On January 23, 2025, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Moore v. Oakland Cnty.[i], which is instructive regarding the use of soft-empty-hand control tactics with a non-compliant, driver during a traffic stop. The relevant facts of Moore, taken directly from the case, are as follows:
On May 8, 2020, Glorianna Moore drove her car to deliver a Dunkin’ Donuts order to a DoorDash customer in Pontiac, Michigan. Officer Brian Wilson noticed that she was going 50 miles per hour in a 35 mile-per-hour zone. He stopped her. Wilson’s dashcam and Moore’s phone camera captured the next three minutes.
Wilson approached the driver-side window and greeted her: “What’s up, man?” R.40-4 at 1:27. Seeing “some type of card in her hand,” R.40-3 at 51, he held his palm out and said, “Your license,” R.40-4 at 1:31. Moore responded: “What am I getting stopped for? What am I getting stopped for? I don’t have to give you my license.” R.40-4 at 1:33-1:35. Moore recoiled and moved her hands “towards the center console area . . . where [Officer Wilson] could not see” them. R.40-3 at 56-57.
Wilson tried to remove Moore from her vehicle. Telling her, “you’re coming out [of] the car,” he tried to open the driver-side door from the exterior handle, which was locked. R.40-4 at 1:37. He reached through the window to grab Moore’s arm and “control her hands.” R.40-3 at 61. At the same time, Wilson ordered Moore to “Shut the car off.” R.40-4 at 1:37-1:42. She did not agree to turn off the car. R.40-4 at 1:42-1:45. Moore leaned away and loudly objected, “No I don’t. Get off of me. Get off of me.” R.40-4 at 1:38-1:41.
Things escalated. Wilson opened the door from the inside and grabbed Moore’s arm. Moore pulled out her phone to capture the encounter. She began yelling that Wilson had “grabbed on [her] arm,” “Get off of me,” and “Help,” as she thrashed her arm and body to twist away from him. R.48-25 at 0:10-0:20. Wilson called for backup. Attempting to control the situation in the interim, he pulled Moore’s arm out of the car with one hand and held her neck down with the other. R.40-4 at 2:05-2:11. He repeatedly exclaimed “Stop” and “Relax.” R.40-4 at 2:08-2:20. That did not work. Moore continued to struggle against Wilson’s grip and continued to scream. She protested that he “didn’t tell [her] what [she] was pulled over for.” R.40-4 at 2:27-2:29.
Two officers arrived a minute later. The three officers together handcuffed Moore and escorted her into Wilson’s patrol car. According to Officer Wilson, they found an “off white rocky substance” in Moore’s car that tested positive for cocaine. R.40-2 at 7. Prosecutors charged her with possessing cocaine, obstructing a police officer, and driving without a license. When a more thorough lab test revealed that the substance was not cocaine, the prosecutors dismissed all of the charges.[ii]
Moore then sued the three officers and Oakland County for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the county and everyone except Officer Wilson, the officer who initiated the stop and reached in Moore’s car. Officer Wilson appealed the denial of qualified immunity to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court began by discussing the principle of qualified immunity, which shields government officials from suit when they do not violate clearly established law. Specifically, the court stated
Qualified immunity spares officers from “the time, expense and risk of money-damages actions” unless they violate clearly established constitutional rights. Hagans v. Franklin Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 695 F.3d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 2012). To overcome the defense, Moore must show that (1) the officers violated a “constitutional right” and (2) the right was “clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). The second question readily resolves this case, making it unnecessary to decide the first one. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009).[iii]
Thus, to overcome an officer’s qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that (1) the officer violated their constitutional rights, and (2) the law was clearly established.
The court of appeals explained what “clearly established” means in the context of qualified immunity. Specifically, the court stated
In identifying clearly established rights, the Supreme Court warns lower courts against defining them “at a high level of generality.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011). The claimant must show that the right’s contours were “sufficiently clear” such that “every reasonable official would have understood” that the officer’s actions violated it. Id. at 741 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)). That usually means the claimant must identify a case with facts “similar enough that” it “squarely governs this one,” Lee v. Russ, 33 F.4th 860, 863 (6th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted), what amounts to “on-point caselaw that would bind a panel of this court,” Bell v. City of Southfield, 37 F.4th 362, 368 (6th Cir. 2022).[iv]
The court also noted that there are issues to resolve to determine if Officer Wilson is entitled to qualified immunity.
First, the court must determine if it was clearly established it would violate the Fourth Amendment for Officer Wilson to reach into Moore’s car and grab her arm after she refused to provide her driver’s license and moved her hands towards the center console.
Second, the court must determine if it was clearly established that Officer Wilson violated the Fourth Amendment when he held her arm and held her head down for two minutes when she failed in an attempt to escape his grasp and screamed at him.
