On December 30, 2024, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the United States v. In[i], which serves as an excellent review regarding the use of handcuffs during traffic (or Terry) stops. The relevant facts of In, taken directly from the case, are as follows:
On the evening of March 4, 2020, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) Enforcement Bike Squad Officers Haley Andersen, Daniel Diaz, and Timothy Nye engaged in a traffic stop on bicycle near Las Vegas Boulevard (“the Strip”) in Las Vegas, Nevada. Officers Andersen, Diaz, and Nye saw a car with a taillight out and a California license plate parked in a red-curb no-parking zone about fifty feet from the Strip. In was seated in the driver’s seat of the car. Officer Diaz walked up to the driver’s-side window, requesting In’s driver’s license, registration, and insurance. The encounter was recorded on body cam video from Officer Diaz and Officer Andersen.
While Officer Diaz spoke with In, Officer Andersen shone her flashlight into the interior of In’s car and discovered a Glock on the backseat passenger-side floor of the car. Officer Andersen stated to the other officers that there was a Glock in the backseat, and she told Officer Diaz to tell In to keep his hands up. Officer Diaz ordered In to get out of the car. In started collecting his documents before Officer Diaz told him to stop reaching for anything in the car and to put his hands up. In set the papers down and raised his hands. Officer Diaz then opened the car door, put his hand on In’s wrist, unbuckled In’s seatbelt, and pulled In out of the car.
After In was pulled out of the car, Officer Diaz held In against the closed backdoor of the car while holding In’s hands behind his back. Officer Diaz asked In, “Do you have any weapons on you?” and In said, “No.” Officer Andersen next asked, “There any weapons in the car?” and In said, “No.” Officer Diaz then began patting down In. While In was being patted down, Officer Andersen asked, “Have you ever been arrested,” and In answered, “Yeah, in California.” Officer Andersen then asked, “For what?” and In responded “For marijuana,” to which Officer Andersen said, “What else?” and In responded, “That’s It.”
Officer Diaz then began handcuffing In. While In was being handcuffed, Officer Andersen asked: “You have no weapons in your car?” to which In responded “No.” The handcuffs being used by Officer Diaz made a ratcheting sound, indicating they were being tightened, as Officer Andersen asked “Why is there a Glock back there? You don’t know now?” In said he had left the shooting range, and Officer Diaz responded, “Did you? In some sandals? Do we look new to you?” Officer Andersen told In that he had to answer honestly or he would be in a lot of trouble.
Officer Andersen asked In, “Are you a felon?” to which In responded, “No.” Officer Andersen then asked In if the gun belonged to him, and he responded “Yeah.” Officer Andersen asked, “Why are you so nervous right now?” to which In responded, “Because I didn’t do nothing except sit in my car.” Officer Andersen explained that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop In because he was parked in a red zone for an unreasonable amount of time and had a taillight out. Officer Diaz then walked In, handcuffed, to the curb. Officer Andersen asked, “You never been arrested out here?” and In responded, “No, I’ve never got in trouble in Las Vegas, I never come to Las Vegas.”
Officer Andersen then called LVMPD’s records office from her cell phone to determine whether In had warrants or convictions in Nevada. Meanwhile, Officer Diaz read In his Miranda rights. In asked if he was getting arrested, and Officer Diaz responded, “No, I, we—we like to read you your rights, that way you understand before we go ahead and talk to you.” Officer Diaz asked In what he was arrested for in California, and In responded that he had a grand theft on a person, but that he thought it would no longer be on his record because it had been more than seven years.
While In stood handcuffed on the sidewalk, Officer Diaz asked if they could search the car, and In said “Yeah.” However, when Officer Diaz told Officer Nye that In gave them consent to search the car, Officer Nye stopped Officer Diaz from searching the car, telling Officer Diaz: “Whoa, whoa, whoa, let’s hang on to that, for a second, even if we have consent. He’s in cuffs, right?” Officer Diaz responded, “Yeah, but you still have a firearm, that’s still an officer safety thing,” but Officer Nye shook his head no and rhetorically asked Officer Diaz, “Is he in the car right now? Before we let him go, we can do that, but let’s find out if there’s anything that she,” pointing to Officer Andersen, “finds out before we go in. You hear what I’m saying?”
After several minutes, a fourth officer, Sergeant Leung, arrived in a police car. Officer Andersen had been told by LVMPD’s records office that In did not have a criminal history or active warrants in Nevada. Officer Andersen said to Sergeant Leung, “I’m gonna Triple I him,” referring to a non-routine process used to obtain interstate history records. Sergeant Leung asked if In was prohibited from carrying a firearm, and Officer Andersen said, “that why—I’m Triple-I’ing him, I don’t know yet.” Officer Andersen later testified that she believed running the Triple I check was necessary because In said that he had been arrested in California and was not truthful at points during the encounter.
