On October 22, 2024, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the United States v. Perry[i], in which the court examined whether search warrants officers obtained for Perry’s real-time, cell site location information to locate and arrest him pursuant to an arrest warrant, were valid. The relevant facts of Perry are as follows:
On July 11, 2021, Perry fired over a dozen shots into the ceiling at the Elks Lodge in Alliance, Ohio. Police investigators identified Perry from a surveillance video and obtained an arrest warrant on July 16. They also obtained two search warrants for cellphone-location and call-history data from the cellphone number Perry had historically used to call his parole officer. But neither helped locate Perry, who had apparently stopped using the subject phone. With the help of Perry’s parole officer, however, investigators learned that Perry was using a new phone number. They then obtained a warrant for call-detail records and real-time location data from that new number.
Detectives used real-time location data from Perry’s new phone to track him to Boardman Township, Ohio. Detective Michael Jones had grown up in Boardman and identified two motels where Perry was likely to stay. The Police set up surveillance at the Boardman Inn, where Jones spotted Perry as he exited the motel, got into a Ford Taurus, and left. Jones followed the car and called for backup. Eventually, an officer from a neighboring jurisdiction, Officer James Conrad, stopped the car, and Alliance officers quickly arrived and arrested Perry. Alliance Lieutenant Don Wensel searched Perry and found a loaded handgun, which led to this prosecution.[ii]
Perry was subsequently indicted for a federal firearms violation. He filed a motion to suppress and argued that he was stopped in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the search warrants for his real-time cell site location information were not valid under the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied the motions to suppress, and Perry pleaded guilty with the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Perry appealed the denial of his motions to suppress to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Sixth Circuit first examined whether the search warrants for Perry’s real-time cell site location information were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court examined the relevant legal principles and stated
Law-enforcement officers generally need a warrant to conduct a “search” that intrudes upon a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967). But a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location while moving in public or “in the real-time location data that their cellular telephones transmit.” United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403, 428-29 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, the officers’ use of Perry’s real-time location data was not a Fourth Amendment search, and so they did not need a warrant to obtain it.[iii]
Thus, here the court of appeals distinguished between real-time location information and historical location information. It should be noted, while the court stated that a warrant is not needed for real-time location information since anyone could physically observe the person as they move about in public, a warrant is generally needed to obtain historical cell-site location information, as that is not available by public observation.
The court of appeals then held that, because a search warrant was not needed under the Fourth Amendment to obtain the real-time cell site location information, they did not need to analyze whether the warrants were supported by probable cause or were otherwise valid, as they were unnecessary. Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motions to suppress pertaining to the search warrants.
The remaining issue examined by the court of appeals was whether the stop of Perry’s vehicle, by an officer from a different jurisdiction that had no personal knowledge of the facts that supported the stop, violated the Fourth Amendment.
The court examined the legal principles relevant to this issue and stated
Police may stop a vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion that a person inside the vehicle is the subject of an arrest warrant. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-29, 105 S. Ct. 675, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985). When one officer has reasonable suspicion but relies on another officer to execute the stop, courts “impute collective knowledge among multiple law enforcement agencies, even when the evidence demonstrates that the responding officer was wholly unaware of the specific facts that established reasonable suspicion for the stop.” United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 766 (6th Cir. 2012). In these situations, the investigating officer “must have facts supporting the level of suspicion required” to execute the stop, and the responding officer “must act in objective reliance on the information received.” Id. at 767.[iv]
The principle discussed above is often called the “collective knowledge doctrine.” Simply put, when one officer is aware of facts that amount to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, that officer can request another officer to make the stop or the arrest; the assisting officer does not need to be aware of the facts that support the reasonable suspicion or probable cause in order to conduct the stop or arrest, as long as such reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists.
In Perry’s case, Detective Jones of the Alliance (OH) Police Department knew Perry had a warrant for his arrest. Using real-time cell site location information, he located Perry at a motel in a neighboring jurisdiction. He observed Perry enter Ford Taurus and drive away. He followed the Taurus and requested another officer to conduct the stop. Officer Conrad of the Canfield (OH) Police Department received the vehicle description, tag number and request to stop the vehicle from his dispatcher. He located the vehicle and conducted the stop. He later testified that he did not know Perry was in the car, who Perry was and did not witness a traffic violation. He testified that he made the stop based on the request to stop it by Detective Jones that was relayed by his dispatcher.
Perry argued that Officer Conrad lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him because he did not independently verify the factual basis for the stop with the Detective Jones or other Alliance police officers. However, the court of appeals noted
[O]fficers are not “expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation of transmitted information,” so Conrad had no duty to verify the basis for the stop. Id. at 766. Nor did Conrad need to speak directly with Alliance officers beforehand.[v]
Thus, under the collective knowledge doctrine, Officer Conrad was allowed to reasonably rely upon the information he received from his dispatcher, and as such, the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citrations
[i] No. 23-3918 (6th Cir. October 22, 2024 Unpublished)
[ii] Id. at 1-2
[iii] Id. at 3 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 3-4 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 5 (emphasis added)
