On April 25, 2024, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided the United States v. Ostrum[i], in which the court of appeals examined whether a person in possession of a stolen vehicle had standing under the Fourth Amendment to contest the warrantless search of the vehicle. The relevant facts of Ostrum are as follows:
The investigation into Dylan Ostrum began after law enforcement agents executed a search warrant at the Indianapolis home of Ricky Blythe. While Ostrum was not on the investigators’ radar before the search of Blythe’s home, that quickly changed. Agents found numerous text messages between Blythe and Ostrum on Blythe’s phone showing that the two repeatedly sold each other methamphetamine and marijuana.
The investigation progressed quickly from there. Investigators learned that Ostrum had felony convictions for burglary and possession of marijuana and methamphetamine. They also became aware of statements from three confidential informants, who credibly claimed to have seen Ostrum selling firearms and narcotics out of his home in Indiana. The informants confirmed that Ostrum stored several of his own firearms at the residence, and that he would possess pound quantities of marijuana and methamphetamine at a time. One informant reported that he had delivered Ostrum several pounds of methamphetamine each week for the past several months.
Another informant stated that Ostrum drove a light blue Chrysler 300 sedan, which law enforcement observed parked outside his residence. Further investigation revealed that the Chrysler’s license plates, although registered in Ostrum’s name, did not correspond to the Chrysler.
Based on this evidence, law enforcement obtained a valid warrant to search Ostrum’s residence. The warrant authorized the search and seizure of firearms, narcotics, and other drug distribution materials. It also permitted officers to seize keys “relating to safe deposit boxes.”
The search turned up little—some ammunition, a small amount of marijuana, and a keychain—but Ostrum was present and willingly spoke with law enforcement officers. He identified the seized keys as belonging to a safe, which he emphasized “literally ha[d] nothing inside of it.” He also admitted that he had obtained methamphetamine and a gun from Blythe, that he knew of Blythe’s arrest, and that he was expecting a delivery of drugs from Blythe on the day of his arrest.
Yet Ostrum disclaimed having guns and drugs around, insisting that he “got rid” of them after Blythe’s arrest. His wife, he said, threatened to divorce him if he did not. He explained, “I don’t have any of that stuff here. I don’t have any ‘go’ [methamphetamine] …. I got bud [marijuana]. No guns.” But when officers asked where he had taken the contraband, Ostrum was evasive. He confirmed only that he had taken “pretty much” “everything” to his father’s house in Pendleton, Indiana.
The Chrysler was not on the premises at the time of the search, so law enforcement probed Ostrum on its whereabouts. Unprompted, Ostrum clarified that “everybody always thought that [car] … was mine and really I was just renting it.” He provided the keys and told officers it was also at his father’s house in Pendleton. So too, he averred, was the missing safe.
Law enforcement soon located the Chrysler—not in Pendleton, but in a nearby driveway. The home’s occupant gave law enforcement consent to enter the property and conduct a “free air” dog sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. The dog did not alert for the presence of drugs. A search of the Chrysler’s Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”), however, revealed that a rental car company had reported it stolen several months earlier.
Officers searched the vehicle and discovered two safes inside. They used the keys seized from Ostrum pursuant to the warrant to unlock both. Inside they found a loaded Glock 9mm pistol and matching ammunition, 513.5 grams of methamphetamine, around two pounds of marijuana, a digital scale, and what appeared to be a drug ledger.[ii]
Ostrum was ultimately charged with federal drug and weapons violations. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence and argued that police conducted an unlawful warrantless search of his vehicle; the district court denied his motion. Ostrum was convicted by a jury and subsequently filed an appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the court first examined whether Ostrum had standing under the Fourth Amendment to contest the search of the vehicle and the safes, which were in the vehicle. Regarding standing, the court of appeals stated
Fourth Amendment standing is not “jurisdictional,” but instead reflects the “idea that a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search.” Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 410, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 200 L. Ed. 2d 805 (2018). The question is whether a defendant possesses a “legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises” searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978).[iii]
Ostrum argued that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle, even though it was stolen.
