On December 15, 2023, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the United States v. Ramos[i], which serves as an excellent review of the law related to vehicle impounds conducted incident to arrests.
The incident occurred at 11:51 p.m., on February 13, 2022, at the Hop & Sack Convenience Store, where Officer Puentes of the Frederick Police Department received a dispatch regarding a disturbance.
When Officer Puentes arrived, he observed two men, Ramos and Hogan, in a physical altercation. He recognized both men, as the Town of Frederick is a small town, and Officer Puentes grew up there. In fact, the court noted that Officer Puentes knew Ramos and knew Ramos’s mother, which will become important later. He also knew that Ramos’s mother only lived three blocks away from the Hop & Sack, which was about a one-minute drive. Assistant Police Chief Rodriguez arrived on scene to assist Officer Puentes. He also knew Ramos and Ramos’s mother, and the close proximity in which she lived.
Officer Puentes separated Ramos and Hogan and subsequently arrested Ramos for assault, as the investigation revealed that it appeared Ramos instigated altercation. Ramos’s vehicle, a tow truck, was properly parked in a parking space at the Hop & Sack, and the motor was running.
The remainder of facts, taken directly from case, are as follows:
Once Puentes had Ramos in custody, he considered towing or impounding Ramos’s vehicle. Puentes described his decision as “protocol,” meaning “as soon as I arrest someone, and no one is around, I’ll impound their vehicle.” By 11:59 p.m., Puentes decided he was going to impound the vehicle. His decision never changed and was based solely on the fact he had arrested Ramos.
Ramos was driving a tow truck, which was parked on the east side of the Hop & Sack. The Hop & Sack closes at midnight and it was past midnight when Puentes asked Ramos if he needed anything out of his truck. Ramos responded he had everything he needed and indicated the truck belonged to his mother. When Puentes asked if Juanes was home, Ramos shook his head yes. Ramos asked if he could call Juanes to come pick up the truck. Puentes did not answer yes or no to Ramos’s request because his plan was to first check the vehicle’s registration. Puentes never called Juanes, despite admitting he could have obtained her phone number from Ramos. Puentes asked Rodriguez whether he should let Juanes come get the truck. Rodriguez deferred to Puentes, but suggested they first see whether the vehicle registration came back to Juanes. Puentes and Rodriguez were considering releasing the vehicle to Juanes, but needed to see if the vehicle was registered to her because their “protocol” was “to release the vehicle to the registered owner.”
While the officers were discussing whether to release the vehicle to Juanes, Puentes discovered the truck had no license plate displayed. Rodriguez then advised Puentes to call a tow truck. Rodriguez recognized it was Puentes’s call whether to call a tow truck but indicated he was the supervisor on the scene, so he was advising Puentes. When he discovered no license plate was displayed on the truck, Puentes concluded it was irrelevant whether the vehicle was registered to Juanes because it could not be lawfully driven on the roadway without a license plate displayed and, without a license plate, the police could not confirm the vehicle’s registration. Further, Ramos was alone, Juanes was not at the scene, and Puentes suspected Ramos was intoxicated.
Puentes testified he would not leave the truck parked at the Hop & Sack overnight because the FPD would be liable if the vehicle were burglarized or vandalized while Ramos was in police custody. He also indicated the truck’s engine was still running at the time.7 Additionally, Puentes would not leave the truck parked at the Hop & Sack overnight because the store had a posted sign that prohibited parking to non-customers. Puentes believed Ramos was no longer a customer because it was fifteen minutes past midnight and the store closed at midnight. Although Puentes had never towed a vehicle from the Hop & Sack before, he believed it would be the store manager’s decision whether the truck could remain parked there overnight. Puentes had no information indicating Ramos had permission from the store manager to leave his vehicle overnight.
After deciding to impound the truck, Puentes asked Rodriguez to transport Ramos to the jail so he could remain at the scene. As Ramos got into the back of Rodriguez’s patrol car, Puentes asked him about the missing license plate. Ramos indicated it was likely in the truck behind the seat but could also be in his other truck. Puentes looked for the license plate in the truck, eventually finding it behind the passenger seat. Puentes prepared to run a check on the license plate, but he did not put the license plate back on the truck. Puentes testified he had never done that before or heard of a police officer doing so. He also indicated there could be liability issues if an officer were to damage the truck remounting the plate. Puentes called the license plate number into dispatch; the dispatcher advised that the license plate return came back to Ramos’s truck with an expiration date of November 30, 2022. The dispatcher also advised that the insurance was confirmed. The dispatcher did not indicate the vehicle was registered to anyone else besides Ramos.
