On August 23, 2024, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Williams v. City of Sparks[i], in which the court examined whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity when they shot Williams, who had just led them on a forty-two-minute vehicle pursuit and then attempted to resume flight after officers used their vehicles to physically block his truck.  The relevant facts of Williams are as follows:

On May 5, 2020, at around 12:10 AM, SPD dispatch received a 911 call from a gas station that a male suspect had stolen alcohol and was “vandalizing” a vehicle in the parking lot. Dispatch requested an officer response for “larceny” and advised that the suspect did not appear to have a weapon. Officers Taylor and Colborn were dispatched, and Officer Colborn arrived at the gas station at approximately 12:14 AM. Officer Colborn pulled behind Williams’s truck and activated his overhead lights. Williams fled in his truck.

Colborn pursued Williams with his siren and overhead lights active. Colborn radioed other officers about the pursuit, noting that Williams was driving between 30 and 45 miles per hour and that there was no pedestrian traffic on the road. At several points, Williams slowed his truck to a stop, waited briefly, and then continued fleeing. He also ran multiple red lights. During this time, SPD dispatch informed the officers of Williams’s identity, residence, and criminal history of “battery with a deadly weapon and eluding.”

Around four minutes into the pursuit, Williams drove his truck into a dead-end street and stopped his truck. The officers exited their patrol vehicles and shouted for Williams to step out of his vehicle and to keep his hands up. Williams refused to exit the vehicle. For over ten minutes, the officers attempted to reason with Williams and have him exit his vehicle. Williams began yelling at the officers, revved the engine of his truck, and drove through a chain-link fence to flee the area. The officers continued their pursuit of Williams.

The officers attempted a pursuit intervention (PIT) maneuver on Williams’s truck as he turned onto a major road. His truck spun around and accelerated past the officers, turning back onto the major road. Williams continued fleeing the officers for several minutes. He ran two more red lights with his speed ranging from about 35 to 50 miles per hour. During this time, Colborn reported “no traffic” on the roads. Eventually, Williams ran a third red light and turned onto the freeway. The freeway had light traffic going in the opposite direction. Williams’s speed ranged between 55 and 70 miles per hour.

The pursuit continued on or near the freeway for around twenty minutes. Officers deployed spike strips, which dispatch confirmed were “effective” in puncturing the front passenger tire of Williams’s truck. Although still fleeing, Williams slowed down to about 50 miles per hour. Williams continued driving on the freeway, swerving between lanes at speeds of about 35 to 45 miles per hour. Officers attempted another PIT maneuver on Williams’s truck, but it was unsuccessful. Williams exited the freeway and ran two stop signs before turning back onto the freeway. By that point in time, Williams was driving on a flat tire, without any lights on, and briefly on the wrong side of the freeway before crossing the dirt median onto the correct side. Colborn drove up to the rear driver side of Williams’s truck but had to back off when Williams suddenly braked and turned toward Colborn’s patrol vehicle. Colborn radioed in that Williams had “just tried to ram [him].” Williams continued driving, weaving between lanes and with sparks coming from the truck’s punctured wheel. Officers then performed a successful PIT maneuver, causing the truck to spin around and enter the ditch separating eastbound and westbound traffic.

Williams continued driving, now in the direction of the officers. The rear passenger wheel of his truck ran over the hood of Colborn’s patrol vehicle. Then, the back of his truck hit the front of Officer Bare’s vehicle. Williams came to a stop once Officer Janning wedged his patrol vehicle underneath the truck, pinning it against Officer Terrasas’s patrol vehicle. After Williams’s truck stopped moving, Officer Gibson positioned his patrol vehicle next to Janning’s, in front of and facing the truck. Williams was effectively boxed in by Janning, Gibson, and Terrasas.

