On May 30, 2023, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Watkins v. Bigwood[i], in which the court examined whether the police were entitled to qualified immunity for conducting an involuntary mental health committal on a man that was singing an anti-gay song with violent lyrics in a public park. The relevant facts of Watkins are as follows:
On the morning of December 15, 2014, Watkins arrived at John Mullin Park in Lauderhill, Florida, and began his usual routine. He was living out of his car at the time, and he visited the park every day to make breakfast and work on his legal cases. While he did those things, he would regularly and repeatedly sing the song “Boom Bye Bye,” by reggae artist Buju Banton, an “anti-gay” song with lyrics describing if not advocating violence against gay people, including shooting them in the head.
As Watkins sang the anti-gay song by his car on December 15, two joggers-Tanika Beckford and Jermaine Jackson-went past on the park’s walkway, about 60 feet from his location. Jackson stopped and asked if Watkins was speaking to him. Watkins said “no” and that he was singing a song, and the joggers went on their way. Watkins continued to sing the same song as they came around a second time. Jackson stopped again and began walking toward Watkins and cursing at him. Watkins continued singing. Jackson then attempted to physically attack Watkins but was restrained by Beckford. Watkins continued singing as the two joggers walked away, still cursing at him. Beckford later called the police.
Three police officers-Sergeant (now Lieutenant) Michael Bigwood and Officers Samuel Ramos and Thomas Yopps responded to a 911 dispatch to Mullins Park regarding a report of a man shouting anti-gay slurs and making threats toward joggers in the park. Bigwood and Ramos spoke with Beckford, Jackson, and Watkins. Yopps was present as backup but did not participate in the questioning or the decision to invoke the Baker Act.
Beckford and Jackson reported to the officers that Watkins began yelling about shooting gay men in the head as they jogged passed him. Jackson said that, as he jogged past, Watkins’s yelling grew louder and he appeared unstable. Beckford said she saw Watkins make a stabbing motion in the air with a knife as he yelled at them. Both Beckford and Jackson stated that they feared for their safety.
When questioned by Ramos, Watkins admitted singing “Boom Bye Bye.” Ramos testified that, after he thanked Watkins for his cooperation, Watkins “reacted angrily,” which seemed “irrational an[d] unreasonable” to Ramos. Bigwood then questioned Watkins, who admitted that he possessed two knives in his car, but he denied having a knife in his hand or waving it around. As Watkins spoke with Bigwood, Ramos observed Watkins’s “behavior vary from calm to angry, without warning or explanation.” Bigwood likewise made this same observation. For his part, Watkins called these statements “lies” and said that he “reacted normal” and was “coherent” and “calm and collected” while speaking with the officers. As we must at summary judgment, we credit Watkins’s account of his demeanor during this interaction.
After Watkins refused Bigwood’s offer to have a voluntary mental-health examination, Watkins was handcuffed and transferred to the Florida Medical Center for an involuntary mental health evaluation under Florida’s Baker Act, Fla. Stat. § 394.463. 1 Watkins remained at the Florida Medical Center until his release on December 19, within the 72 hours permitted under the Baker Act.
Watkins later submitted a complaint against Ramos and Big-wood arising out of the events on December 15, 2014, but the Lauderhill Police Department’s Professional Standards Unit found that the officers acted in an “appropriate and justified manner based upon their training and experience.[ii]
Watkins filed suit and alleged that the officers and their respective municipalities violated his rights under the First and Fourth Amendment. The district court granted qualified immunity for the officers and summary judgment for the cities. Watkins appealed dismissal of his suit to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals first discussed qualified immunity. An officer who is engaged in discretionary act, such as deciding whether conduct an involuntary committal, is entitled to qualified immunity. In order to defeat the officer’s qualified immunity, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test. First, the plaintiff must show that the officer violated his constitutional rights. Second, the plaintiff must show that the law was clearly established “such that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating” the plaintiff’s rights.[iii]
The court of appeals then set out to examine Watkins’ claims.
- Fourth Amendment Claim
Watkins’ first claim was that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing him for an involuntary mental health committal without sufficient probable cause. The court of appeals stated
To be reasonable, a custodial seizure must be supported by probable cause. Id.; see Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Mental-health seizures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the officer has probable cause to believe that the seized person is a danger to himself or to others.”). Even if probable cause is lacking, officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they have arguable probable cause. Carter v. Butts Cnty., Ga., 821 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir. 2016).[iv]
Arguable probable cause exists when another reasonable officer in the same situation could believe that probable cause was present, even if a court later determines that actual probable cause was not present.
