On November 17, 2023, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Argueta v. Jaradi[i], in which the court of appeals examined whether it was reasonable for an officer to shoot a fleeing suspect who made a furtive movement indicative of being armed or reaching for a weapon. The relevant facts of Argueta are as follows:
On June 25, 2018, Argueta and his girlfriend, Mary Ann Luna, drove to a convenience store in Galveston around 3 a.m. According to Luna, Argueta intended to buy a cigar. While Argueta was inside the store, Jaradi and his partner, Officer Matthew Larson, drove into the store’s parking lot. Luna indicated that the police officers were “looking at [Argueta] like . . . something was wrong,” and, when Argueta returned to the car, Luna told Argueta that the officers were “looking at [him] crazy.” While Luna denies that Argueta talked to anyone in or outside the store besides a store employee, the officers indicate that Argueta spoke to a woman outside the store whom Jaradi suspected of being a prostitute. Argueta and Luna drove off shortly after the officers pulled into the parking lot. While Jaradi testified that Argueta sped off at a “really high rate of speed,” Luna said that Argueta’s car left “super slow[ly].”
The officers initially lost sight of Argueta’s car after it left the parking lot, but later, while patrolling the area, they saw the vehicle drive through an alleyway. The officers contend that Argueta’s headlights and taillights were off and that Argueta rolled through several stop signs. Around this time, Jaradi turned on the patrol car’s dashboard camera (“dashcam”). By the time the dashcam video footage begins, Argueta’s lights are turned on while the car was in motion. The video also indicates that the vehicle stopped, at least momentarily, at all stop signs, and moved at a moderate speed. The patrol car followed Argueta for a few blocks before the officers turned on the emergency lights. Argueta continued driving for roughly two blocks and then pulled over.
The video shows that Argueta quickly exited the car, turned his left side towards the officers, and ran toward a vacant lot across the street. Argueta’s right arm and hand were not visible in the dashcam footage because Argueta kept his right arm pressed against his side and ran in a direction where only his left side was visible to the officers; his right arm and hand were also not clearly visible in the officers’ body-camera (“bodycam”) footage as they were obscured, blurry, or—at times—apparently pressed down on the right side of Argueta’s body. Argueta’s apparent concealment of his right hand from Officer Jaradi’s view—by pressing his right hand near his right hip with the core of his body between him and Jaradi—made Jaradi concerned that he could not, if necessary, react with his handgun in time to stop an attack.
Approximately five seconds after Argueta exited his vehicle, Jaradi fired two shots at Argueta, both of which struck Argueta and caused Argueta to fall to the ground. There is no audio accompanying the bodycam footage until Jaradi shoots.
Seconds later, the officers set their flashlights on Argueta, who was laying on his back in the empty lot. The bodycam footage shows a black pistol in Argueta’s right hand. The officers direct Argueta to drop the weapon and roll over onto his stomach. A few seconds later, Argueta complied, revealing the gunshot wounds on his back.
Shortly after the shooting, the officers called for Emergency Medical Services and backup. Two minutes later, additional officers arrived on the scene. They handcuffed Argueta and started administering medical aid until EMS arrived and transported Argueta to the hospital. Argueta was pronounced dead at 3:42 a.m.[ii]
Argueta’s estate filed suit against Officer Jaradi for wrongful death and alleged that Officer Jaradi used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he shot Argueta. The officer filed a motion for qualified immunity and the district court denied the motion. Officer Jaradi appealed the denial of qualified immunity to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court first discussed qualified immunity and stated
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from civil damages liability when their actions could reasonably have been believed to be legal.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The qualified-immunity inquiry has two parts. First, we ask whether the facts, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . show the officer’s conduct violated a federal right.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 188 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2014) (alterations adopted) (quotation marks and citation omitted). And second, we ask “whether the right in question was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged violation, such that the officer was on notice of the unlawfulness of his or her conduct.” Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 451 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Once an officer pleads qualified immunity, it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish that the officer violated the plaintiff’s clearly established federal rights. Estate of Davis v. City of North Richland Hills, 406 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2005).[iii]
Thus, to defeat an officer’s motion for qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show (1) there was a constitutional violation and (2) that the law was clearly established such that every reasonable officer in the same situation would have known he was violating the person’s rights.
The court then examined the legal principles related to the use of deadly force and how these rules relate to qualified immunity. The court noted the following legal principles:
[1] An officer’s use of deadly force is not unreasonable when the officer has reason to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the officer or to others. Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 2003). [iv]
[2] The reasonableness of the use of deadly force “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). [v]
[3] In so doing, the “court must ‘ask whether the law so clearly and unambiguously prohibited [the police officer’s] conduct that every reasonable [police officer] would understand that what he is doing violates [the law].'” Vincent, 805 F.3d at 547 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). [vi]
[4] If reasonable public officials could differ on the lawfulness of the defendant’s actions, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th Cir. 1990).” [vii]
[5] Determining whether the force used was objectively unreasonable “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of [the] particular case,” including “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Trammell v. Fruge, 868 F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) [viii]
Next, the court of appeals discussed the factual disputes that caused the district court to deny qualified immunity. When there are disputes of material facts, summary judgment, and qualified immunity are not appropriate because the appropriateness of those remedies depends upon the material facts that are in dispute, and a jury is required to ultimately determine facts. Further, at this stage of the litigation, the court is required to view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff unless the plaintiff’s version of events is contradicted by video evidence.
