On December 1, 2022, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided J.I.W. v. Dorminey[i], in which the court examined whether a school resource officer was entitled to qualified immunity when he used an arm-bar, which resulted in a broken arm on a disorderly student.  A summary of the relevant facts of J.I.W. is as follows:

J.I.W., a thirteen-year-old middle school student at the time of the incident, had a history of psychological issues, having been hospitalized several times for psychological disorders. One afternoon, J.I.W. entered a classroom, informed his teacher he did not take his medication, and proceeded to act disruptively. The teacher instructed him to leave the classroom. J.I.W. moved into the hallway where the situation escalated, and J.I.W. refused to yield to educators’ requests that he go to the principal’s office. Two teachers, one guidance counselor, and one administrator tried to calm J.I.W. to no avail. J.I.W.’s behavior prompted an administrator to radio the school resource officer, Blake Dorminey, who arrived moments later.

Dorminey witnessed J.I.W. speaking with an administrator. J.I.W. then punched a locker and moved in the administrator’s direction. Dorminey grabbed J.I.W. by the arm and attempted to calm him down. Over the next thirty seconds, J.I.W. pulled away from Dorminey four times. Dorminey used three increasingly forceful “wristlock” maneuvers, each of which J.I.W. forcefully resisted. On the third try, J.I.W.’s arm “popped,” and the two went to the ground. J.I.W. hit the ground and began writhing and screaming in pain. Dorminey applied handcuffs. After the incident, J.I.W. underwent two surgeries to repair his broken arm.[ii]

J.I.W. filed suit and alleged that SRO Dorminey violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by using unreasonable, excessive force.  J.I.W. also filed state law claims that will not be discussed in this article. SRO Dorminey filed a motion for qualified immunity and the district court denied the motion.  SRO Dorminey appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The court of appeals first discussed qualified immunity.  An officer who is engaged in discretionary act, such as deciding what type of force to use during an arrest or detention, is entitled to qualified immunity.  In order to defeat the officer’s qualified immunity, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-prong test.  First, the plaintiff must show that the officer violated his constitutional rights.  Second, the plaintiff must show that the law was clearly established such that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating the plaintiff’s rights.  The law can be clearly established by court precedent that is similar enough to the case at hand to give an officer fair warning that his conduct violates a persons rights.  The case law must typically come from the U.S. Supreme Court, the applicable federal circuit appellate court, here the Eleventh Circuit, or the highest appellate court in the state in which the incident occurred.  Additionally, if the conduct is so egregious that any reasonable officer would have known the conduct violated a person’s rights, the law is considered clearly established because of its “obvious clarity.”

The court of appeals next set out to determine the correct legal standard to use when evaluating a use of force in a school environment.  Normally, uses of force are evaluated under the “objective reasonableness” standard of the Fourth Amendment.  The lead Supreme Court case on use of force is Graham v. Connor, in which the Court stated

[T]he main question is whether “the force used by a police officer” is “reasonably proportionate to the need for that force.” Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1198 (applying Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989)).[iii]

However, in the school environment, the Supreme Court case, New Jersey v. T.L.O.[iv] is typically used to evaluate whether a search or seizure of a student was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  The Eleventh Circuit discussed T.L.O. and stated

In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court held that “the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.” 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985) (emphasis added).

As the Court explained in T.L.O., the reasonableness of a search is a two-part inquiry: we must “first . . . consider whether the action was justified at its inception,” and then ask “whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. (cleaned up). In the search context, an initial search is justified when “reasonable grounds” suggest that a student violated “either the law or the rules of the school.” Id. at 342. And at step two, a search is reasonable “when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Id.[v]

The court of appeals noted that, regarding evaluating a use of force, there was not much difference between each standard, as both standards “consider the initial justification for the force and measure the officer’s actions against the need” for force.  The court then stated

[W]e adopt the two-part test promulgated by T.L.O., with Graham guiding our analysis when necessary.[vi]

However, since J.I.W. did not contest the reasonableness of the detention, the court does not need to evaluate the first part of T.L.O., which is whether the initial detention of J.I.W. was justified at its inception.

Therefore, the issue before the court of appeals was whether SRO Dorminey’s use of force against J.I.W. was so unreasonable that it violated clearly established law.

