On December 28, 2023, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided the United States v. Tiller[i], which serves as excellent review of the law related to reasonable suspicion to believe person is involved in drug dealing. The relevant facts of Tiller are as follows:

At about 6:00 p.m. on October 29, 2019, Corporal Young of the Bay County Sheriff’s Office was looking for Travis Shutes based on a federal warrant. Corporal Young was in an unmarked car in the area of a bar and liquor store called Foghorn’s that Shutes was known to frequent. Foghorn’s was the location of past fights, and complaints of drug use and drug sales. Shutes also was the only suspect in a recent strong-arm robbery at Foghorn’s.

While surveilling the property, Corporal Young noticed defendant Tiller walking around the parking lot, sitting and talking briefly with people in their cars, and driving in and out of the parking lot. Corporal Young did not know either Shutes or Tiller, but had a digital picture of Shutes. From his location across the road, a distance of about 200 feet, Corporal Young believed Tiller looked similar to Shutes, and notified his shift supervisor that he had spotted Shutes in Foghorn’s parking lot.

Based on his experience observing drug deals, Corporal Young also believed defendant Tiller’s activities in the parking lot were consistent with drug dealing. Corporal Young explained that these transactions are quick, with the individuals first meeting up to negotiate a deal. The drug dealer then retrieves the product and brings it back so the transaction can take place.

Because Corporal Young believed that defendant Tiller was Shutes and that he was engaged in drug activity, Corporal Young decided to make contact with him. As Tiller drove away and returned to the parking lot once more, Corporal Young pulled in behind Tiller’s car. As he did so, Corporal Young saw a passenger exit Tiller’s car. Corporal Young did not try to speak to or stop the passenger because as the sole deputy there, doing so would not have been safe.

Corporal Young walked up to defendant Tiller’s car, and Tiller rolled his window down “just slightly.” Corporal Young introduced himself as an investigator with the Bay County Sheriff’s Office and explained that he was investigating Tiller’s suspicious activity that he believed involved drug transactions. Corporal Young asked Tiller for his identification. Tiller appeared agitated and refused to produce his identification several times. Corporal Young spent several minutes attempting to calm Tiller down.

While Corporal Young talked with Tiller, a second officer arrived and requested a K-9 unit to respond to the scene. At that point, Tiller produced his identification. Corporal Young entered Tiller’s driver’s license number into his car computer and learned that the license was valid. At that point, Corporal Young realized Tiller was not Shutes.

Nonetheless, Corporal Young continued to investigate the suspected drug activity by Tiller that he had witnessed. Corporal Young ran Tiller’s identification through state and national crime databases to research his recent criminal history and began filling out a field interview card to document his contact with Tiller. As he was doing so, the K-9 unit arrived and gave a positive alert on Tiller’s car. Corporal Young estimated that the K-9 unit arrived six minutes after being requested and that the entire encounter with Tiller from first contact to the drug dog’s alert lasted ten minutes at most.

Subsequently, in Tiller’s car, officers found bulk amounts of crack and powder cocaine, smaller plastic baggies of individually packaged drugs, a digital scale, and a firearm and ammunition.[ii]

Tiller filed a motion to suppress the evidence and argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him because he did not look like Shutes, because Shutes was actually in custody at the time of the stop and because the officer failed to observe a hand-to-hand transaction.  The district court held that the officer’s testimony was credible and denied the motion to suppress.  Tiller was convicted by jury.  He subsequently appealed the denial of his motion to suppress to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

On appeal, Tiller only argued that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him for the investigation.

The Eleventh Circuit then noted the standard of review they must follow regarding factual or credibility determinations.  Specifically, unless the factual or credibility determinations of the district court are clearly in error, they must accept the determination of the district court.

The court then examined the legal principles relevant to the issue of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Tiller.  The court stated

Reasonable suspicion “is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000). “Reasonable suspicion may ‘be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.'” Gonzalez-Zea, 995 F.3d at 1303 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125). However, because “at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop” is required, the law enforcement officer “must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-24 (quotation marks omitted).

To determine whether reasonable suspicion existed, we look to the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Bautista-Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009). “We may not consider each fact only in isolation, and reasonable suspicion may exist even if each fact alone is susceptible of innocent explanation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).[iii]

Simply put, reasonable suspicion requires a lower standard of proof than probable cause, and it is based on the totality of the circumstances; even facts with innocent explanation when viewed alone, can, in the totality of the circumstances amount to reasonable suspicion.

The court then discussed various circumstances where the court has found sufficient reasonable suspicion.  The court stated

Some circumstances that may support a finding of reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop include: (1) an officer’s observation of conduct consistent with street-level, hand-to-hand drug transactions, even without witnessing an actual exchange; United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2009), (2) a person’s presence in a “high crime area” known for drug dealing and drug use; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, and (3) a person’s nervous, evasive behavior. Id. A person’s physical resemblance to a known felony suspect may also support reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985) (“[I]f police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.”).[iv]

With the legal principles and precedent in mind, the court of appeals examined the credibility determination of the district court.  The district court determined that the officer was credible, and the court of appeals determined that the decision of the district court was not in error.

The court then evaluated whether the totality of the circumstances provided the officer with sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Tiller.

First, the court noted that the officer believed that Shutes was still wanted for a federal warrant and at-large.  Second, the court noted that the area around Foghorn’s was known for both drug sales and drug use.  Third, Shutes was known to be involved this type of activity.  Fourth, the officer observed Tiller, whom he believed was Shutes, engage in activity that appeared consistent with drug sales.  Specifically, the officer testified that

[H]e saw Tiller walk across the parking lot, to and from his car to other people’s cars, briefly talk with people inside their cars, and then drive away in his own car and return a short time later.[v]

The officer testified that, based on his experience investigating drug activity, this “pattern of movement was consistent with street-level drug dealing…”[vi]  The officer further explained that the dealer first will negotiate the deal, then leave to get the drugs, and later return to complete the transaction.  Tiller argued that the officer never observed a hand-to-hand transaction.  The court of appeals stated

It was not necessary for [the officer] to see Tiller make a hand-to-hand exchange to reasonably suspect him of drug dealing. See Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d at 1313-14.[vii]

The court of appeals then held

Tiller’s actions consistent with hand-to-hand drug dealing in and around the Foghorn’s parking lot, an area known for drug dealing, coupled with Corporal Young’s belief that Tiller resembled Shutes, a known felony suspect who frequented the area, created reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Tiller and investigate whether he was in fact Shutes and whether he was engaged in drug dealing.[viii]

Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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Citations

[i] No. 23-10613 (11th Cir. Decided December 28, 2023 Unpublished)

[ii] Id. at 1-4

[iii] Id. at 8 (emphasis added)

[iv] Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added)

[v] Id. at 11-12

[vi] Id. at 12

[vii] Id. at 13 (emphasis added)

[viii] Id.