The factual disputes that were cited by the district court in denying qualified immunity were as follows:
(1) whether Jaradi could see that Argueta held a weapon;
(2) whether Argueta’s flight posed any risk to the officers or the public;
(3) whether Argueta raised the gun or otherwise made a threatening motion towards the officers; and
(4) whether either officer warned Argueta before firing.[ix]
However, the court of appeals noted that the second dispute, whether Argueta’s flight posed a risk to the officers, was actually a question of law in that it required the court to determine if it was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe Argueta posed a risk to their safety. Therefore, the court did not consider this a factual dispute.
The court of appeals then examined the dash camera and the body camera videos of the incident with Argueta. The court observed that Argueta fled his vehicle in a way that concealed the right side of his body, right arm, and right hand. The body camera video is also filmed from the officer’s chest rather than the perspective of his eye level. At no point does the video give a clear view of the firearm before or when the officer used deadly force, and, as such, a reasonable jury could conclude that Argueta’s weapon was not visible to the officer prior to or at the point of his use of deadly force. Additionally, the video showed that Argueta kept his right arm pressed against his body, which suggests that he was “trying to conceal his right arm and hand from officers.” However, the video does not show Argueta pointing or raising the gun. Thus, the video is not able to clarify the factual disputes cited by the district court.
Therefore, the court stated
Because a genuine dispute of fact exists as to this issue, we must take the facts in the light most favorable to Argueta and assume that Jaradi could not see that Argueta was armed before Jaradi used deadly force. Accordingly, each of Jaradi’s cases in which a gun (or apparent gun) was visible to police prior to their use of deadly force is facially inapposite. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Bastrop, 26 F.4th 709, 711 (5th Cir. 2022); Garza v. Briones, 943 F.3d 740, 743 (5th Cir. 2019); Ramirez v. Knoulton, 542 F.3d 124, 126-27 (5th Cir. 2008). Instead, we must look to cases where police officers confronted an individual whose actions suggested that he or she possessed, and might in that moment access, a firearm.[x]
The court of appeals then examined each factual dispute noted by the district court.
1. Whether the officer could see a gun
The court of appeals then set out to determine if the first factual dispute, whether the officer could see a gun, mattered or was material to summary judgment and qualified immunity.
The court discussed four cases where officers used deadly force against a person who made movements as if they were reaching for a weapon, but no weapon was actually seen by the officers.
First, the court of appeals discussed Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, in which a police officer shot Salazar in the back after a traffic stop where he “did not comply with commands and suddenly reached toward his waistband which was covered by an untucked shirt.” [xi] The Fifth Circuit stated
Although Salazar was later found to be unarmed, the officer—at the moment he fired—perceived Salazar’s combination of movements to be consistent with Salazar retrieving a weapon from his waistband. Id. We held that the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable, citing the following circumstances: “Salazar’s resistance, intoxication, his disregard for [the officer]’s orders, the threat he and the other three men in his truck posed while unrestrained, and Salazar’s actions leading up to the shooting (including suddenly reaching towards his waistband).” Id. at 279 (emphasis in original).[xii]
Second, the court of appeals discussed Batyukova v. Doege, in which Batyukova, who failed to comply with commands, was verbally aggressive and, instead of showing her hands, reached her hand behind her back toward her waistband.[xiii] The deputy shot her, and it was later determined that she did not have a weapon. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the deputy’s grant of summary judgment (dismissing the case) because she refused to follow commands, faced the deputy and reached for her waistband, as if reaching for a weapon.
Third, the court examined Manis v. Lawson, in which Manis “ignored police commands to show his hands,” and “reached under the seat of his vehicle and then moved as if he had obtained the object he sought.”[xiv] The Fifth Circuit held
[T]he officer’s use of deadly force did not violate Manis’s Fourth Amendment rights, reasoning that such force is reasonable when a suspect “moves out of the officer’s line of sight such that the officer could reasonably believe the suspect was reaching for a weapon.” Id. (collecting cases); accord Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, 564 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Young v. City of Killeen, 775 F.2d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1985); Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1991) (both involving a refusal to comply with police commands coupled with reaching under a car seat during a traffic stop).[xv]
In contrast to Salazar, Batyukova, and Manis, the court also examined Poole v. City of Shreveport, in which Poole led police in a low-speed vehicle pursuit. Poole eventually stopped, exited his truck and reached into the truck bed. An officer shouted, “show me your hands!” The dashcam video showed that Poole raised his hands from the truck bed, and they were empty. Poole then began to sit back in his vehicle and the officer shot him four times. In Poole, the Fifth Circuit denied summary judgment because there was a factual dispute as to whether it was apparent that Poole’s hands were empty.
