On April 16, 2024, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Chisesi v. Hunady[i], which is instructive regarding a sheriff’s liability for failing to train deputies on dealing with mentally ill subjects.  In this case, Jonathan Victor was involved in a single vehicle accident on an interstate in Alabama.  Firefighters and paramedics arrived and noticed that Victor’s hand was wrapped in a bloody cloth, he was bleeding, and he was acting strange and aggressive.  Victor yelled at the paramedics to leave, and as they were doing so, one believed he saw a weapon on Victor’s lap.

Deputy Hunady arrived and the paramedic informed him of the above information.  The information known to the deputy was that Victor had crashed his car, was barricaded in his car, paramedics had seen a weapon on his lap, he was covered in blood with his arm wrapped, he “grabbed something”, he was refusing to comply with commands, and he was talking to himself.

Deputy Hunady took cover, with his rifle, behind a fire truck.  For approximately ten minutes, he told Victor that he was with the sheriff’s department, he should exit the vehicle with his hands up, and that he was there to help him.  Victor did not comply and was moving around in his vehicle.

After about ten minutes, Victor exited the passenger side of his vehicle, which was the side closest to the deputies.  His hand was wrapped in a manner that could conceal a weapon.  The deputies stated that Victor’s arms were “punched out” in an “aggressive, shooter-type stance” as if aiming a weapon at them, something that Victor’s estate disputes in the lawsuit. The estate alleges that Victor’s hand was wrapped because it was bleeding and he was holding his arm because it was injured. The court noted that the video could be interpreted by a jury to support either version of events.

Deputy Hunady and other deputies repeatedly ordered Victor to “drop it” and stop, as Victor walked toward them.  Victor replied, “No, you drop it,” as he continued to advance toward the deputies.  As Victor continued to advance, Deputy Hunady shot Victor, who tragically died.

Chisesi, the administratrix of Victor’s estate sued Deputy Hunady for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and Sheriff Mack for failing to train his deputies on how to deal with the mentally ill.  Both filed motions for summary judgment and qualified immunity and the district court denied their motions.  Both appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

Regarding the excessive force claim against Deputy Hunady, because his denial of qualified immunity rested upon a factual dispute, the court of appeals held that they did not have jurisdiction to rule on his appeal.  Therefore, the facts must be decided by a jury.

Regarding the allegation of failure to train deputies on how to deal with the mentally ill, the court of appeals stated that they did have jurisdiction on the Sheriff’s appeal because it involved a question of law rather than a dispute of facts.

The court then discussed the legal principles that are relevant in cases where a plaintiff alleges a failure to train led to a violation of his constitutional rights.  The court stated

A supervisor can be held liable for failure to train under § 1983 “‘only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [officers] come into contact.'” Id. at 1052 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989)). Deliberate indifference is an exacting standard, requiring proof that a supervisor “disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. This means that a plaintiff alleging a constitutional violation “must demonstrate that the supervisor had ‘actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes [his or her] employees to violate citizen’s constitutional rights,’ and that armed with that knowledge the supervisor chose to retain the training program.” Keith, 749 F.3d at 1052.[ii]

Simply put, to be liable for failure to train, (1) the sheriff must have actual or constructive notice of a known or obvious risk to the constitutional rights of citizens based on deficient training and (2) the sheriff must then disregard that risk such that he acted with deliberate indifference.

The court of appeals also discussed how a sheriff could be put on “actual or constructive notice” of a deficient training program.  The court stated

A supervisor may be put on actual or constructive notice of deficient training in two ways. Ordinarily, a plaintiff must show “‘[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.'” Id. at 1053 (alteration in original) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62). Alternatively, a plaintiff may show actual or constructive notice “without evidence of prior incidents, if the likelihood for constitutional violation is so high that the need for training would be obvious.” Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293. But this second option—using a single incident as the basis for liability—is available in only a “narrow range of circumstances.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997). The Supreme Court hypothesized that a supervisor could be liable without a prior pattern of constitutional violations if, for example, he armed his police force with firearms and deployed the police—without any training— into the public to capture fleeing felons. Connick, 563 U.S. at 63-64 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10).

Moreover, a single incident is unlikely to give rise to liability for failure to train where the underlying practice “does not carry a high probability for constitutional violations” or where its omission from the training program at issue is not “‘glaring.'” Lewis, 561 F.3d at 1293 (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 410). So liability on this basis is rare.[iii]

Thus, the required “actual or constructive notice” can be proven in two ways.  First, it can be proven by showing a pattern of similar constitutional violations by employees who are not being sufficiently trained.  Second, it can be proven without prior constitutional violations if “the likelihood for constitutional violations is so high that the need for training would be obvious.”[iv]  However, regarding this second option, the court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court gave an example of a situation where officers are issued firearms without any training.  As such, the courts will rarely utilize this option; rather, plaintiffs are normally required to show a pattern of similar constitutional violations related to a failure to train.

In Victor’s case, the plaintiff, Chisesi, attempted to establish a failure to train claim on the “obvious need” option rather than showing a pattern of similar violations.  The court of appeals stated

Even if Officer Hunady committed a constitutional violation, the “narrow circumstances” that justify imposing liability on Sheriff Mack for failure to train on the basis of a single incident are not present here. Chisesi presented evidence that from 2015 to 2018, there were at least 1,000 officer-involved shootings in the United States where the subject appeared to be in a mental health crisis. Although this evidence shows the possibility of recurring situations involving those suffering mental health crises, the evidence is far more equivocal on whether there was an obvious potential for the violation of constitutional rights and an obvious need for more or different training.[v]

The court of appeals noted that training officers and deputies on how to engage with the mentally ill, how to handle barricaded suspects, and how to de-escalate are certainly important, it also noted that

[T]he failure to train officers in those areas does not “carry a high probability for constitutional violations in the manner intended by the ‘so obvious’ notice that would open the door to [supervisor] liability.” Id. Moreover, we cannot say that Sheriff Mack knew to a moral certainty that constitutional violations would result from declining to further train his deputies on engaging with individuals experiencing mental health crises.[vi]

Therefore, the court of appeals held that Sheriff Mack was entitled to summary judgment on the failure to train claim because

Chisesi failed to demonstrate that Sheriff Mack had actual or constructive notice that the particular omissions in the training program were likely to result in constitutional violations.[vii]

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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Citations

[i] No. 21-11700 (11th Cir. April 16, 2024)

[ii] Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added)

[iii] Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added)

[iv] Id.

[v] Id. at 19-20

[vi] Id. at 20

[vii] Id. at 20-21