After Rodriguez and Ramos left in the patrol vehicle for the jail, Puentes obtained a written statement from the store clerk, Jessica Ward. Puentes did not ask for Ward’s permission to tow Ramos’s truck. It was not on his mind, he did not think to ask, and, in his view, it would not have mattered because it would have been up to the store manager whether Ramos could leave his vehicle overnight. Rodriguez, likewise, did not consult with any Hop & Sack employee about leaving Ramos’s vehicle at the store overnight. Rather, he acted based on the store’s posted sign and his past experience in being called out to tow vehicles left in the Hop & Sack parking lot. He testified there have been a few times over the years when someone was arrested and the store personnel did not want the arrestee’s vehicle left on the property because they did not want to be responsible for damages. There had been other times when a vehicle was “abandoned” and the store clerk or manager did not know why the vehicle was left there or who it belonged to, so they called the police to come out and tow the abandoned vehicle. Rodriguez admitted he could not recall a specific instance or specific year in which he was called out to the Hop & Sack to tow a vehicle, or a specific employee with whom he spoke. He further indicated that there has “been a time or two” when an individual left their vehicle overnight with the Hop & Sack’s permission.
Subsequently, Puentes inventoried the contents of the vehicle to ensure the FPD was not liable if something came up missing once the truck left their possession. Puentes estimated he conducted the inventory around 12:25 a.m. This was after he had called the towing company. While conducting the inventory search, Puentes found a loaded M-16 firearm behind the driver’s seat. Meanwhile, as he was being booked into the jail, Ramos received a call on his cell phone. He told the caller to contact Juanes. Juanes arrived at the Hop & Sack after Puentes completed his inventory of the truck, but approximately fifteen minutes before the tow truck arrived. Puentes advised her that the tow truck was enroute and it was too late to cancel the tow.[ii]
The officers characterized the area as “one where there is a significant amount of crime” and “heavy foot traffic.”
Ramos filed a motion to suppress the gun located during the impound and inventory of the truck, arguing that the impound and inventory was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because his mother, who was also a registered owner of the vehicle, could have come and picked up the truck. The district court denied the motion to suppress and held the impound was reasonable. Ramos appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals discussed several legal principles that apply to whether a vehicle impound is lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The legal principles were as follows:
First, an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment exists for vehicle impound under the “community caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement. The court noted that
This exception allows law enforcement to impound an automobile and, in connection with the impoundment, inventory the vehicle’s contents. Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1244-45. Such an impoundment, however, must be based on “something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity,” such as “protecting public safety and promoting the efficient movement of traffic.” Id. at 1245 (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234, 1243 (10th Cir. 2021) (holding that “public safety lies at the heart” of the community-caretaking doctrine).[iii]
Second, the court noted that
[A] community-caretaking impoundment cannot be based on a suspicion or hope evidence of criminal activity will be found in the vehicle. The government has the burden of proving a vehicle impoundment satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1244.[iv]
In other words, an officer cannot impound a vehicle that would not be impounded otherwise solely because the officer hopes to find evidence in the vehicle.
Third, the court of appeals explained that the community-caretaking exception operates differently when the vehicle being impounded is located on private property rather than public property, such as road. The court stated
When the vehicle is located on public property, specifically including streets, roads, and ways, officers have far greater authority to impound. See Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1175; see also generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 37 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1973); United States v. Trujillo, 993 F.3d 859 (10th Cir. 2021). When, on the other hand, police impound a car located on private property, and that car is neither “obstructing traffic or creating an imminent threat to public safety,” a community-caretaking rationale “is less likely to exist.” Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1176, 1178.[v]
Fourth, the court explained that, when the vehicle is located on private property,
[T]his court imposes “heightened requirements on police.” Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1249. To be consistent with the Fourth Amendment, such an impoundment must be “justified by both a standardized policy and a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale.” Id. at 1248. A failure to satisfy either criterion is sufficient to establish that the impoundment, and related inventory search, is unconstitutional. Id. at 1243.[vi]
The court of appeals discussed the requirements of the United States v. Sanders,[vii] and stated that there were two prongs that must be satisfied for a vehicle impound to comply with the Fourth Amendment. First, the impound must be pursuant to a standardized policy. Second, the impound must be non-pretextual and reasonable under the community-caretaking exception. To satisfy the second prong, the court established five factors that should be considered. The five factors to consider are as follows: (1) whether the vehicle was on public or private property; (2) whether the officers consulted the owner of the private property, if the vehicle was located on private property; (3) whether there was an alternative to impoundment that did not threaten public safety or convenience; (4) whether the vehicle is implicated in the crime for which the person is being arrested; and (5) whether the vehicle’s driver or owner consented to the impound.
