From the United States Supreme Court
Unprovoked Flight and Reasonable Suspicion
In District of Columbia v. R.W.[1] the United States Supreme Court decided a case where strange behavior by the occupants of a vehicle and the conduct of the vehicle’s driver led to reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.
The Court described the facts as follows:
In the wee hours of a winter morning in Washington, D. C., District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officer Clifford Vanterpool received a radio dispatch call directing him to check out a suspicious vehicle at a specific address. Officer Vanterpool reached the apartment building at that address around 2:00 a.m. As he turned his marked police vehicle into the parking lot, he saw two people immediately flee from a car, “unprovoked,” after “[p]olice had not done anything other than simply pull up.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 48a. The runners left open at least one of the car doors. The driver then began to back out of the parking space, rear door still open. Officer Vanterpool decided to investigate. He parked directly behind the car, left his own vehicle, ordered the driver, R. W., to put his hands up, and drew his service weapon.
The stop of R.W. led to the recovery of evidence which in turn led to a number of charges being filed against this juvenile. The charges included, “unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, felony receipt of stolen property, unlawful entry of a motor vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle in the District of Columbia without a permit.”
R.W. sought to have the evidence suppressed before his trial on the charges arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the stop and thus, all of the evidence would be fruit of the poisonous tree. The trial court denied R.W.’s suppression motion citing the information the officer had at the time of the stop. (1) The officer had received a radio call of a suspicious vehicle at a specific address. [what officer heard from dispatch] [Note, the officer found a vehicle at that address [visual observation]. Geographic and time proximity will serve as some corroboration of reporting party- See Navarette v. California]. (2) The officer observed two occupants flee from the vehicle upon his arrival. [visual observation]. (3) It was almost 2 a.m. (4) As Officer Vanterpool began approaching the car, R.W. began backing out of the parking space with one of the rear doors still open. [visual observation]. The trial court denied R.W.’s attempt to suppress the evidence but the D.C. Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and suppressed the evidence. This led to the appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court noted that “Reasonable suspicion ‘depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act’…It permits officers to make ‘commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.’”
The Court noted that it had previously ruled that “unprovoked flight upon noticing the police…is certainly suggestive of wrongdoing.”
The Court noted that here, Vanterpool, after receiving a late-night dispatch about a suspicious vehicle, observed every person in R.W.’s vehicle react “strangely” to the sight of an approaching police vehicle. Two of the occupants fled on foot, and although R.W. “did not run from the car,” “his companions’ flight cast his presence in a suspicious light.” The Court noted that in Maryland v. Pringle, they had “observed that ‘a car passenger…will often be engaged in a common enterprise as the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.”[2]
The Court made clear that while the occupants fleeing from the car were part of the facts and circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion, they were not deciding that simple association with a fleeing suspect from the vehicle was enough to establish reasonable suspicion standing by itself.
The Court noted: “We need not determine whether that connection alone supported reasonable suspicion because R. W. was in the driver’s seat and—after the passengers fled from the car—began backing out of the parking space, ignoring the car’s open back door. For most drivers, it would be a surprising event for their back-seat passengers to exit the car and run headlong away from them. But we doubt that most would respond by putting their car into reverse and attempting to drive away without at least checking whether the doors were closed. R. W.’s own actions—combined with the panicked flight of his companions—strongly suggested that he was (like them) engaged in unlawful conduct he wished to hide from police.”
The Court critiqued the D.C. Court of Appeals’ not taking into consideration facts known to the officer including the radio dispatch that led the officer to be at the location in the first place as well as the occupants fleeing the vehicle. The Court noted that the lower court only considered R.W.’s slight movement of the vehicle and the late hour as facts and circumstances articulated by the officer for reasonable suspicion. The Court asserted that all of the facts and circumstances must be considered and recognized that throughout the Court’s prior decisions it has been recognized that courts should not do a “divide-and-conquer” analysis of the facts known to the officer but instead should recognize that “the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts—especially when the parts are viewed in isolation.”
The Court concluded that based on all the facts and circumstances taken together that were known to the officer, reasonable suspicion existed for the stop of R.W.
Commentary: This case represents several concepts that officers should be aware of. First and foremost is that officers should include all of the facts and circumstances known to them at the time they take any enforcement action. If one considers each fact or circumstance as a drop of water going into a measuring cup that has lines for reasonable suspicion, probable cause, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than ounces or cups, the officer will be in a position of trying to fill the cup to certain lines before taking enforcement action at the various levels.
The officer can use their 5 senses to develop the drops of water [facts and circumstances] to fill the glass.
What did the officer hear from dispatch, witnesses, suspects, or any other source such as a scream, the dropping of a tool, a gunshot, screeching tires or any other relevant sound.
What did the officer see while on the way to the location or upon arrival. As noted seeing things consistent with the facts indicated by the reporting party offers a level of corroboration. Seeing things consistent with criminal behavior through first-hand observation, as occurred here, will be a factor.
In many cases, officers smell things like marijuana, the odor of a dead body, the odor of alcohol, or any other odor the officer can identify that supports an inference the officer is considering.
In some cases, officers may touch things, such as in the case of the plain-touch exception, where, while doing a lawful frisk, an officer touches an item that the officer immediately recognizes as evidence or contraband without making a further intrusion. There are cases where an officer touches the hood of a vehicle to determine whether it has recently been running, based on the heat or lack thereof coming from the hood.
In some, but certainly fewer, the officer may taste something that provides a drop of water for the measuring cup. There are cases, for example, where a restaurant worker has put something into an officer’s food or drink that leads the officer to believe that the food or drink has been tampered with.
Officers should document all of the facts and circumstances that were known to them at the time of the enforcement action and should, when questioned or in testimony, provide the laundry list of facts and circumstances that were known to them at the time. Facts and circumstances taken in isolation may not lead to a justification for enforcement action; however, when all of the facts and circumstances known to the officer, as pointed out by the Court, are put together, enforcement action is proper.
[1] District of Columbia v. R.W., 2026 U.S. LEXIS 1858
[2] Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 at 373 (2003).
