health crises).
7 Many jurisdictions around the country have introduced programs in which police officers and mental-health professionals jointly respond to calls about mental-health crises. See Policy Research, Inc. & National League of Cities, A. Krider, R. Huerter, K. Gaherty, & A. Moore, Responding to Individuals in Behavioral Health Crisis Via Co-responder Models (Jan. 2020), https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/SJC Responding%20to%20Individuals.pdf (describing “co-responder” programs).