With those issues in mind, the court next examined the relevant legal principles and stated
An officer may stop a motorist if he has probable cause of a civil traffic infraction or reasonable suspicion of a crime. Cruise-Gulyas v. Minard, 918 F.3d 494, 496 (6th Cir. 2019). Because “roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous,” officers may take measures to protect themselves. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). An officer may order the motorist to exit the vehicle. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977) (per curiam). An officer may frisk the driver and search the passenger compartment for weapons if he reasonably believes that the motorist is armed and dangerous. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50. And an officer may use a reasonable amount of force to conduct the stop. Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95.[v]
The focus of this case is what constitutes reasonable or unreasonable force. Regarding unreasonable force, the court noted
With respect to the use of reasonable force, officers may not subdue a “non-violent, nonresisting, or only passively resisting suspect” with physical force such as tasing, pepper-spraying, or beating them. Smith v. City of Troy, 874 F.3d 938, 945 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Passive resistance, such as merely failing “to exit a vehicle,” “does not justify” that degree of force. See Browning v. Edmonson County, 18 F.4th 516, 527 (6th Cir. 2021).[vi]
For example, the court of appeals discussed Smith v. City of Troy and stated that they held it was excessive force when a man, who was having an epileptic seizure, moved his arm away from an officer, and the officer used a leg sweep to place the man face down on the ground and then landed on top of the man, who was giving minimal resistance. The court also examined Saalim v. Walmart, where an illegally parked driver verbally refused to give the officers his driver’s license. The court of appeals held it was excessive force to attempt to “wrench” him out of the vehicle, then order him out at Taser point and shove him against the vehicle after he exited, and then Tase him when he turned to face the officer.[vii]
Regarding reasonable force, the court noted
An officer may use force to restrain someone who actively resists by physically struggling with police, threatening them, resisting handcuffs, or acting erratically. Browning, 18 F.4th at 527. If an arrestee “kick[s], flail[s], and wriggl[es] away” from an arresting officer’s grasp, see Roell v. Hamilton County, 870 F.3d 471, 482-83 (6th Cir. 2017), or “repeatedly pull[s] his left arm away” from an officer’s handcuffs, Bell, 37 F.4th at 368, officers may use a taser to restrain him.[viii]
The court then applied the legal principles and precedent discussed to the facts of Moore’s incident.
- The Initial Contact with Moore
The court of appeals then examined Officer Wilson’s initial contact with Moore. This occurred when Moore refused to produce her driver’s license and then moved her hands towards the center console, out of view of the officer. The court first noted that he used “far less force” by grabbing Moore’s arm, than the officers that “tased, pepper-sprayed, and beat” passively resistant suspects who did not pose a threat to the officer. Rather, the court noted that Moore did pose a threat to the officer. Specifically, Moore refused to provide her driver’s license in violation of law, moved her hands toward the center console out of view, and failed to turn off her car. The court of appeals stated
A reasonable officer could conclude that, taken together, these factors amounted to active resistance and warranted the modest step of grabbing her arm.[ix]
Thus, the court of appeals held that it was reasonable for Officer Wilson to initially reach into Moore’s car and grab her arm.
- Holding Moore’s arm and neck down as she pulled away, flailed and screamed at the officer
The court of appeals next examined whether Officer Wilson’s holding Moore’s arm out of the car and neck down after she pulled away from him to escape his grasp and screamed at him was reasonable. Officer Wilson held her in that position, as she was seated in her car, for approximately two minutes as he awaited back-up to assist in safely removing Moore from the vehicle and handcuffing her. The court stated
When Moore began screaming and twisting her body to escape Officer Wilson’s hold, that made his hold all the more reasonable. As before, he used far less force than in comparable cases in which the officers violated the Fourth Amendment. And as before, Moore actively resisted by trying to “flail[] and wriggl[e] away” from Wilson. Roell, 870 F.3d at 482. Her flailing and out-of-control yelling justified a hold to prevent her escape and to move her to Wilson’s patrol car. See United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2001).[x]
Moore argued that she did not reach toward the center console until after the officer grabbed her arm. Her only support was that the video did not show this action, however, that was out of frame of the officer’s body camera. The court noted that she offered no testimony to support her argument. However, the court of appeals noted that the officer supported his statement with an incident report, sworn deposition testimony, and sworn courtroom testimony. Thus, Moore’s argument failed.
The court of appeals then held
Officer Wilson’s efforts, in contrast, fairly amount to a reasonable officer’s “split-second judgment[]” in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances to use some force to stop or arrest a suspect. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.[xi]
As such, the court of appeals reversed the decision reversed the decision of the district court, and Officer Wilson was entitled to qualified immunity.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
___________________
[i] No. 24-1563 (6th Cir. January 23, 2025)
[ii] Id. at 1-3
[iii] Id. at 4 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added)
[vi] Id. at 7 (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. (citing Saalim v. Walmart, 97 F.4th 995 (6th Cir. 2024))
[viii] Id. at 8 (emphasis added)
[ix] Id. at 9
[x] Id. (emphasis added)
[xi] Id. at 12
