On July 2, 2024, the Court of Appeals of Georgia decided the State v. Caldwell[i], in which the court examined whether a deputy unreasonably extended the duration of a traffic stop by questioning the driver about marijuana. The relevant facts of Caldwell are as follows:
On April 9, 2021, Deputy Reece of the Cherokee County Sheriff’s Office initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle after observing that the driver was not wearing his seatbelt. Deputy Reece approached the vehicle and made contact with Daniel Murray, the driver, and Caldwell, who was seated in the front passenger’s seat. As Deputy Reece requested Murray’s and Caldwell’s driver’s licenses, he noticed that Murray’s hands shook “uncontrollably.” Deputy Reece noticed that the car had an out-of-state license plate, so after he obtained the driver’s licenses, he asked them if they were Georgia residents, and Murray said that he and Caldwell had recently relocated to Georgia from Indiana. Deputy Reece asked Murray whether marijuana was legal in Indiana and whether he had “anything in the car.” He then asked Murray for consent to search the vehicle, and Murray replied, “if you want to,” which all occurred less than two minutes after the traffic stop. Deputy Reece asked Murray about his “pot” sunglasses that apparently had depictions or drawings of marijuana on them, when he had last “smoked weed,” and whether there was a marijuana “roach” in the car. Deputy Reece, however, did not detect any odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. Murray then reached into the front console of the vehicle and handed a roach to Deputy Reece. Deputy Reece removed Murray from the vehicle, and Murray informed Deputy Reece that he was a convicted felon, that he had a firearm in his possession, and that there was a warrant for him from Indiana. Deputy Reece retrieved a firearm from Murray’s waistband, secured the firearm in his patrol vehicle, and requested that Caldwell exit the vehicle, which all occurred within five minutes of the traffic stop. At roughly five minutes into the traffic stop, Deputy Reece went to his vehicle and provided dispatch with Murray’s and Caldwell’s driver’s licenses and the serial number for the firearm, and he entered information into a computer for roughly five minutes. Approximately 11 minutes after the beginning of the traffic stop, Deputy Reece searched the vehicle and recovered a firearm and Xanax pills from Caldwell’s purse. The video footage shows that the search of Caldwell’s purse occurred before dispatch provided a response to Deputy Reece with information regarding Murray and Caldwell.[ii]
Caldwell was subsequently indicted for possession of a firearm while in commission of a felony and a violation of the controlled substances act, under Georgia law. Murray was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Caldwell, the passenger, filed a motion to suppress the gun and drugs found in her purse and argued that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop when he questioned the driver, Murray. [Note: Because Caldwell’s other arguments were not relevant to the appeal, they will not be discussed.]
The trial court granted Caldwell’s motion to suppress and held that the deputy unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop when he asked questions about marijuana use, possession and for consent to search. The State appealed the grant of the motion to suppress to the Court of Appeals of Georgia.
The issue on appeal was whether the deputy unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop by asking questions about marijuana use and possession and for consent to search.
The court first examined the legal principles related to this issue and stated
It is axiomatic that a police officer who observes a traffic violation is authorized to conduct a traffic stop of the vehicle in question.” (Citation omitted.) Rush v. State, 368 Ga. App. 827, 831 (2) (890 SE2d 883) (2023). “Moreover, when police make a traffic stop, as a practical matter, not only the driver of the stopped vehicle but also any passengers are detained during the stop and are considered ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Williams, 264 Ga. App. 199, 201 (590 SE2d 151) (2003). “Once a valid traffic stop has been effected, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the officer from unreasonably prolonging the stop beyond the time required to fulfill the purpose of the stop without a reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity.” (Citation omitted.) Rush, supra, 368 Ga. App. at 831-832 (1). And “[t]he United States Supreme Court has held unequivocally that the Fourth Amendment does not allow even a de minimis extension of a traffic stop beyond the investigation of the circumstances giving rise to the stop.” (Citations omitted.) Hill v. State, 360 Ga. App. 683, 686 (1) (859 SE2d 891) (2021). Therefore, activities unrelated to the mission of the traffic stop must not extend the time of the stop at all, and such a prolongation of the stop is not permissible even if those activities are done in the middle of the stop. Thus, if an officer clearly diverts from conducting his traffic investigation to carry out a task unrelated to the mission of the stop, the traffic stop is unreasonably prolonged. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McNeil v. State, 362 Ga. App. 85, 89 (866 SE2d 249) (2021).[iii]
Here, the court of appeals observed that the deputy stopped the vehicle because of the occupant’s failure to wear seatbelts, and he obtained Murray and Caldwell’s driver’s licenses. He then immediately asked whether marijuana was legal in Indiana, whether he had anything in the vehicle, for consent to search the vehicle, when he had last smoked marijuana and if there was a “roach” in the vehicle. The court noted that, at this point, the deputy had not begun to check the status of the licenses and had not begun to write the citation. The deputy also stated that he did not detect the odor of marijuana in the vehicle.
The court of appeals also noted that they have previously held similar extensions of a traffic stop to be unreasonable. Specifically, in McNeil v. State, they held that
[A] police officer unlawfully prolonged traffic stop for following too closely where officer abandoned the task of writing a citation and instead questioned the defendant about her candle business.[iv]
Additionally, in Nunnally v. State, they held that
[An] officer unreasonably prolonged a traffic stop where he abandoned the investigation into a vehicle’s registration and detained the passengers of the vehicle to search for drugs.[v]
Based upon the above, the court of appeals held
[I]t is clear that after initiating the traffic stop for the seatbelt violation, [the deputy] clearly diverted from his investigation of the traffic stop and instead pursued to question Murray about marijuana, a matter entirely unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop. Therefore, the traffic stop was prolonged beyond the time necessary to fulfill the mission of issuing a citation for the seatbelt violation.[vi]
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to suppress.
Practice Pointer:
If an officer wants to question a person detained in a traffic stop about matters unrelated to the reason for the stop and/or ask for consent to search, the officer should do so while the traffic stop is being actively pursued. For example, the Court of Appeals contrasted Caldwell’s case with Betancourt v. State, in which officers sought consent to search and asked questions unrelated to the traffic stop, which was for a window tint violation, as they awaited NCIC and GCIC returns regarding driver’s license and warrant status of the driver and passengers. The court held that this did not unreasonably prolong the stop because the stop was being “actively pursued,” since they were awaiting information from dispatch.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] A24A0037 (Ga. App. July 2, 2024)
[ii] Id. at 2-4
[iii] Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 8-9 (see McNeil v. State, 362 Ga. App. 85, 89 (866 SE2d 249) (2021))
[v] Id. at 9 (see Nunnally v. State, 310 Ga. App. 183, 186-187 (2) (713 SE2d 408) (2011))
[vi] Id. at 8
