On May 14, 2024, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Faile v. City of Leesburg[i], in which the court examined whether two officers were entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest. The relevant facts of Faile are as follows:
On April 3, 2020, Plaintiff was living in his office at a rental property he managed in Leesburg, Florida. That afternoon, Plaintiff had an altercation with the tenant and her boyfriend during which the boyfriend pushed Plaintiff to the ground. As Plaintiff walked away, he “exposed a small portion of skin on the right side of his lower back and approximately one to two inches . . . of his right upper buttocks,” slapped the exposed area, and told the boyfriend, “[K]iss my ass.” The tenant and her boyfriend recorded a video of Plaintiff as he walked away.
Both Plaintiff and the tenant contacted the Leesburg police to report the altercation, and Defendants Hart and Carter responded to the scene. The officers questioned Plaintiff, the tenant, and her boyfriend about the most recent altercation and the incidents that had occurred previously during the day. The tenant and her boyfriend told Carter during questioning that they had a video recording of Plaintiff exposing his buttocks and possibly his genitalia as he walked away from them earlier. Carter and Hart viewed the tenant’s video on the scene, after which the officers concluded that they “saw the exposure of sexual organs.”
Although Hart previously had advised Plaintiff he could leave the scene, Carter yelled at Plaintiff, who was by this time inside his truck, to stop and that he was under arrest. Carter then forcefully pulled Plaintiff from the truck, handcuffed him, and placed him in Hart’s patrol car. Hart transported Plaintiff to the police department booking room, where Carter informed Plaintiff that he was being charged with exposure of sexual organs in violation of Florida Statutes § 800.03. Carter seized Plaintiff’s truck and had it towed from the property.
Plaintiff was booked and remained in the Lake County jail until 8:00 p.m. that evening, when he bonded out. Three days later, the State Attorney’s Office dismissed the exposure of sexual organs charge against Plaintiff due to insufficient evidence, and a week after the dismissal the Florida Department of Law Enforcement expunged Plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff was unable to retrieve his truck from the towing company until April 6, and he was unable to return to his residence at the rental property until April 10 because of a victim “no-contact” order.
Hart and Carter were disciplined by the Leesburg police department due to their involvement in Plaintiff’s arrest. According to a disciplinary report attached to the complaint, Hart stated in a report written on the day of the incident that she had viewed the tenant’s video and that it showed Plaintiff “pulling his pants down, while bending over showing his sexual organs and buttocks as he walked . . . away from the victim.” Hart concluded that Plaintiff had violated Florida Statutes § 800.03 by “exposing his sexual organs in front of the victim and her boyfriend.” As noted in the disciplinary report, however, it was apparent from the video that Plaintiff “did not expose his genitals.” Hart allegedly “resigned in lieu of termination” due to her conduct resulting in Plaintiff’s arrest. Carter received a written reprimand based on the incident.[ii]
Faile sued Officers Hart and Carter for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed all claims except the false arrest claim and the unlawful seizure of personal property claim. The officers appealed the denial of their motion for qualified immunity to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. [Note: This article will not discuss the state law claims.]
On appeal, the court first noted that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity when they act in their discretionary capacity, unless the plaintiff satisfies a two-pronged test. First, the plaintiff must show that the officer violated a constitutional right. Second, the plaintiff must show that the clear established such every reasonable officer would have known he was violating the plaintiff’s rights.
The False Arrest Claim
The court then examined the relevant legal principles that apply to false arrest claims and stated that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. Conversely, the existence of probable cause at the time of the arrest is “an absolute bar” to a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment.
