WHEN THE HARASSER ISN’T THE BOSS: ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIES SUPERVISOR LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII

On July 24, 2026, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Harding v. Seminole Cnty. Sheriff,[i] in which the court of appeals examined whether a sheriff is liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964[ii], based on vicarious liability, when a lieutenant, who worked in a different division of the sheriff’s department, allegedly sexually harassed a jailer.  The facts, taken directly from the case, are as follows:

David Harding became a detention deputy employed by the Seminole County Sheriff’s Office in October 2022. He held certifications as a detention deputy and as a deputy sheriff, but he was sworn in only as a detention deputy, and his work was confined to the jail.

Late in the evening on December 16, 2022, when Harding was off duty, he received a video call from Charles Albrecht, a lieutenant in the sheriff’s office’s law enforcement division. Albrecht was wearing a woman’s wig, makeup, and women’s lingerie and told Harding that he was sexually attracted to men. Albrecht hoped that because Harding was openly gay, he would help Albrecht with “obstacles that [he was] having with coming out.” He also told Harding that he was interested in him sexually. According to Harding, Albrecht told Harding that if Harding had sex with him, Albrecht would “put in a word to get [him] out of the jail and onto the road” (in other words, transferred to the law enforcement division). Harding told Albrecht he “felt uncomfortable,” and Harding “tried getting off the call.”

After the 15-to 20-minute video call ended, Albrecht sent Harding a pornographic video of himself with a text message reading, “This is what I want you to do to me.” The next day Albrecht texted Harding, “Apologies for being so forward last night,” and Harding responded that his “apology was accepted” and that he was “here for [Albrecht] as a friend,” but that he was “not comfortable with the conversation.” Harding testified that he just wanted to “put the situation to rest” and avoid “creat[ing] waves” for himself at work. Harding related that after the video call, “[t]here was an instance where [he] ran into [Albrecht]” at work, and Albrecht gave him a look that was “not a comfortable look.” Harding did not immediately report Albrecht’s behavior to the sheriff’s office, but he did eventually file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sometime between February 18 and May 24, 2023. When the sheriff’s office learned of the incident, it terminated Albrecht’s employment.[iii]

It is noteworthy that Harding did not report the incidents involving Albrecht until February 2023, which was when Harding was terminated for misconduct that was unrelated to Albrecht.

Harding filed suit against Sheriff Lemma under Title VII for sexual harassment based on the actions of Lieutenant Albrecht.  The district court granted the sheriff’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims.  Harding appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.  [Note:  This article will not discuss the claims brought by Harding related to the incident that led to the termination of his employment.]

On appeal, Harding’s sexual harassment claims were based on two grounds, specifically, (1) hostile work environment and (2) quid pro quo sexual harassment.

The court first examined the hostile work environment claim.  The court stated, in this type of claim, the plaintiff must show that

(1) [t]he employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based upon sex; (4) the harassment complained of was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment; and (5) [there is] a basis for holding the employer liable.  Wilcox v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 892 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotations omitted).[iv]

The court of appeals also explained that to satisfy the fifth element – the basis for holding the employer liable – the plaintiff must provide evidence that the person that committed the sexual harassment was the plaintiff’s supervisor.  If the person that committed the sexual harassment was not the plaintiff’s supervisor, to hold the employer liable, the plaintiff must show that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt action to stop the harassment.  The court also explained what is meant by the term “supervisor” and stated:

An employee is a supervisor when “the employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim . . . , such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassign[ing] with significantly different responsibilities, or [making] a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”  Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 186 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2013) (quotations omitted).[v]

The court of appeals then noted that Harding did not make a proper showing that Lieutenant Albrecht was his supervisor.  In fact, the court observed that Harding testified that Albrecht was in a different chain of command and there was no evidence that Albrecht had the power to “take tangible employment actions against” Harding.  Further, evidence showed that Harding stated that Albrecht told him that he could “put in a word to get him out of the jail and onto the road.”  Recommending a transfer is not the same as having the power to actually make the transfer happen.  Thus, Harding failed to establish that Albrecht was his supervisor.

Harding also argued that Lieutenant Albrecht gave him a false impression that he had supervisory power over him, or in other words, he had “apparent authority” over him.  The court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court has previously stated

[T]hat generally “a supervisor’s harassment involves misuse of actual power, not the false impression of its existence.” 524 U.S. 742, 759, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998); id. at 759-60 (“When a party seeks to impose vicarious liability based on an agent’s misuse of delegated authority, the . . . [‘]aided in the agency relation[‘] rule, rather than the [‘]apparent authority[‘] rule, appears to be the appropriate form of analysis.”). While the Court left open the possibility that “in the unusual case,” a plaintiff might “allege[] there is a false impression that the actor was a supervisor, when he in fact was not,” it noted that the false impression “must be a reasonable one.” Id. at 759.[vi]

Thus, the general rule is that the person must have the “actual power” of a supervisor rather than giving the false impression of such power.  However, the court left open the possibility of a false impression creating liability, but noted that false impression must be reasonable.  Here, the court found that it was not reasonable for Harding to have such a false impression regarding Albrecht’s power.  The only explanation provided by Harding for the false impression was that Albrecht was “high ranking” and was “on track” to be promoted to captain.  The court stated that no precedent supports Harding’s reasoning as a basis for vicarious liability.

Since Lieutenant Albrecht was not Harding’s supervisor, the only other way for Harding to advance his sexual harassment claim is to show that Sheriff Lemma “knew or should have known” of the harassing conduct and failed to take prompt remedial action.  There are two ways a plaintiff can make this showing.  First, the plaintiff can show that the sheriff knew about the harassment at issue because the plaintiff complained to management about the conduct.  Second, the plaintiff can show that the “harassment was so severe and pervasive as to create an inference of constructive knowledge.”

Examining the first method, specifically that Harding made a complaint to management, the evidence shows that Harding did not make such a complaint until after he himself was fired for misconduct unrelated to the sexual harassment.

Regarding the second method, specifically that the harassment is severe and pervasive such that it infers constructive knowledge, the evidence showed that after the initial incident of harassing conduct, Harding only referenced one instance where Albrecht allegedly “ran into” Harding and gave him a look that made Harding uncomfortable.  The court stated “a single uncomfortable look does not constitute pervasive harassment.”

The court also considered Harding’s quid pro quo claim, noting that the Supreme Court has stated the new terminology is a “tangible employment action” claim.  Specifically, the court stated

As for Harding’s quid pro quo claim, the Supreme Court has instructed that the term “quid pro quo” “should no longer be used in the analysis of whether an employer is liable under Title VII,” so we instead “use[] the preferred term ‘tangible employment action’ to refer to harassment that culminates in a discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1245 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 141 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1998)). “An employer is liable under Title VII if it (even unknowingly) permits a supervisor to take a tangible employment action against an employee because [he] refused to give in to his sexual overtures.” Id. at 1245. Because “co-workers cannot take employment actions against each other,” plaintiffs may bring Title VII claims based on tangible employment actions only based on harassment by a supervisor. Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 508 (11th Cir. 2000). [vii]

Here, because Albrecht was not Harding’s supervisor, the “tangible employment action” claim also fails.

Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the sheriff regarding the sexual harassment claims.

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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[i]2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 22068 (11th Cir. 2026) (Unpublished)

[ii] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)

[iii] Harding, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 22068 at 2-5

[iv] Id. at 9

[v] Id. at 10-11

[vi] Id. at fn. 3

[vii] Id. at 13-14