On July 9, 2024, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the United States v. Gonzalez[i], which serves as an excellent review of law pertaining to drug interdiction traffic stops. The relevant facts of Gonzalez are as follows:
On June 14, 2019, Gonzalez was driving through Texas on U.S. 287 when State Trooper Daniel Manney (“the trooper”) observed him traveling 91 miles per hour in a 75-miles-per-hour zone and stopped him for speeding. The trooper’s body and in-car cameras captured the entire encounter.
The trooper approached the passenger side of Gonzalez’s vehicle, informed him that he had been stopped for speeding, asked about his travel plans, and requested his driver’s license and proof of insurance. Gonzalez provided his license and registration, explaining that he was on his way to a family reunion in Alabama and that his car was insured, but he did not have proof of insurance with him. Two minutes and twenty seconds into the stop, the trooper asked Gonzalez to accompany him in his patrol car to conduct an insurance check. Once seated in the patrol car, Gonzalez commented that it was his first time in the front of a police car. The trooper noted that Gonzalez appeared unnaturally nervous, as his hands and arms were shaking.
Three minutes after the initial stop, the trooper began running various computer checks as he continued to ask Gonzalez about his travel plans. Gonzalez told the trooper that he was not sure exactly where in Alabama the reunion would be held, but once there, he would “meet up” with his family and they would “go to a lake or something . . ..” He elaborated that it was his mother’s family that would be attending the reunion, that he was “born and raised” in Los Angeles, and that other than a visit to Las Vegas, it was the first time he had left California. Approximately seven minutes into the stop, the trooper confirmed that Gonzalez had car insurance, but he continued running computer checks and questioning him. Gonzalez explained that he did not know why the reunion was being hosted in Alabama, but he guessed it was because his family members were “big travelers.”
Eight minutes and twenty-eight seconds into the stop, the trooper asked Gonzalez if he had ever been arrested. Gonzalez admitted he had been arrested twice before for crimes involving theft. When asked, he denied having large amounts of cash or anything illegal in his car. Nine minutes and eighteen seconds into the stop, the trooper resumed his questioning about the family reunion.
As confirmed by the body camera footage, the trooper completed the computer searches and asked for consent to search the car nine minutes and forty-seven seconds into the stop. For about ninety seconds, Gonzalez avoided directly answering the question; he first stated he did not “have anything in there,” asked if a search was necessary, and finally said he did not mind a search “if we can get on our way.” The trooper called for a canine unit eleven minutes and three seconds into the stop, and the canine unit arrived approximately eight minutes later, which was nineteen minutes and thirty seconds into the stop. The dog alerted to the trunk of the car, where the trooper found 420 grams of heroin. Gonzalez was arrested and later charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).[ii]
Gonzalez filed a motion to suppress the evidence and argued that the trooper unreasonably extended the length of the traffic stop after the insurance was verified approximately seven minutes into the traffic stop. The district court denied the motion, and Gonzalez entered a guilty plea with the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Gonzalez then appealed the denial of the motion to suppress to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, Gonzalez argued that the trooper unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop by continuing to question him after the insurance was verified seven minutes into the stop. He also argued that the delay waiting on the canine to arrive unreasonably prolonged the stop.
The court of appeals then discussed the legal principles that apply to the traffic stops, which are considered seizures under the Fourth Amendment. The principles are as follows:
- The reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under the framework articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which requires examination of (1) “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception,” and (2) “whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.” Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506.[iii]
- As part of a traffic stop investigation, an officer may examine driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations and run computer checks . . . . He may also ask about the purpose and itinerary of the occupant’s trip . . . because we consider these questions to be reasonably related in scope to his investigation of the circumstances that caused the stop. . . . [A]n officer may ask questions on subjects unrelated to the circumstances that caused the stop, so long as these unrelated questions do not extend the duration of the stop. United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir. 2010),modified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010).[iv]
- Under the second Terry prong, however, a traffic stop may not last longer than necessary to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). “Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed.” Id.[v]
- If an officer develops reasonable suspicion of other crimes while investigating the circumstances that caused the stop, however, he may detain the car’s occupants for a reasonable time until that reasonable suspicion is dispelled or confirmed. Pack, 612 F.3d at 350.[vi]
The court of appeals then examined whether the trooper impermissibly prolonged the stop. Gonzalez argued that the stop should have ended at seven minutes when the trooper verified his insurance was valid. The court noted that the district court held that first nine-minutes-and-forty-seven seconds of the stop were “reasonably related” to the initial reason for the stop. The district court observed, from the trooper’s body camera video, that the first seven minutes were spent primarily verifying ownership and insurance of the vehicle. Then, for an additional two-minutes-and-forty-seven seconds the trooper conducted a criminal history check while he asked Gonzalez questions. The district court held that the trooper’s questions during this nine-minute-and-forty-seven second period did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the questions did not extend the length of the stop. The court of appeals held that the district court’s determinations were not clearly erroneous, therefore, they cannot reverse those decisions.