The court also noted that even if an officer lacks actual probable cause, he or she may still be entitled to qualified immunity if they had “arguable probable cause” at the time of arrest. Specifically, the court stated
Even without actual probable cause, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he had “arguable probable cause to arrest [the] plaintiff.” Id. “Arguable probable cause exists where reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the [defendant] could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). The arguable probable cause standard “recognizes that law enforcement officers may make reasonable but mistaken judgments regarding probable cause but does not shield officers who unreasonably conclude that probable cause exists.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original).[iii]
Here, the officers argued that they had arguable probable cause to arrest Faile for unlawfully exposing his sexual organs under Florida statute Section 800.03. The court of appeals noted that the statute prohibited a person from exposing their “sexual organs.” Further, the Florida Supreme Court has previously interpreted the statute to require that the exposure be “lascivious or lewd,” which has a sexual connotation. The court of appeals stated
[I]t would be objectively unreasonable for an officer to believe this statute was violated by Plaintiff’s exposure of “a small portion of skin on the right side of his lower back” and “one to two inches . . . of his right upper buttocks.”[iv]
The court also noted that the officers cannot rely on the statements of the tenants that Faile showed his genitalia because
[S]uch reliance is foreclosed given Plaintiff’s allegation—supported by the disciplinary report attached to the complaint—that the officers viewed the video themselves before arresting Plaintiff. Having seen the video, the officers should have known that it did not show Plaintiff exposing his genitalia, despite what the tenant said. Indeed, construing the facts in favor of Plaintiff, the video evidence viewed by the officers on the scene established Plaintiff’s innocence of the crime for which he was arrested.[v]
The court also stated
[C]onstruing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, the officers did not “reasonably but mistakenly conclude[] that probable cause was present” to arrest Plaintiff for violating § 800.03. See D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 65, 138 S. Ct. 577, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018) (quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted). Instead, they knew after watching the tenant’s video that Plaintiff had not exposed his sexual organs in violation of § 800.03, but falsified their account of the incident in statements made in support of his arrest under that statute. See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[F]alsifying facts to establish probable cause is patently unconstitutional.”), abrogated on other grounds by Washington v. Durand, 25 F.4th 891, 899 (11th Cir. 2022). “[E]xisting precedent” at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest made the unconstitutionality of the arrest under those circumstances “beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12, 136 S. Ct. 305, 193 L. Ed. 2d 255 (2015) (quotation marks omitted).[vi]
The court of appeals then held that the officers did not have actual or arguable probable cause to arrest Faile for exposing his sexual organs.
It is also important to note that if the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Faile for some other charge, they would be entitled to qualified immunity, even if they did not charge Faile with that offense. The officers attempted to argue this point, but at this stage of the litigation, the court must construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff (Faile) and the plaintiff did not assert any facts in his complaint that show the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest him for another offense. This may be shown at a later time, such as at trial, but at this stage, the undisputed facts did not support that the plaintiff committed other offenses for which the officers had arguable probable cause to arrest Faile.
Next, the court examined if both officers were subject to liability for false arrest since Carter physically effected the arrest and Hart completed the warrant process and transported Faile. The court of appeals noted
It is true that “[m]erely being present with the arresting officers at the scene is not enough” to establish the causal connection required to impose individual liability for an unlawful arrest under § 1983.[vii]
In Faile’s case, Officer Hart completed the warrant affidavit and Carter was her supervisor, who was on the scene of the incident.
Faile claimed that Officer Hart completed the warrant affidavit in which she “falsely stated [ ] that the tenant’s video showed Plaintiff pulling his pants down while bending over showing his sexual organs and buttocks as he walked south, away from the victim.”[viii] The court noted that, although Hart did not complete the affidavit until after the arrest, she made the same statement on the scene and that was the basis for the arrest at the scene. This was documented in the disciplinary investigation.
Faile claimed that Sergeant Carter pulled Faile from his truck, handcuffed him, and placed him in the rear of Hart’s patrol vehicle after receiving confirmation from Hart that the video showed Faile exposing his sexual organs and buttocks. Faile also asserted that Carter also watched the video.
The court of appeals then held that under these facts, the plaintiff has shown a causal connection between each officer and the arrest sufficient to create a claim against both.
Therefore, the court of appeals held that Faile established (1) a constitutional violation (false arrest under the Fourth Amendment) and (2) that the law was beyond debate, or in other words clearly established. Since both prongs of the test to defeat qualified immunity were satisfied, the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for both Hart and Carter
The Seizure of Personal Property Claim
The court first noted the relevant legal principles related to this claim and stated
Generally, the seizure of personal property is per se unreasonable when not pursuant to a warrant issued upon probable cause. Crocker v. Beatty, 886 F.3d 1132, 1136 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). There are several exceptions to this rule, and it is well-established that police have the authority to seize and remove from the street “vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976).[i]
In his complaint, Faile claimed that his truck was towed from private property where he lived. He claimed that it was not blocking traffic or threatening public safety. Further, the department disciplinary investigation supported the plaintiff’s allegations and stated “that Carter ‘approved the towing of Plaintiff’s vehicle’ when it could have been ‘parked and secured at his own property.’”[ii]
The court held based on the above facts, Faile has alleged a viable claim for unlawful seizure of personal property under the Fourth Amendment.
As such, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of qualified immunity for both officers.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] No. 23-11465 (11th Cir. May 24, 2024 Unpublished)
[ii] Id. at 3-5
[iii] Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 12
[v] Id. at 13-14
[vi] Id. at 14 (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. at 17 (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. at 17
[ix] Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added)
[x] Id. at 19
