On August 22, 2023, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided the United States v. Joins[i], which serves as an excellent review of the law related to search warrants, curtilage, and the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement. The relevant facts of Joins are as follows:
Federal and Florida-state law enforcement received a tip from a confidential informant that Joins was distributing methamphetamine from a mobile home on Sherman Avenue in Panama City, Florida. Based on this tip, law enforcement officers obtained a warrant to search the mobile home. The search warrant authorized the officers to “enter the [mobile home] premises and the curtilage thereof and any vehicles parked thereon . . . and then and there to search diligently for the property described in this warrant.”
Officers went to the Sherman Avenue residence to execute the search warrant. When they arrived at the mobile home, they saw two men, later identified as Joins and Webb, standing outside trying to jump-start a motorcycle using cables connected to a silver Nissan sedan. The officers detained the two men as they began the search. Inside the mobile home, the officers encountered two people: Randall Grant, who was just inside the front door, and Amanda Grant, who was in one of the bedrooms. The officers observed drugs and drug paraphernalia in rooms throughout the mobile home.
During the search, the officers found a bag on the residence’s front step. Inside the bag, they found a shoebox holding a large Ziploc bag filled with a substance that looked like methamphetamine.
The officers also searched the silver Nissan. Inside the Nissan, they found a camouflage bag containing a large Ziploc bag with a substance inside that appeared to be methamphetamine. Field testing confirmed that the bag contained methamphetamine, and lab testing later revealed that each Ziploc bag contained approximately one kilogram of methamphetamine.[ii]
Joins filed a motion to suppress and argued that his vehicle was outside of the curtilage, therefore, the search warrant did not authorize a search of his vehicle. Further, he argued that there was not independent probable cause for the search of his vehicle because the search took place prior to the search of the residence and the bag on the front steps, which the state argued provided probable cause for the search of Joins’ vehicle. Joins made this argument because some of the arrest warrant affidavits for the defendants in the case stated that the drugs found in Joins’ car were found prior to the search of the residence. The state argued that testimony at the motion to suppress and the officers’ written reports stated that the drugs in Joins’ car were found after the search of the house.
The district court credited the officers’ testimony and found that the drugs in Joins’ vehicle were found after the search of the house, which provided probable cause to search the car. The district court also found that the car was outside of the curtilage and the scope of the search warrant, however, the automobile exception supported the search of the car.
The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Joins appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first noted that they cannot overturn the factual findings of the district court unless the findings were clearly in error.
The court then examined the legal principles that applied to Joins’ case. First, the court noted that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to search any area where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Second, the court of appeals noted that there are exceptions to the warrant requirement. Specifically, the court stated
One such exception is the automobile exception. A warrantless search of an automobile is constitutional when (1) the vehicle is “readily mobile,” and (2) there is “probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2011). The first prong is satisfied if the vehicle is operational. United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2007). And as to the second prong, an officer has probable cause to search a vehicle when “the facts, considering the totality of the circumstances and viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer, establish ‘a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.‘” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018)); see California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-70, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991) (explaining that if officers have probable cause to believe a car contains evidence of criminal activity, they may search every part of the car that may conceal this evidence).[iii]
The court then set out to determine if the search of Joins’ car met the requirements of the automobile exception.
Regarding the first prong, whether the vehicle was “readily mobile,” the court noted that Joins and Webb drove the car to the location of the search warrant on the night of the search. Thus, the car was operational, and the first prong of the test was satisfied.
Regarding the second prong, the court set out to determine if the search was supported by probable cause that there was contraband or evidence of drug trafficking in the vehicle.
The court of appeals first noted that there was a factual dispute between the government and Joins regarding when the search of his vehicle occurred. The government argued that the search of the vehicle was after the search of the residence and the search of the bag of drugs on the porch steps. Joins argued the search of the vehicle occurred prior to the search of the residence and the search of the bag. The court of appeals noted that the district court found that the officers first secured the mobile home and searched the bag on the steps that contained drugs, and then subsequently searched the vehicle. The court of appeals examined the evidence upon which the district court relied in making that finding to determine if the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous. The court noted the finding was based upon (1) the sworn testimony of the officers at the motion to suppress that they first secured the mobile home and searched the bag on the porch steps prior to search the vehicle, (2) they saw Joins and Webb standing outside the vehicle near the mobile home, (3) they searched the bag on the porch steps and located large amount of suspected methamphetamine, and (4) Randall (a resident inside the mobile home) told the officers that Joins and Webb had come to the mobile home in that vehicle and brought the bag containing the suspected methamphetamine that was on the porch steps. Therefore, since the search warrant was directed at finding evidence of drug trafficking, there was a substantial chance (or probable cause) that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of drug trafficking, and the finding was not clearly erroneous.
The court of appeals then held
[W]e conclude that the search was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Webb’s motion to suppress the methamphetamine evidence discovered in the vehicle.[iv]
The court of appeals declined to determine if the vehicle was located on the curtilage because they held that the automobile exception justified the search.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] No. 21-13623 (11th Cir. Decided August 22, 2023 Unpublished)
[ii] Id. at 3-4
[iii] Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 11
