On January 18, 2024, the Court of Appeals of Georgia decided McAnnally v. State[i], which is an excellent review of the law regarding vehicle impound requirements and constructive possession. The relevant facts of McAnnally are as follows:

In the early morning hours of January 30, 2022, two officers with the City of Ringgold Police Department witnessed a truck that was towing a boat run two red lights and drive back-and-forth across traffic lanes. The officers activated their lights and sirens, and the truck pulled over on the side of an entrance ramp to Interstate 75. Byrd, who was driving the truck, was acting erratically. He had looped his seatbelt through the steering wheel of the truck, laughed at odd times, and gnashed his teeth. McAnnally was sitting in the passenger seat of the truck.

One of the officers smelled alcohol on Byrd and instructed him to exit the truck; after a brief resistance, he complied. Prior to his exit from the truck, an officer noticed Byrd’s hand go down towards the center console area. Byrd completed the horizontal gaze nystagmus and walk-and-turn field sobriety tests and showed clues of impairment on both. Officers determined that Byrd was driving under the influence to the extent it was less safe for him to drive, and he was arrested. It was still dark outside and the truck with the boat still attached was parked around the shoulder of the highway entrance ramp. The officers believed this created an unsafe situation.  McAnnally did not have a valid driver’s license, so she was unauthorized to drive the truck away. Byrd told the officer that the truck belonged to his mother, which was confirmed by officers, and that she could drive it away. McAnnally also claimed to officers that she had called Byrd’s mother and that his mother was on her way to pick up the truck. Officers decided, however, to call a tow truck and impound the vehicle.

While Byrd performed his field sobriety tests, McAnnally remained in the passenger seat of the truck and rolled up the windows and locked the doors. An officer instructed McAnnally to exit the truck multiple times, but she refused. The officer informed McAnnally multiple times that if she did not open the door, he would break the truck’s window and forcibly remove her, but she continued to refuse to exit. Ultimately the officer used his baton to break the driver side window, and McAnnally was removed and arrested for obstruction of a law enforcement officer.

After arresting McAnnally, the truck was searched and an officer located a loaded revolver in the crevice between the driver seat and center console.[ii]

McAnnally was convicted under Georgia law for being a felon in possession of a firearm and obstruction of a law enforcement officer.  She filed a motion for a new trial which was denied.  McAnnally subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

First, McAnnally argued that that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.  She argued that her mere proximity to the firearm is not enough to establish that she was in constructive possession of the firearm.

The court of appeals first examined the legal principles relevant to the issue and stated

Mere proximity to contraband, absent other evidence connecting a suspect with that contraband, is not enough to establish constructive possession.” “Constructive possession can be proven — and very often is proven — by circumstantial evidence. Of course, as with any charge based on purely circumstantial evidence, in order to support a conviction, the evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis, save that of constructive possession by the defendant.”  “[T]he evidence need not exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis — only those that are reasonable.[iii]

In this case, the evidence relevant to her conviction was (1) she was seated close enough in the truck to access the firearm and (2) when the police asked her numerous times to exit the truck, she refused such that the officers had to break the truck window to remove her from the vehicle.
The court of appeals noted that jury is permitted to find that a suspect had “intent to exercise power and control” over contraband based on a suspect’s fleeing and eluding police.  As such, the court of appeals held

McAnnally’s suspicious conduct demonstrated knowledge by McAnnally of the firearm’s presence and her intention to prevent officers from discovering it.[iv]

Second, McAnnally argued that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for obstruction of a law enforcement officer.

The Georgia obstruction law states

[A] person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer … in the lawful discharge of his or her official duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.[v]

McAnnally argued that, while she refused to exit the truck, the officer was not in the “lawful performance of his official duties,” therefore she was allowed to disobey him.

To this argument, the court of appeals noted that the United States Supreme Court has established the “community caretaking function,” which allows officers to do such acts as impounding a dangerously parked vehicle or a vehicle where a driver has been arrested and nobody that can take the vehicle is present.  The court of appeals stated

It is well established that cases supporting the State’s right to impound a vehicle incident to the arrest of a person in control of it are founded on a doctrine of necessity. Under that doctrine, while the police may not impound a car to search for contraband, they may impound a vehicle if they must take charge of it for some reason. And ultimately, the test for the validity of the police’s conduct is whether, under the circumstances then confronting the police, their conduct was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. More specifically, the test is whether the impoundment was reasonably necessary under the circumstances, not whether it was absolutely necessary. Furthermore, subsequent to a reasonable impoundment, the contents of an impounded vehicle are routinely inventoried to protect the property of the owner, protect the officers against claims for lost or stolen property, and protect the police from potential danger.[vi]

In McAnnally’s case, Byrd, the driver was impaired, and McAnnally was unlicensed.  Thus, it was reasonable and necessary for the officers to impound the vehicle because it was parked in a dangerous location.  McAnnally argued that Byrd’s mother was on her way to pick up the truck.  However, the court of appeals stated

[P]olice officers are not required to ask whether an arrestee desires to have someone come and get the [vehicle], nor are they required to accede to an arrestee’s request that they do so.[vii]

Therefore, the court of appeals held that the police were in the lawful discharge of their official duties in requiring McAnnally to exit the truck because they were reasonably impounding and inventorying the truck, and as such, the elements of the obstruction statute were satisfied.  Additionally, the court held that the evidence was admissible and supported McAnnally’s conviction.

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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Citations

[i] A23A1239 (Ga. App. Decided January 18, 2024)

[ii] Id. at 2-3

[iii] Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added)

[iv] Id. at 6

[v] OCGA 16-10-24(a)

[vi] Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added)

[vii] Id. at 8 (emphasis added)