The court of appeals then examined the facts of Ramos’s case in light the legal principles discussed. The police department had a standardized, department policy regarding vehicle impounds.
The court next examined whether the impound of Ramos’s vehicle was pretextual. A pretextual impound occurs when an officer impounds the vehicle because he has a suspicion that evidence of crime may be found in the vehicle. The court noted that there was “scant” evidence that the impound of Ramos’s vehicle was pretextual. However, the court also noted that that, to comply with the requirements of Sanders, as discussed above, an impound must be non-pretextual and reasonable. To determine if the impound was reasonable, the court must examine the five factors as noted above from Sanders.
The court then examined each factor. The first factor is whether the vehicle was located on public or private property. Here, Ramos’s vehicle was located on private property, particularly, in a parking space on the property of the Hop & Sack Convenience Store. The court noted that
Public safety and convenience are less likely to be at risk when the vehicle is located on private property as opposed to public property.[viii]
The government argued that the vehicle was not located on Ramos’s private property, however, the court of appeals noted that Sanders does not require the vehicle to be on the vehicle owner’s property to apply. Rather, this factor weighs against impounding the vehicle if it is located on any private property. Therefore, the first factor weighed against the reasonableness of impounding the vehicle.
The second factor was whether the officer consulted the property owner. Here, Officer Puentes did not consult the property owner, or even the store clerk, regarding whether Ramos had permission to leave his vehicle parked at Hop & Sack. The officer testified that he did not consult with the owner or clerk because a sign was posted in the parking lot that it was only for customers, and the officer did not consider Ramos a customer after his arrest and after the store closed. However, the court of appeals stated that this did not impede the officer from complying with Sanders and consulting with the clerk on-duty that evening, noting that the officer did speak to the clerk about the altercation but not about the vehicle.
The officer also testified that he did not consult the clerk because his police department policy permitted the impound. However, the court of appeals noted that, while an officer must comply with department policy, the application of policy must still be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment based on the specific circumstance of the case. Therefore, the second factor weighed against the reasonableness of impounding the vehicle.
The third factor was whether there were reasonable alternatives to the impound that did not threaten public safety or convenience. The court of appeals noted that the district court considered that the vehicle did not display a license plate so it could not legally be driven on the streets. However, the court of appeals also noted the plate was found in the vehicle, and a check of the plate showed the vehicle was properly registered and insured to Ramos and his mother. Additionally, the district court considered that Officer Puentes was the only officer working that night so it would be inconvenient to wait on Ramos’s mother to arrive to pick up the vehicle. However, the court noted that Ramos’s mother lived closer than the company that was called to tow the vehicle. Further, Ramos’s mother did come to the scene and arrived prior to the wrecker. Thus, there was no inconvenience or public safety issue created by releasing the vehicle to her. As such, this factor weighed against the reasonableness of the impound.
The fourth factor was whether the vehicle was implicated or involved in the crime for which Ramos was arrested. It was not. Ramos was arrested for assault stemming from a physical altercation in the parking lot. It was unrelated to his vehicle. As such, this factor weighed against the reasonableness of the impound.
The fifth, and last factor, was whether officer had consent of the driver or owner to impound the vehicle. Here, Ramos did not consent to the impound of his vehicle. As such, this factor weighed against the reasonableness of the impound.
The court would typically weigh the factors to determine if some factors should be given more weight based on the circumstances of a particular case, since it is possible that some factors could weigh for, and some against, impound. However, in this case, the court of appeals held that all factors weighed against impound so it was unnecessary to balance the factors.
As such, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] 88 F.4th 862 (10th Cir. 2023)
[ii] Id. at 869-871
[iii] Id. at 867 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. (emphasis added)
[v] Id. (emphasis added)
[vi] Id. at 868 (emphasis added)
[vii] 796 F.3d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 2015)
[viii] Ramos, 88 F.4th at 874 (emphasis added)