Using the Triple I check, the officers confirmed that In had prior felony convictions in California. The officers then obtained a telephonic search warrant from a state court judge to search In’s car and recovered the gun.[ii]
In was arrested and subsequently indicted under federal law for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. In filed a motion to suppress the evidence arguing that the initial traffic stop became a de-facto arrest without probable cause when the officer handcuffed him. The district court agreed and granted the motion to suppress. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The issue on appeal was whether the use of handcuffs during In’s traffic stop escalated the encounter from a valid investigative stop to a de-facto arrest.
The court of appeals first examined the legal principles related to this issue. The court noted that there are two categories of seizures by police. The first is a Terry stop (investigative detention), which is the category into which traffic stops are placed. This type of stop requires reasonable suspicion to believe a crime or traffic violation occurred. The second category is a “full scale arrest”, which requires probable cause, at the time of arrest, to believe the person committed a crime.
The court also noted that an investigative detention can transform into a de-facto arrest under some circumstances. If this happens, and the officer does not have probable cause at the time, the seizure is unlawful and can result in suppression of evidence that is discovered as a result of the de-facto arrest. The court stated
To determine whether a Terry stop becomes a de facto arrest, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the “severity of the intrusion, the aggressiveness of the officer’s actions, and the reasonableness of the officer’s methods under the circumstances.” Reynaga Hernandez, 969 F.3d at 940 (citing Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 1996)). When considering the reasonableness of the officer’s methods under the circumstances, we consider whether the officer had “sufficient basis to fear for his [or her] safety to warrant the intrusiveness of the action taken.” United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 2014). This “inquiry is undertaken . . . from the perspective of law enforcement, while bearing in mind that the purpose of a Terry stop is to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The use of “especially intrusive means” of effecting Terry stops has been held permissible in certain circumstances, including:
(1) where the suspect is uncooperative or takes action at the scene that raises a reasonable possibility of danger or flight; (2) where the police have information that the suspect is currently armed; (3) where the stop closely follows a violent crime; and (4) where the police have information that a crime that may involve violence is about to occur.
Reynaga Hernandez, 969 F.3d at 940–941 (quoting Washington, 98 F.3d at 1189 (footnotes omitted)). “Handcuffing as a means of detaining an individual does not automatically escalate a stop into an arrest, but it substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of an otherwise routine investigatory detention and is not part of a typical Terry stop.” Id. at 941 (internal quotation marks omitted). [iii]
The court then applied the facts of In’s case to the legal principles above. The court noted that the use of handcuffs made the traffic stop more intrusive than a typical Terry (or traffic) stop. The court also held that the use of handcuffs was reasonable and did not transform the stop into a de-facto arrest.
The court explained their rationale, first noting Officer Anderson, moments after initiating the stop, observed a gun on backseat floorboard of In’s car. Second, when the officer asked In if there was a gun in his car, In replied, “No.” The fact that In answered this question untruthfully reasonably raised the possibility that the stop could quickly turn “extremely dangerous” because there was an unsecured gun in the vehicle, and the officers did not know In’s background. Third, the safety risk was enhanced because this stop occurred approximately fifty feet from the Strip, which is a very densely populated area. Fourth, the officers were patrolling on bicycles, so they did not have patrol vehicle to use as cover if In reached for the gun. Fifth, because the officers were on bicycles, they could not secure In in a patrol vehicle to prevent his access to his vehicle and the gun; rather, they would have to overpower him if he chose to attempt to grab the gun. The court stated that even though In did not actually reach for his gun, the proper inquiry is “whether officers had a sufficient basis to fear for their safety to warrant the intrusiveness of the actions taken.”[iv]
The court of appeals then held
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the officers had a sufficient and reasonable basis to fear for their safety, justifying their decision to handcuff In so that their safety was assured during their investigation. The officers had good reason to handcuff In to prevent him from being able to access the unsecured gun on the floor of the backseat. The officers were eliminating the possibility that In could gain access to the unsecured gun. That conduct properly protected both the officers and the general public. And this is true even though Nevada is an open carry state. See Nev. Const. art. I, § 11. Because the officers’ conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, the Terry stop did not escalate into a de facto arrest without probable cause.[v]
Thus, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] No. 23-2917 (9th Cir. December 30, 2024)
[ii] Id. at 3-8
[iii] Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 12
[v] Id. (emphasis added)