The court then set out to examine whether the officers had arguable probable to detain Watkins pursuant to Florida’s Baker Act. The court of appeals examined the Baker Act and noted
Florida’s Baker Act permits police officers to take a “person who appears to meet the criteria for involuntary examination into custody” and deliver the person to a mental-health facility. Fla. Stat. § 394.463(2)(a)2. As relevant here, the criteria are met if there is “reason to believe that the person has a mental illness and because of his . . . mental illness . . . [t]here is a substantial likelihood that without care or treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm to himself . . . or others in the near future, as evidenced by recent behavior.” Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1).[v]
Therefore, arguable probable cause is present if “a reasonable officer, knowing the information the officers possessed, could have believed that probable cause existed to involuntarily commit Watkins.”[vi]
The court also noted that, because a person might need treatment, standing alone, is not sufficient to justify an involuntary committal. Specifically, the court stated
That an individual might need treatment for a mental illness alone is insufficient to justify involuntary commitment. Id.; Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 983, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). So too are “[v]ague notions about what a person might do-for example, a belief about some likelihood that without treatment a person might cause some type of harm at some point.” Khoury, 4 F.th at 1126.
The court of appeals then examined facts relevant to the issue of whether a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause was present, which is considered arguable probable cause, and is sufficient to make the officers entitled to qualified immunity.
The court noted the relevant facts as follows: (1) a witness, Jackson, told the police that Watkins began yelling, unprompted, about shooting gay men in the head as Jackson jogged past him; (2) Watkins’ appeared unstable; (3) Beckford, another witness who was with Jackson, reported that Watkins made a stabbing motion in the air with a knife as he yelled at them; and (4) Watkins admitted the police that he possessed two knives in his car.
The court of appeals then held
Based on the witness reports of Watkins engaging in threatening and intimidating behavior towards passing joggers while holding a knife, plus Watkins’s own confirmation that he possessed two knives, a reasonable officer possessing the same knowledge as the defendants could have believed that Watkins appeared to meet the criteria for involuntary examination.[vii]
Watkins disputed the accounts of Jackson and Beckford regarding his conduct. However, the court of appeals noted that officers can rely on witness accounts, even if it later is learned that the witnesses were mistaken or lying. The court stated
[A]lthough Watkins disputed the joggers’ accounts, and even assuming the joggers were lying, officers may rely on alleged victims’ statements as support for probable cause, Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998), and they are not “required to sift through conflicting evidence or explanations or resolve issues of credibility when assessing probable cause,” Huebner v. Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1188 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). When evaluating qualified immunity for a Fourth Amendment claim, what matters is “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” not necessarily what the actual facts may have been. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015).[viii]
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of qualified immunity for the officers.
2. First Amendment Claim
The court of appeals then examined Watkins’ First Amendment claim. Watkins argued that he was taken into custody because he was exercising his First Amendment rights when he was singing the offensive song. The court noted that for a plaintiff to properly state a claim for a First Amendment retaliatory arrest,
[A] plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected speech; (2) the defendant’s conduct adversely affected his protected speech; and (3) a causal connection exists between the adverse conduct and the protected speech. Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005).[ix]
The court also noted that
The presence of probable cause will typically invalidate a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.[x]
The only exception to the above rule occurs when the plaintiff provides objective evidence that shows that other people engaged in similar conduct but not engaged in the same protected speech were not arrested. The court stated
A narrow exception to the requirement for a plaintiff to establish the absence of probable cause applies “when a plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019).[xi]
The court of appeals also stated that this exception did not apply in Watkins’ case. Furthermore, the court stated that protected speech, as part of the totality of the circumstances, can be a legitimate consideration in the probable cause determination. For example, in Watkins’ case, the protected speech to which he referred involved threats of violence, coupled with Watkins stabbing motion with a knife in the air as the joggers approached, provided the officers arguable probable cause to believe the requirements of the Baker Act were satisfied.
Therefore the court of appeals affirmed the grant of qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim.
3. Municipal Liability Claim
The court then considered the claims against the city. The court of appeals noted
In general, a municipality is not liable under § 1983 for constitutional injuries inflicted by its employees unless the injury was caused by a custom or policy of the municipality. See Monellv. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). “Only those officials who have final policymaking authority may render the municipality liable under § 1983.” Hill v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1150, 1152 (11th Cir. 1996).[xii]
Watkins argued that because the officers had the discretion to make determinations under the Baker Act, they had final, policy-making authority. The court of appeals stated that that Watkins was incorrect on this theory. Specifically, the court of appeals stated
Under Florida law, police chiefs have final policymaking authority in their respective municipalities for law enforcement matters. Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1222 (11th Cir. 2005). “[T]he mere delegation of authority to a subordinate to exercise discretion”-to make a Baker Act determination, for example-“is not sufficient to give the subordinate policymaking authority.” Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 792 (11th Cir. 1989).[xiii]
For the officers to have final, policy-making authority, their decisions cannot be restricted by department policy and must not be subject to review. In this case, the officers were obligated to follow department policy and their decisions were subject to review. For example, the department investigated the complaint that Watkins made and determined that the officers acted properly. As such, the court held the officers were not policy-makers.
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the city.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] No. 22-10875 (11th Cir. Decided May 30, 2023)
[ii] Id. at 2-4
[iii] Id. at 7
[iv] Id. (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 8 (emphasis added)
[vi] Id.
[vii] Id. at 10 (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. a 10-11 (emphasis added)
[ix] Id. at 12 (emphasis added)
[x] Id. (emphasis added)
[xi] Id. (emphasis added)
[xii] Id. at 14 (emphasis added)
[xiii] Id. (emphasis added)