The Fifth Circuit then set out to decide if Argueta’s case is more akin to Poole or the furtive movement cases (Salazar, Batyukova, and Manis). The court stated
In Poole, we distinguished the facts at hand from the furtive-gesture cases because, we concluded, a jury could find that Poole was “visibly unarmed” at the moment of the shooting. Thus, Poole was unlike furtive-gesture cases in “in which the officer could reasonably fear that the suspect was about to pull a gun from a waistband or other hidden location.” 13 F.4th at 425. Here, no reasonable jury could conclude that Argueta was visibly unarmed—because he was armed. At most, a jury could conclude that Argueta was apparently unarmed. Considering the furtive-gesture case law, we conclude that whether Jaradi could see Argueta’s weapon is immaterial because Argueta clutched his right arm to his side as he fled, which created “reasonabl[e] fear that [Argueta] was about to pull a gun from a … hidden location.”[xvi]
Thus, this factual dispute is not material and, as such, does not prevent the court from granting summary judgment or qualified immunity.
2. Whether Argueta’s flight posed a risk to the officers or others
The court of appeals then set out to determine if the second factual dispute, whether Argueta’s flight posed a risk to the officers or others, was material to summary judgment. As previously stated, the court of appeals determined that this was a question of law rather than factual dispute. Thus, the court stated that it must review this question under the “objective reasonableness analysis” of the Fourth Amendment. The court held
[B]ecause we conclude that Argueta’s concealing his right arm as he fled the police amounted to a furtive gesture akin to reaching for a waistband during a police confrontation, Jaradi’s conclusion that Argueta posed an immediate danger was not unreasonable. See, e.g., Salazar-Limon, 826 F.3d at 279; Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1992).[xvii]
Thus, this factual dispute is not material and as such, does not prevent the court from granting summary judgment or qualified immunity.
3. Whether Argueta raised his gun or made a threatening motion toward the officers
The court of appeals then set out to determine if the third factual dispute, whether Argueta raised his gun or made a threatening motion toward the officers, was material to summary judgment. The court of appeals held
Our analysis of the first fact dispute obviates this one. Even if Argueta never touched his gun and his gun remained completely concealed from the moment he exited the vehicle until after he was shot, that fact is immaterial: Argueta did not need to raise (or even show) his gun or make a threatening motion towards the officers because, by suspiciously concealing his right arm as he fled in a way that objectively suggested he was armed and dangerous, he engaged in a furtive gesture justifying deadly force. See, e.g., Salazar, 826 F.3d at 279; Batyukova, 994 F.3d at 729.[xviii]
Thus, this factual dispute is not material and as such, does not prevent the court from granting summary judgment or qualified immunity.
4. Whether either officer warned Argueta before he was shot
The court of appeals then set out to determine if the fourth factual dispute, whether either officer warned Argueta before he was shot, was material to summary judgment. The court of appeals noted that, the Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Garner, required a warning before using deadly force, if feasible. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated
[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given. 471 U.S. 1, 11-12, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985)[xix]
Regarding the warning requirement, the court of appeals held
Notwithstanding this general rule, neither party has presented, and we have not located, clearly established law holding that a furtive gesture signaling an immediate threat to officers followed by deadly force without warning constitutes a violation of the suspect’s federal rights. To the contrary, we held in Batyukova that the suspect’s ignoring police commands and reaching behind her back to her waistband justified deadly force notwithstanding the officer’s lack of warning. 994 F.3d at 729. For this reason, we conclude that whether Jaradi issued a warning prior to firing is immaterial here.[xx]
Thus, this factual dispute is not material and as such, does not prevent the court from granting summary judgment or qualified immunity.
The court of appeals then reversed the decision of the district court, and rendered summary judgment in favor of Officer Jaradi.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] No. 22-40781 (5th Cir. Decided November 17, 2023)
[ii] Id. at 1-4
[iii] Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 6 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. (emphasis added)
[vi] Id. (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. at 7 (emphasis added)
[ix] Id. at 7-8
[x] Id. at 11 (emphasis added)
[xi] 826 F.3d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 2016)
[xii] Argueta at 11-12
[xiii] 994 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2021)
[xiv] 585 F.3d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 2009)
[xv] Argueta at 13 (emphasis added)
[xvi] Id. at 15-16
[xvii] Id. at 18 (emphasis added)
[xviii] Id. (emphasis added)
[xix] Id. at 19 (emphasis added)
[xx] Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added)