The truck’s engine then made a loud, continuous noise, and a cloud of dirt and debris formed near the back of the truck. Colborn, Gibson, Janning, Taylor, and Terrasas all exited their vehicles and shouted commands, including “Stop the car!”, while firing dozens of rounds into the cabin of the truck. Gibson fired his rounds from behind the back bumper of his patrol vehicle; Janning fired his rounds from behind his patrol vehicle; Colborn fired his rounds from behind Williams’s truck; Taylor fired his rounds while taking cover from behind his patrol vehicle; and Terrasas fired his rounds as he walked from his patrol vehicle toward the truck’s rear passenger corner. The officers continued firing for approximately 14 seconds, during which Williams’s engine continued making a loud noise. Several bullets struck and injured Williams. This ended the forty-two-minute chase.

The officers coordinated a plan to get Williams out of the truck. They tried first to deploy a 40-millimeter less-lethal foam launcher to punch out the truck’s rear window. However, the window did not break. Terrasas then moved his patrol vehicle away from Williams’s passenger door. Williams opened the passenger door, exchanged words with the officers, and lay down on the ground. Colborn placed Williams in handcuffs and checked where he had been hit. Expedited paramedics then arrived and transported Williams to the hospital.[ii]

Williams filed suit and alleged that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by using excessive force, as well as battery and negligence under Nevada law.  He also alleged claims against the City of Sparks for inadequate training and unconstitutional policy, custom or practice.

The officers and city filed motions for qualified immunity and summary judgment.  Williams, the plaintiff, claimed that, when he was shot, he was not attempting to resume flight and was not revving his motor or spinning his tires.  The district court denied the defendant’s motions, holding that the body camera video of Officers Colborn, Terrasas, Gibson and Taylor and the dash camera video of Officers Colborn and Gibson did not clearly show that Williams was attempting to accelerate or flee, in part due to the smoke coming from the rear of Williams’ truck.  Because this was a dispute of a material fact, the district court denied the defendant’s motions.  All defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

A case with a dispute of material fact is typically not subject to review by the court of appeals; rather, the disputed facts must be determined by the jury.  However, in this case, on appeal, the officers cited dash camera video from Officer Janning, which the district court did not consider, but was included in the evidence.  The court of appeals reviewed Officer Jannings dash camera video and observed

Janning’s dash camera footage plainly depicts the rear tire of Williams’s truck as he is being boxed in. The video shows white lettering on the side of the tire and then shows those letters begin to blur as the engine revs—a clear indication that the tire was spinning. The video also shows those letters reappearing as the tire stopped spinning, about a minute after the shooting stopped. The video thus “contradicts the version of the story” told by Williams about the seconds leading up to the shooting. Williams was clearly attempting to accelerate—and therefore attempting to flee—when the officers opened fire. [iii]

While, at this stage of the litigation, the court of appeals must view the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, they are not required to do so when the plaintiff’s version of events is “clearly contradicted by the record so that no reasonable jury could believe it.”  That is the case here, and the court of appeals stated that they would begin their review of Williams’ case considering that he was “clearly attempting to accelerate” at the time the officers shot him.

The court discussed qualified immunity and stated

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from § 1983 liability “unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.'” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63, 138 S. Ct. 577, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 182 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2012)).[iv]

The court then set out to examine the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, specifically, whether the officers violated Williams’ constitutional rights.

The court discussed the legal principles relevant to this issue and stated

A police officer’s application of deadly force to restrain a subject’s movements “is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985). Accordingly, any such use of deadly force must be “objectively reasonable.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham identified several factors to consider when evaluating the strength of the government’s interest in the force used: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. “The most important Graham factor is whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to anyone’s safety.” Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019).[v]

The court also noted that they must also consider the totality of the circumstances in addition to the factors above, noting that two principles must also be remembered. Specifically, the court stated

When weighing these competing factors two key principles must be kept in mind. First, “‘[t]he “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.'” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 103, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 200 L. Ed. 2d 449 (2018) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Second, “‘[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.'” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97).[vi]