The court of appeals then set out to examine the detention past nine-minute-and-forty-seven seconds. The court noted that, if the trooper did not have reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, this additional detention would be considered an unreasonable detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court of appeals stated
Reasonable suspicion “exists when the detaining officer can point to specific and articulable facts that, when taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the . . . seizure.” UnitedStates v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2006). It “must be based on more than the officer’s sense that a detainee appears to have something to hide.” Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 437. Courts “must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” UnitedStates v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). “Any analysis of reasonable suspicion is necessarily fact-specific, and factors which by themselves may appear innocent, may in the aggregate rise to the level of reasonable suspicion.” Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d at 759.[vii]
The court of appeals noted that the district held that the trooper had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop based on (1) the fact that Gonzalez was traveling a known drug corridor, (2) Gonzalez’s excessive nervousness, (3) the “implausibility” of his story regarding a family reunion in Alabama, and (4) the trooper’s training and experience regarding drug interdiction.
Regarding the implausibility of Gonzalez’s story of a family reunion in Alabama, the trooper explained his rationale in his report by stating that it seemed uncommon for a person to travel across the country for a family reunion to a state where none of his family lives, and where he did not have an address for the reunion but rather was to meet up with family in Alabama and then go to the reunion.
Regarding the fact that Gonzalez was traveling on a drug corridor, the court of appeals stated that the “record is devoid of evidence that Gonzalez was traveling a known drug corridor” when he was stopped. At the time of the appeal, there was no evidence in the record regarding what made that highway a drug corridor, and there was no specific evidence regarding the trooper’s education, training and experience related to it being a drug corridor. However, the court of appeals stated that they “give due weight to the troopers’ factual inferences because officers may draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences” from the cumulative information available to them that “may elude an untrained person.”[viii]
The court of appeals then held
Based on the totality of the circumstances-Gonzalez’s nervous behavior, implausible story, and the trooper’s deductions therefrom-it was not unreasonable for the trooper to suspect that Gonzalez was involved in criminal activity. See Pack, 612 F.3d at 361-62 (holding that a defendant’s extreme nervousness, conflicting stories, and presence on a known drug.[ix]
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court that reasonable suspicion was present to prolong the detention.
The court of appeals next set out to determine if the stop was unreasonably prolonged based upon the time it took for the canine unit to arrive. The court examined the legal principles relevant to this issue and stated
After developing reasonable suspicion of other crimes during a traffic stop, an officer is permitted to detain the car’s occupants for a reasonable amount of time to dispel the suspicion. Pack, 612 F.3d at 350. This court has held that a ten-minute delay in deploying a canine unit after developing reasonable suspicion did not unreasonably extend a traffic stop. Smith, 952 F.3d at 646, 650-51.[x]
The court of appeals noted that, at 9:47 into the traffic stop, the trooper had developed reasonable suspicion. He then asked for consent, to which Gonzalez originally avoided. At 11:33, the trooper radioed for a canine unit to come to the stop location. At 19:33 into the stop, the canine unit arrived. This was approximately eight-and-a-half minutes after the trooper developed reasonable suspicion. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that the traffic stop was not unreasonably delayed waiting on the canine’s arrival.
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] No. 23-10963 (5th Cir. July 9, 2024)
[ii] Id. at 2-3
[iii] Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 6 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added)
[vi] Id. at 7 (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. at 11
[ix] Id. at 11-12
[x] Id. at 12 (emphasis added)
