On December 14, 2023, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the United States v. Betts[i], which serves as an excellent review of the law related to reasonable suspicion required to expand the scope of a traffic stop. The relevant facts of Betts are as follows:
On June 3, 2021, at 5:50 p.m., Iowa State Patrol Trooper Spencer Baltes observed Betts narrowly pass a semi-truck without using a turn signal on I-80 in Dallas County, Iowa. Baltes initiated a traffic stop and approached Betts’s vehicle from the front passenger side, where Betts’s niece Macey Wignall was seated. Betts produced his license and registration but explained that his insurance had lapsed. Due to the noise of passing traffic, Baltes asked Betts to sit with him in his patrol vehicle, which Betts agreed to do.
During this initial encounter, Baltes observed a torch-style lighter on the floorboard of the front passenger seat. Baltes knew that torch-style lighters were often used to heat drugs like methamphetamine. Looking through Betts’s back passenger window as he returned to the patrol car, Baltes saw several shopping bags, including new clothes and shoes. He also observed that Betts had “extremely rotting teeth,” and that, unlike Wignall, Betts was speaking quickly, sweating profusely, and was “very fidgety.” Moreover, Betts’s rapid, shallow breathing was so stark that Baltes could hear it. Based on his years of experience and training in law enforcement, Baltes knew these traits were consistent with methamphetamine use.
Once they were seated in the patrol vehicle, Baltes asked Betts about his travel plans. Betts explained that he had been driving to Las Vegas for a few days of vacation with Wignall, but that they turned around in Nebraska when he heard that pet-sitting arrangements for his pets had fallen through in Marshalltown, Iowa. Upon further questioning, Betts explained that he was unemployed and thus could not afford to insure his vehicle. During their conversation, Baltes observed that Betts’s breathing was still rapid and shallow. Betts continued to sweat, even though the patrol vehicle’s air conditioning was running.
Baltes testified that Betts’s plans made him suspicious. Baltes knew that Las Vegas was a collection point for drug trafficking, and he thought it was an unusually distant, “extremely uneconomical” destination for only a few days of vacation. He also knew that I-80 was a significant thoroughfare for drug activity. Moreover, he found it suspicious that Betts would abruptly turn around in the middle of a long drive from Iowa to Las Vegas because of pet-sitting issues without first trying to find a replacement sitter. Still in the patrol vehicle, Baltes ran Betts’s driver’s license. He discovered that Betts was on parole for possession and delivery of methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, and driving while barred. According to Baltes, he now suspected that Betts was a methamphetamine user and was likely in possession of it.
Baltes then returned to Betts’s vehicle to speak with Wignall. She declined to provide identification but told Baltes that she and Betts had taken a one-day trip to an outlet mall in Council Bluffs, Iowa. She made no mention of a Las Vegas vacation.
At approximately 6:00 p.m., Baltes returned to his patrol car to have Betts complete the digital paperwork for a traffic warning. Baltes inquired further about Betts’s and Wignall’s travel plans, at which time Betts said that he and Wignall had stopped at the Nebraska Crossing outlet mall near Omaha. After running Wignall’s name, Baltes learned that she was married, lived 20 minutes from Marshalltown, and had prior drug-related convictions and an eluding charge. This raised Baltes’ suspicions further: not only did Betts and Wignall give conflicting accounts of their travel plans, but it was unclear why Wignall’s spouse could not watch Betts’s pets, why Betts could not afford insurance but would buy new clothes and shoes, or why Betts made the pet-sitting sound like an emergency despite stopping to shop on his return.
