EIGHTH CIRCUIT UPHOLDS SEARCH WARRANT OF HOTEL ROOM BASED PRIMARILY ON ODOR OF MARIJUANA EMANATING FROM ROOM

On June 5, 2025, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided United States v. Tate[i], which serves as an excellent review of the law related to probable cause to search a hotel room.  The facts, taken directly from the case, are as follows:

One afternoon in August 2022, Bismarck Police Department Patrol Officer Zachary Collins walked into a local hotel as part of his routine patrol and smelled marijuana in the front entrance. He then “smell[ed] room doors,” going door to door until he “was able to detect an odor of marijuana emitting from [R]oom #118.” After identifying the scent coming from Room 118, he continued down the hall, smelling a few more doors in the area to confirm the marijuana smell was not coming from a nearby room.

Confident that the smell was coming from Room 118, Collins asked a hotel employee to provide him with a guest list. The list showed that Room 118 was being rented to Tate, who had presented a Michigan ID when he had checked into the hotel. Collins had investigated Tate before and knew Tate had a criminal history involving drugs and weapons. Tate’s name did not appear in North Dakota’s identification systems, which meant he could not legally possess marijuana in the state. See generally N.D. Cent. Code § 19-24.1. Collins also learned that Tate had originally booked his room for just one night, but had extended his stay an additional night. Finally, hotel staff told Collins that Tate had specifically requested that he be given a room with a safe and that he had informed staff his safe was not working when he first checked in.

Based on what he had learned, Collins sought a warrant to search Room 118. In his affidavit in support of the search warrant, Collins stated that he had identified Room 118 based on smell—something he had been trained to do. He also included what he had learned about Tate and noted that “it is not uncommon for individuals to come from Michigan to North Dakota to sell illicit drugs,” that “it is not uncommon for these individuals to stay at hotel rooms, extend[ing] their stay day to day,” and that “[i]t is common for safes to be used to store cash, illicit drugs[,] and firearms.” Finally, he briefly summarized Tate’s applicable criminal history and stated  [*681]  his belief that there was probable cause to believe marijuana and related paraphernalia were present in Room 118.

The warrant was issued that evening and executed the following morning. Tate, who had been alone in Room 118, was detained in the hotel lobby prior to the search of the room. Inside Room 118, officers found 2,879 fentanyl pills and more than $15,000 in cash in the safe. They also discovered firearm parts and a postal service receipt of a package shipped to Michigan. Pursuant to department practice, Collins updated his affidavit to include the items discovered during the search and obtained an amended search warrant before seizing the items found.

Tate was charged with three drug-related crimes: (1) conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846, (2) possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 2.[ii]

Tate filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, and the officer exceeded the scope of the warrant.  The district court denied the motion, and Tate pled guilty with the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress.  He filed a timely appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The court first examined whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause.  The court stated

Probable cause exists if, “under the totality of the circumstances, a showing of facts can be made ‘sufficient to create a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.'” United States v. Johnson, 848 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2017)[iii]

The court then explained that the officer’s detection of the smell of marijuana coming from Tate’s room provided “substantial support for the existence of probable cause.”[iv]  The court then discussed numerous prior cases that support the proposition that the odor of marijuana provides probable cause for a search.  The court stated

We have routinely allowed the scent of marijuana to provide a basis for probable cause in the vehicle context. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 955 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 2020) (determining officers had probable cause to search a defendant’s vehicle “because [an officer] smelled marijuana when [the defendant] opened the car door“); United States v. Walker, 840 F.3d 477, 484 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting that the smell of unburned marijuana in a vehicle “provided probable cause to search the car“); United States v. Beard, 708 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The smell of marijuana in a vehicle can establish probable cause . . . .”); United States v. Peltier, 217 F.3d 608, 610 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he smell of marijuana gave the deputy probable cause to search Peltier’s truck for drugs.”). And we have applied the same analysis when the odor emits from an apartment. See Miller v. Sigler, 353 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1965) (noting that an officer’s statement that he detected the smell of marijuana coming from a particular room was sufficient to establish probable cause to search the room). This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s longstanding guidance that the presence of odors “might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive character.” See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948); see also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009) (noting that an officer who smelled burnt marijuana and saw an envelope marked “Supergold,” a name associated with marijuana, had probable cause to conduct a search (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981)[v]

Tate first argued that the smell of marijuana did not provide probable cause in his case because the officer did not have sufficient training to identify the scent of marijuana and to track it to a particular room.  He compared the training and reliability requirements to that of a police canine.  The court of appeals noted that Tate did not cite any case, nor could the court find any case, that required police officers to be subject to the same training standards as police canines for the common scent of marijuana.

