On April 29, 2025, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Thompson v. Richter[i], in which the court of appeals had to decide if troopers were entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly violating the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment by extending a traffic stop to allow for a canine sniff.  The relevant facts of Thompson, taken directly from the case, are as follows:

In the early morning hours of September 23, 2020, Trooper Will Richter pulled over Russell Thompson and Demetrius McChester on Route 287 for speeding. At the time, McChester was driving Thompson’s 2019 Mercedes Benz. Richter approached the vehicle after McChester pulled over and asked for McChester’s license and insurance. After realizing the vehicle was not registered or insured to McChester, Trooper Richter asked Thompson for his license, which Thompson provided. Trooper Richter noticed that the car’s GPS display had the men’s destination set as Memphis, Tennessee.

Trooper Richter then asked McChester to step out of the car, and McChester complied. Trooper Richter proceeded to question the men separately about where they were coming from, where they were going, and what was the purpose of their travel. McChester answered that he and Thompson were cousins, that they went to visit Thompson’s family and friends in California and Las Vegas, and that they were returning to McChester’s hometown of New Boston, Texas. While answering questions, McChester crossed his arms and looked away from Trooper Richter. McChester was wearing shorts and a t-shirt, and the morning was “chilly.” Trooper Richter then moved to the car to question Thompson. Thompson stated that the men were coming from Las Vegas, where they had stopped to visit his friends. Thompson also told Trooper Richter that he had lived in New Boston all his life, but that he was licensed in Georgia because he “used to operate semi-trucks for a living.” At this point, the stop had been ongoing for approximately ten minutes.

Trooper Richter requested their consent to search the vehicle, which they denied. He returned to his squad car and called dispatch. On the call, Trooper Richter stated that the men’s stories were similar but inconsistent. Richter called Trooper Mark Strange and asked that he bring his K-9 to the scene to conduct a free-air sniff of the vehicle. Trooper Strange arrived about 26 minutes later. His K-9 began the free-air sniff and alerted to the presence of drugs in multiple areas of the vehicle. Troopers Richter and Strange searched the cabin of the car, which smelled of marijuana, and allegedly found a dispensary receipt. When searching the trunk, Trooper Strange found a loaded handgun.

Trooper Richter returned to his squad car and checked Thompson’s criminal record. The search showed Thompson had a felony conviction, so Richter arrested him for being a felon in possession of a firearm. A few days later, the charges were dropped due to a post-conviction reduction of Thompson’s offense to a gross misdemeanor.[ii]

The plaintiffs, Thompson (the vehicle owner) and McChester (the driver), sued Trooper Richter and Trooper Strange for violating their rights under the Fourth Amendment by impermissibly extending the traffic stop for a canine sniff, illegally searching the car without consent or a warrant, and for arresting Thompson.  The district court ultimately granted qualified immunity to Trooper Richter and Trooper Strange, and the plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

In order to defeat the troopers’ motions for qualified immunity, the plaintiffs must establish (1) that the troopers violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment, and (2) that the law was clearly established such that every reasonable officer would have known they were violating the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.  The law is “clearly established” when there is precedent that is factually similar enough to put a reasonable officer on notice that his conduct violates the constitution, and the precedent was decided prior to the incident at issue or when the facts of the incident are an “obvious violation” of the constitution.

The court then examined whether Trooper Richter is entitled to qualified immunity for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment by subjecting Thompson and McChester to an unlawful seizure when he extended the length of the traffic stop to wait for a canine officer to arrive to conduct a sniff of the vehicle.

The plaintiffs did not dispute the initial validity of the traffic stop for speeding.  Rather, they argued that the stop became unlawful under the Fourth Amendment when Trooper Richter extended the length of the stop to investigate crimes unrelated to speeding, the reason for the stop.

The court of appeals first noted that

The Supreme Court has stated that “[authority for the seizure] ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Id. This means that a detention should “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, unless further reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, emerges.” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507.[iii]

When Trooper Richter first approached the plaintiffs’ vehicle, he asked them where they were headed, where they were coming from, and why they were traveling.  Regarding these questions, the court of appeals stated

An officer “may also ask about the purpose and itinerary of the occupants’ trip as part of this investigation, because . . . these questions [are] reasonably related in scope to his investigation of the circumstances that caused the stop.” United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010)[iv]

In light of the above rule, the court of appeals held that the initial questioning did not amount to an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

Next, the court of appeals examined the additional twenty-six-minute detention waiting on the canine unit to arrive to conduct a sniff.

The court of appeals stated that to detain the plaintiffs beyond the normal traffic stop, the trooper must have reasonable suspicion that “something illegal [is] afoot.”[v]  The court also noted that it did not matter that the trooper did not have “direct evidence that suggested the [plaintiffs] were carrying contraband.”[vi]

The court of appeals then listed several circumstances where they have previously held officers had sufficient reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop.  Specifically, the court stated

In the context of an extended traffic stop, we have held that many factors can reasonably create suspicion:

Trooper Richter stated that he based his decision to detain the plaintiffs for the case on the following observations: (1) the plaintiffs were travelling on a known drug corridor in the early morning hours; (2) the plaintiffs claimed they were going to New Boston, Texas, but the destination on the vehicle’s GPS was Memphis, Tennessee; (3) the vehicle had temporary tags; and (4) McChester “displayed multiple signs of evasiveness” when he answered questions.

The court of appeals, rather than deciding if Trooper Richter had sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain the plaintiffs an extra twenty-six-minutes, focused on whether the law was “clearly established” such that a reasonable officer would have known he was violating the Fourth Amendment with the extended detention.

The court of appeals examined the precedent offered by the plaintiffs as they argued the law was clearly established, but they held all the cases cited were distinguishable from the plaintiffs’ case.

For example, the plaintiff cited the United States v. Santiago,[viii] in which the Fifth Circuit held that

[T]he driver and occupant’s “nervousness and conflicting statements” alone were insufficient to justify searching the car for narcotics. 310 F.3d at 342.

The court of appeals also examined Weisshaus v. Teichelman, in which the court of appeals held that

[T]he officer had reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop and conduct a K-9 search when the “[a]ppellant was short with his responses to questions about his travel plans, (2) [he] had a[n out of state] driver’s license and was traveling on I-40, a known drug corridor, (3) with a female that appeared to be considerably younger than him, and (4) had no familial relation to him.” 2024 WL 620372, at *3. Not only did the officer observe the parties’ uneasiness and inconsistent stories, but he was aware of their location on a drug corridor and had not dispelled his suspicions about their diverging answers to his questions.[ix]

Thus, Santiago involved only nervousness and conflicting statement and was deemed insufficient; however, Weisshaus involved short responses to questions, travel on a drug corridor, and a considerably younger female passenger and this was held to be sufficient to detain for a canine.  As such, the court of appeals held that the law was not clearly established such that a reasonable officer would have known the extended detention violated the Fourth Amendment.  Therefore, the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity.  Further, the holding on this issue negated the need to decide the plaintiffs’ other issues because they were based on the premise that the extended detention was illegal.  [Note: The court of appeals did not decide whether or not the detention violated the Fourth Amendment.]

 Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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[i] No. 24-10837 (5th Cir. April 29, 2025 Unpublished)

[ii] Id. at 1-4

[iii] Id. at 10 (emphasis added)

[iv] Id. at 11 (emphasis added)

[v] Id. at 12

[vi] Id.

[vii] Id. (emphasis added)

[viii] 310 F. 3d 336 (5th Cir. 2002)

[ix] Thompson at 15-16 (emphasis added)