While the traffic warning printed, Baltes asked Betts screener questions about contraband and whether a drug dog would alert to his vehicle. Betts denied the existence of any contraband but “appeared very triggered” by the drug dog question, equivocating on his answer. Around 6:05 p.m., Baltes radioed for the nearest canine unit, which arrived approximately 40 minutes later. After the drug dog alerted to Betts’s vehicle, troopers searched it and recovered a loaded .380 caliber handgun, a six-round magazine, and 1.2 grams of methamphetamine with related paraphernalia. After being read his Miranda warnings, Betts admitted the gun and drugs were his.[ii]
Betts filed a motion to suppress the evidence and argued that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and wait for a canine. The district court denied the motion to suppress and held that Betts’ physical manifestations of methamphetamine use, his unusual travel plans, his inconsistent statements with his and his passenger’s reasons for travel, and other factors observed by the trooper amounted to reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and wait for a canine. The district court reasoned that the traffic stop was extended after the trooper finished issuing the digital documents to Betts. Betts entered a conditional guilty plea and filed a timely appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, Betts argued that the traffic stop was impermissibly extended when the trooper left the patrol vehicle, with Betts seated therein, to walk to Betts’s car and question Wignall, his female passenger. Betts argued that there was insufficient reasonable suspicion to allow the trooper to extend the traffic stop at this point and therefore, the evidence obtained after this point should be suppressed because it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The court of appeals then examined the legal principles related to the extension or expansion of the scope of a traffic stop. The court stated
Once a traffic stop is lawfully initiated, “[b]eyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket,” an officer may conduct additional ordinary inquiries that “serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015). This includes “checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. An officer may conduct other unrelated checks into criminal activity beyond the traffic infraction, but “he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent . . . reasonable suspicion.” Id. In other words, if an officer’s unrelated investigations extend the traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to achieve “‘th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket,” he must have reasonable suspicion of some other criminal activity. Id. at 350-51 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). If evidence at a traffic stop is “obtained through a Fourth Amendment violation [it] is normally subject to exclusion.” United States v. Forjan, 66 F.4th 739, 748 (8th Cir. 2023). This “extends to ‘evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or “fruit of the poisonous tree.”‘” United States v. Tuton, 893 F.3d 562, 568 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 82 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1984)).[iii]
The district court assumed the traffic stop became extended when the trooper completed his paperwork with Betts. Betts argued that the traffic stop became extended earlier, particularly when the trooper left his patrol vehicle with Betts seated therein to walk to Betts’s car and question Wignall, the female passenger. The court of appeals agreed with Betts on this point. Thus, the court of appeals set out to determine if the trooper had reasonable suspicion that Betts was in possession of illegal drugs at time the trooper left his vehicle to speak to Wignall.
The court of appeals then discussed legal principles relevant to reasonable suspicion required to extend a traffic stop. The court stated
Reasonable suspicion requires ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, amount to reasonable suspicion that further investigation is warranted.'” Gonzalez-Carmona, 35 F.4th at 641 (citation omitted). This concept is “not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). Accordingly, our review of reasonable suspicion “looks to the totality of the circumstances, ‘allow[ing] officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them.'” United States v. Dortch, 868 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002)). Still, we view the totality of the circumstances not from an individual officer’s subjective standpoint, but from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996).[iv]
The reason that the point in time that the traffic stop became extended is significant in Betts’s case is that the district court used information from the trooper’s conversation with Wignall (her criminal history and inconsistent travel plans) as part of the facts that supported reasonable suspicion to detain Betts for a canine. Since the court of appeals held that the traffic stop was extended at the point the trooper left his vehicle to speak to Wignall, Wignall’s information cannot be used to support reasonable suspicion.
The court then examined the facts known to the trooper prior to him exiting his patrol vehicle to speak to Wignall. The facts were as follows: (1) the trooper observed Betts’ physical signs of drug use such as rotting teeth, talking fast, profuse sweating, and rapid breathing, which continued even after Betts was seated in the airconditioned police vehicle; (2) the trooper observed a torch-style lighter on the floor of Betts’ vehicle and the trooper recognized that type of lighter as one commonly used to heat methamphetamine; (3) Betts was on parole for possession and delivery of methamphetamine; (4) Betts travel plans contributed to reasonable suspicion in that I-80 was known as a thoroughfare for drug activity and Las Vegas was known as a collection point for illegal drugs; and (5) the trooper believed it was unusual for Betts to turn around and discontinue his trip rather than try to find a replacement pet-sitter.
In considering the above facts, the court of appeals noted that the trooper was entitled to “reasonably draw on his training and experience” in concluding that this was evidence of use and possession of methamphetamine.” Dortch, 868 F.3d at 680.[v] Further, the facts should be viewed based on the totality of the circumstances rather than in isolation. Thus, while nervousness, possession of a torch-lighter, or travel to Las Vegas may individually not amount to reasonable suspicion, when viewed in totality with all of the other facts discussed, the court determined that reasonable suspicion was present at the time the trooper left his vehicle, with Betts seated therein, and walked to Betts’s car to question Wignall. Specifically, the court of appeals stated
[Trooper] Baltes knew that Betts was on parole for possession and distribution of methamphetamine, and he saw Betts showing persistent symptoms of its use. The stop occurred on a known thoroughfare for drug activity, and Betts’s destination was known for drug trafficking. Moreover, Betts’s purported plans seemed uneconomical, and Baltes was suspicious of the pet-sitting story. These facts provide revealing context to what could otherwise be innocent dental problems or an innocent lighter. Cf. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (stating that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) precludes a “divide-and-conquer” approach to potentially innocent facts in a reasonable-suspicion analysis). Viewed “as a whole,” sufficient evidence justified Baltes’s suspicion that Betts was in possession of illegal drugs by the time he left Betts seated in the patrol car and walked back to Betts’s vehicle to question Wignall. Poitier, 818 F.2d at 683. Accordingly, reasonable suspicion existed to extend the stop, no evidence obtained was the fruit of the poisonous tree, and the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.[vi]
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] No. 23-1012 (8th Cir. Decided December 14, 2023)
[ii] Id. at 2-5
[iii] Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 9 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 10
[vi] Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added)