The court of appeals examined the facts relevant to the issue above.  First, SRO Dorminey witnessed J.I.W. aggressively punch a locker and turn toward Principal Hinson in an aggressive manner, with his shoulders back, fists clenched and chest out in the direction of Hinson.  Hinson’s and other witnesses’ statements corroborated Dorminey’s account.  Second, after witnessing the punch to the locker and aggressive move toward Hinson, SRO Dorminey merely grabbed J.I.W. by his arm and moved him away from Hinson.  Third, J.I.W. then tried to pull away from Dorminey.  Dorminey warned J.I.W. that if he did not stop, he would place J.I.W. in handcuffs.  J.I.W. continued to pull away.  Fourth, Dorminey attempted two wristlocks on J.I.W. in an attempt to control him and handcuff him. Fifth, on the third, more aggressive wristlock attempt, as J.I.W. continued to actively resist, J.I.W.’s arm broke, he was placed on the ground, and handcuffed.

The court of appeals then examined court precedent relevant to the issue in the case and stated

Because J.I.W. was resisting, J.I.W. cannot point to a materially similar precedent nor establish that the violation was obvious enough to defeat Dorminey’s qualified immunity defense. We have held that an officer violates a non-resisting detainee’s rights by using force to apply handcuffs. See Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) (a “gratuitous use of force when a criminal suspect is not resisting arrest constitutes excessive force“) (emphasis added); see also Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419-20 (11th Cir. 1997) (affirming the denial of qualified immunity where an officer broke a plaintiff’s arm by handcuffing him although the plaintiff was not resisting). But, when holding that force used to carry out handcuffing was excessive, we have expressly acknowledged the plaintiff’s lack of resistance. Smith, 127 F.3d at 1419-20.[vii]

In summary, the court of appeals noted that in all cases where an officer was held to have used excessive force during handcuffing, the suspect was not resisting arrest.  In contrast, based on witness statements and video of the incident, J.I.W. was actively resisting SRO Dorminey’s efforts to handcuff him.  J.I.W. was not able to cite any cases where a suspect was resisting arresting in a manner similar to the manner in which he resisted arrest and an officer was found to have committed excessive force by using a forceful wristlock in order to effect handcuffing.

The court of appeals also examined whether, in the absence of precedent, this was a case of obvious clarity regarding excessive force.  The court stated

J.I.W. also cannot establish that Dorminey’s conduct was unlawful under the “obvious-clarity” test. To meet this standard, an officer’s conduct must be so severe that every reasonable officer would have known the conduct was unlawful. Gray, 458 F.3d at 1307 (citing Evans v. Stephens, 407 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Our precedents do not indicate that handcuffing a resisting detainee is obviously unlawful. In fact, they establish the opposite. Handcuffing is a de minimis use of force. See Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2019) (“We have applied the de minimis force principle to handcuffing and granted officers qualified immunity in a series of cases.”). This is because handcuffing “carries with it the right to use ‘some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof,’ and ‘the typical arrest involves some force and injury.'” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002)). J.I.W. successfully resisted Dorminey’s wristlock two times. In response, Dorminey applied more force until he overcame J.I.W.’s resistance. Not every reasonable officer in Dorminey’s position would have believed that, in the face of such resistance, the force he used was unreasonable.[viii]

Thus, based on the court precedent discussed, the weight of authority points to the use of force being reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  However, the court of appeals decided the case by holding that the law was not clearly established that the forceful wristlock and takedown was in violation of the Fourth Amendment, when conducted on a resisting middle school student.   This was sufficient to grant SRO Dorminey qualified immunity.

Additionally, the court of appeals also discussed the takedown after J.I.W.’s arm broke and stated

The same can be said of Dorminey’s action of forcibly taking the resisting J.I.W. to the ground. It was not clearly established at the time of the incident that taking a physically resistant middle schooler to the ground to carry out handcuffing was unconstitutional. To be sure, our decisions make clear that applying force to an already handcuffed and under control detainee can be excessive. . . the line between reasonable and excessive force is marked by the resistance of the detainee and the potential threat posed to the arresting officers. For that reason, those authorities do not apply here. J.I.W. resisted Dorminey all the way to the ground.[ix]

As such, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court, and SRO Dorminey was granted qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment excessive force claims.

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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Citations

[i] No. 21-12330 (11th Cir. Decided December 1, 2022 Unpublished)

[ii] Id. at 1-2

[iii] Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added)

[iv] 469 U.S. 325 (1985)

[v] J.I.W. at 13 (emphasis added)

[vi] Id. at 15 (emphasis added)

[vii] Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added)

[viii] Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added)

[ix] Id. at 21 (emphasis added)