The court of appeals also considered a similar case, Plumhoff v. Rickard, decided by the Supreme Court in 2014.[vii]  In Plumhoff, the driver led police on a dangerous pursuit that lasted over five-minutes and exceeded 100 miles-per-hour.  The driver’s car then crashed and came to a momentary standstill where the fleeing vehicle’s bumper was in physical contact with a police vehicle.  Immediately before the officers fired, the court noted “the driver was obviously pushing down on the accelerator because the car’s wheels were spinning.”[viii]  The Supreme Court held

[U]nder the circumstances at the moment when the shots were fired, all that a reasonable police officer could have concluded was that [the driver] was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he was allowed to do so, he would once again pose a deadly threat for others on the road.” Id. at 777. The Court determined that “the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.” Id.[ix]

The court of appeals compared the facts of Williams’ case to Plumhoff and noted that Williams led police on a forty-two-minute chase, he ran red lights, weaved between lanes, drove through a fence, drove a short distance the wrong way on a freeway, and for a significant portion, drove with headlights off and on a blown tire.  He also struck three police vehicles prior to his vehicle being pinned.  As in Plumhoff, Williams was pushing the accelerator, as his engine was revving and his wheels were spinning.

In light of the above, the court of appeals stated

At a minimum, two of the Graham factors weigh in Defendants’ favor, including the “most important” consideration of “whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to anyone’s safety.” Nehad, 929 F.3d at 1132; see Estate of Lopez, 871 F.3d at 1005 (noting that another Graham factor is “whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight” (cleaned up)). In line with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Plumhoff, we hold that Williams—taking into account the duration, speed, and other hazards of his flight, as well as his clear intent to flee—”posed a grave public safety risk” and that “the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to end that risk.” 572 U.S. at 777.[x]

The plaintiff also argued that the duration of the shooting and the number of rounds fired were excessive.  The court of appeals addressed this and stated

Nor was the number or duration of rounds fired excessive. “It stands to reason that, if police officers are justified in firing at a suspect in order to end a severe threat to public safety, the officers need not stop shooting until the threat has ended.” Id. In other words, “if lethal force is justified, officers are taught to keep shooting until the threat is over.” Id. Here, during the fourteen seconds when the shots were fired, Williams did not abandon his attempt to flee. The engine can be heard revving throughout, and the tires continued to spin and kick up dust. The question would be closer if, for example, Williams had taken his foot off the accelerator and officers nevertheless fired a second volley of shots. But that did not occur here. Even Williams concedes in his answering brief that “[t]here was no change in circumstances during the approximately 17 seconds from the time the truck was pinned in, the shooting occurred, and the shooting ended.” Once Williams attempted to accelerate his vehicle, the officers did not need to risk their safety by first waiting to see if his attempt would be successful, and they acted reasonably in firing the immediate fourteen-second volley of shots in response to that effort. Having fired that initial volley, the officers then reasonably ceased firing, as Williams’s further attempts at acceleration proved fruitless.[xi]

The court of appeals then held that, because the officers did not violate Williams’ Fourth Amendment rights when they shot him, they were entitled to qualified immunity, as Williams failed to satisfy the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis.

The court of appeals also granted summary judgment for the city because Williams must establish an underlying constitutional violation on the part of the officers and, as stated above, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Similarly, the court dismissed the claims under Nevada law because the court stated that the state claims employ the same standard of reasonableness as the federal claims.  Since the use of force was reasonable under federal law, it was also reasonable under state law.

Therefore, the decision of the district court was reversed.

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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Citations

[i] No. 23-15465 (9th Cir. Decided August 9, 2024)

[ii] Id. at 4-8

[iii] Id. at 14-15

[iv] Id. at 11 (emphasis added)

[v] Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added)

[vi] Id. at 13 (emphasis added)

[vii] 572 U.S. 765 (2014)

[viii] Williams at 16 (quoting Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 776-777)

[ix] Id. (emphasis added)

[x] Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added)

[xi] Id. at 18-19