The court of appeals first examined whether Ostrum had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The court stated that
A person present in a stolen automobile at the time of the search may [not] object to the lawfulness of the search of the automobile.”(alteration in original) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141 n.9)); Walton, 763 F.3d at 665 (“A driver of a stolen car does not have standing to challenge a car search.”).[iv]
Here, however, Ostrum argued that he did not know the vehicle was stolen. The court noted that that is a “wrinkle” in the rule above, but that they do not need to answer the question of whether a person who is unknowingly in possession of a stolen vehicle has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle because Ostrum offered no evidence to show that he did not know that vehicle was stolen. In this situation, the legal burden was on Ostrum to show that he did not know the vehicle was stolen; his only contention was that he told the officers that he was renting the vehicle. However, the evidence also showed that he put license plates on the vehicle that were registered to him, but were actually registered to a different vehicle, as if to conceal the identity of the stolen vehicle. The court of appeals also stated
We have never held that merely claiming a possessory interest in a vehicle shifts the burden to the government to prove that the asserted privacy interest is not legitimate. [v]
Thus, the court of appeals held that Ostrum did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle such that he could argue that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a warrantless search.
The court also examined whether Ostrum had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the safes. The court stated
While a person lawfully present in a vehicle might be able to assert a privacy interest in a container inside (even without any expectation of privacy in the car itself), see, e.g., United States v. Barber, 777 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Iraheta, 764 F.3d 455, 462 (5th Cir. 2014), a person wrongfully present in a stolen vehicle is differently situated. A stolen car is not a safehouse that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. See United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981) (“A person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects.“); . . . United States v. White, 504 F. App’x 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2012) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of locked box in a stolen minivan). . . the driver of a stolen vehicle lacks standing as to any of its contents, “whether or not they are enclosed in some sort of a container.” Hargrove, 647 F.2d at 412. [vi]
Thus, the court of appeals held that Ostrum lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the stolen vehicle and lacked standing to contest the warrantless search of the vehicle and the searches of the safes that were in the vehicle.
The court of appeals also examined whether the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement applied to Ostrum’s case, if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that Ostrum did have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The court examined the legal principles related to the automobile exception and stated
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to only certain exceptions.” United States v. Kizart, 967 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009)). One of those is the automobile exception, which allows law enforcement to conduct a “warrantless search of a vehicle … so long as there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of illegal activity.” United States v. Washburn, 383 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, T.D. 3686 (1925)). Authority to search the vehicle extends to all containers inside where there exists probable cause to believe they contain contraband or evidence. United States v. Hays, 90 F.4th 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2024) (citing Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580). That is, “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Probable cause is “based on a totality of the circumstances” and allows officers to “draw reasonable inferences from the facts based on their training and experience.” United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 521 (7th Cir. 2009)[vii]
The court then examined whether there was probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence such as drugs or guns. The court first noted that everything that supported the search of the house should be considered. Further, when officers searched the house, Ostrum told them that he moved his belongings to his father’s house. Ostrum also said that the vehicle was also at his father’s house, which would support the inference that he used his vehicle to move the drugs and the guns. Further, Ostrum falsely stated that that the vehicle was at his father’s house, when in fact it was parked a neighbor’s residence. Therefore, the court of appeals held that probable cause supported the search.
Ostrum argued that the police canine’s negative alert on the vehicle negated probable cause. However, the court stated
Even if a negative dog sniff could impact the existence of probable cause to search for narcotics (a question we do not take up here), the possible presence of narcotics was not the only source of probable cause. Firearms were also in play. The null dog sniff did nothing to undermine officers’ probable cause to believe that the Chrysler contained them.[viii]
Lastly, Ostrum argued that the automobile exception does not apply on the curtilage of a residence. However, the residence was not Ostrum’s residence. The court stated that the officer’s here did not trespass onto Ostrum’s curtilage to conduct the warrantless search of the car, rather they obtained written consent from the property owner to conduct the search. Therefore, this argument failed.
As such, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] No. 23-1364 (7th Cir. Decided April 25, 2024)
[ii] Id. at 2-5
[iii] Id. at 6 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 7 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 8 (emphasis added)
[vi] Id. at 9-10
[vii] Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. at 12-13