The court observed that the officer

attested in his affidavit that he was a “trained and licensed” officer with about eight years of experience who had received training “in the recognition of illicit drugs and drug paraphernalia” and who was “familiar with the odor of marijuana because of [his] training and experience as a police officer.”[vi]

The court concluded that the officer’s training, combined with his eight years of experience, was sufficient to qualify him to detect the scent of marijuana.

Tate also argued that detecting the scent of marijuana is different than tracking the smell from door to door.  To this argument, the court stated

Human experience makes clear that a scent is generally strongest from the place it emanates. See Miller, 353 F.2d at 426-27 (affirming the existence of probable cause based in part on officer’s statement that “he had made several trips to the described apartments and the odor of marijuana was readily apparent outside the door of [the defendant]’s room” (emphasis added)). While pinpointing a smell to a particular room may not always be possible, Officer Collins swore in his affidavit that he successfully identified which room was emitting the marijuana scent, and no reason is offered to doubt his veracity. See id. at 427 (“[W]hen an officer personally states that he detected the odor of marijuana from a particular room in an apartment dwelling, certainly this is sufficient probable cause to issue the requested warrant for a search of the room.”).[vii]

Tate further argued that the lack of discovery of marijuana in his room shows the absence of probable cause.  The court noted that the officer smelled the odor of marijuana at 4:20 p.m. but did not execute the search warrant until 9:35 a.m. the following day. The court reasoned that in that time, the marijuana could have been removed or consumed.

Furthermore, the court noted that the probable cause determination was not made solely upon the detection of the odor of marijuana.  Rather, it was a combination of odor, the fact that Tate travelled from Michigan, specifically requested a safe in his room, extended his stay day-to-day, had a criminal history involving drugs, and was not allowed to possess marijuana in North Dakota.  The court stated

Under the totality of the circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for determining that evidence of a crime would be found in Tate’s hotel room…[viii]

Thus, the court of appeals held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and the district court properly denied the motion to suppress.

Lastly, Tate argued that the officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant during the search.  The court stated

A lawful search warrant “extends to all areas and containers in which the object of the search may be found.” United States v. Saddler, 19 F.4th 1035, 1042 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Because the search warrant here authorized law enforcement to search for “marijuana” and “paraphernalia to ingest marijuana,” it allowed officers “to search in any closet, container, or other closed compartment in the [hotel room] large enough to contain” marijuana or such paraphernalia. See United States v. McManaman, 673 F.3d 841, 848  [*684]  (8th Cir. 2012).[ix]

In Tate’s case, the officer testified the safe was 12-inches long, 12-inches wide, and 6-inches tall.  Thus, the safe is capable of holding marijuana. The court then stated

Once officers were lawfully in Tate’s hotel room with lawful access to the items in the safe, the plain view doctrine permitted them to “seize . . . without a warrant” those items in which the “incriminating character [was] immediately apparent.” See United States v. Class, 883 F.3d 734, 737 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Thus, even if the officers had not sought a second search warrant, they would not have exceeded the scope of the first search warrant in seizing items from Tate’s hotel room because the incriminating character of the items seized—fentanyl, firearm parts, cash, and related accessories—was immediately apparent.[x]

Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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[i]139 F.4th 678 (8th Cir. 2025)

[ii] Id. at 680-681

[iii] Id. at 682 (emphasis added)

[iv] Id.

[v] Id. (emphasis added)

[vi] Id. at 683

[vii] Id. (emphasis added)

[viii] Id.

[ix] Id.

[x] Id. at 684 (emphasis added)