In the world of private business, the doctrine of respondeat superior can make an employer liable for the torts committed by their employees in the scope of their duties. However, this doctrine is not applicable to supervisors in law enforcement agencies. In 2016, the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided Saldivar v. Racine,[i] which is instructive regarding supervisory liability for police supervisors. The relevant facts of Saldivar, taken directly from the case, are as follows:
In early June 2011, Elba Saldivar, a resident of Fall River, contacted the Fall River Police Department and reported that her child had been harassed at school. The Police Department assigned Officer Anthony Pridgen to investigate the incident.
Pridgen arrived at Saldivar’s apartment in his marked police cruiser and in full uniform and told Saldivar he needed to question her as part of his investigation. Saldivar allowed Pridgen into her apartment.
Upon entering the apartment, Pridgen pulled out his service handgun and pointed it at Saldivar. He then grabbed Saldivar and assaulted, battered, and raped her. He told Saldivar he would kill her and her children if she reported the assault.
Despite Pridgen’s threats, Saldivar reported the assault to the Police Department, and the Department conducted an investigation. The investigation uncovered security camera footage at Saldivar’s housing complex that showed a police cruiser parked next to one of the buildings in that complex and Pridgen entering and leaving that building. A subsequent search of Pridgen’s police locker led to the seizure of various items, including two condoms and two packages of “Extenze” tablets.
Pridgen resigned from his job as a Fall River police officer on June 28, 2011. In September of that same year, the Bristol County, Massachusetts, District Attorney’s office informed Saldivar that it would not prosecute Pridgen.
The complaint also sets forth the following allegations concerning how Pridgen had been disciplined by the Police Department on various occasions prior to the alleged assault in February 2007, he was suspended for thirty days –a punishment later reduced to a written warning and training — for failing to abide by Department policy in handling a domestic violence call. A few months later, in October 2007, Pridgen was suspended for five days without pay for violating the Department’s sick leave policy. And, according to his disciplinary record, in January 2011, he was suspended for a day for violating the “[r]oll call/[leave benefit] policy.” Pridgen was also reprimanded seven times between September 2003 and June 2011 for “[f]ailure to log & submit [e]vidence [f]orm,” “attention to duty,” “absence from duty/late,” “cruiser accident,” “pursuit policy,” “tardiness,” and “reports.”
Pridgen’s final disciplinary action came in June of 2011, shortly after the alleged rape and assault. At that time, he was suspended for five days without pay for allowing his license to carry his service handgun to lapse for five years.[ii]
Saldivar filed suit in federal court for a variety of constitutional and state law claims. The claims discussed in this article are as follows: (1) the suit against Pridgen, former police chief Daniel Racine, and the City of Fall River for violating her constitutional rights under Section 1983, and (2) the suit against City for state law claims for negligent hiring and supervision. Pridgen never appeared in court and a $600,000 default judgment was awarded against him in favor of Saldivar. Chief Racine and the City filed a motion to dismiss the claims against each and the district court granted the motions.
Saldivar subsequently filed an appeal with the First Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the dismissal of her Section 1983 claim against Racine, her Section 1983 claim against the City, and her negligent hiring, training, and supervision claim against the City.
The court first noted that to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” In evaluating whether a claim is plausible, the court conducts a two-step analysis. First, the court separates the factual allegations from the conclusory legal allegations. Second, the court must determine if the factual allegations are “sufficient to support the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable.”[iii]
- Is former-Chief Racine liable under Section 1983 for a violation of Saldivar’s constitutional rights?
The court of appeals first noted the legal principles relevant to this issue and stated
[A] supervisor is not liable under § 1983 for the actions of a subordinate on a respondeat superior theory. See Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994). Rather, the supervisor is liable for the subordinate’s actions if the subordinate’s behavior led to a constitutional violation and if “the supervisor‘s action or inaction was affirmatively linked to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference.” Estate of Bennett v. Wainwright, 548 F.3d 155, 176-77 (1st Cir. 2008) (brackets omitted) (quoting Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2008)). . .
In order for a police supervisor to be deemed “deliberately indifferent,” the supervisor must have “actual or constructive knowledge” of a “grave risk of harm” posed by the subordinate and fail to take “easily available measures to address the risk.” Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1998). [iv]
Thus, in order to link the supervisor’s inaction to the constitutional violation, (1) the supervisor must have “actual or constructive knowledge” of a “grave risk of harm” posed by the subordinate and (2) the supervisor must fail to take measures to address the risk.
Saldivar alleged that Pridgen’s lengthy record of policy violations indicates that he had a propensity for not following police regulations and might not follow regulations in the future. Pridgen’s disciplinary history was as follows: (1) in February 2007 he received a written warning and training for failing to properly handle a domestic violence call; (2) in October 2007, he was suspended for five days without pay for violating the sick leave policy; (3) in January 2011, he was suspended for one day without pay for violating the roll-call/leave benefit policy; (4) between 2003 and 2011, he was reprimanded seven times for failing to log evidence, attention to duty, absence from duty/late, vehicle accident, pursuit policy violation, tardiness, and report writing; and (5) in June 2011, he was suspended for five days without pay for allowing his license to carry his service handgun lapse for five years.
The court of appeals noted that, while Pridgen had a number of policy violations prior to his alleged assault and rape of Saldivar, his specific violations were not of the nature that would indicate that Pridgen had a propensity for violence, such as assault and rape. Saldivar argued that allowing his firearms license to lapse made it plausible that Pridgen would use it to commit a violent crime, however the court of appeals disagreed and stated that the lapse of the firearms license would not indicate that Pridgen posed a “grave risk” of violence.
The court of appeals then held
[U]nder the Iqbal standard, the complaint must set forth facts that make the § 1983 claim plausible. Id. at 678. And, here, we do not believe the facts that have been set forth suffice to make it plausible that the supervisor — Racine — is liable under § 1983 for the horrific conduct by Officer Pridgen that is alleged.[v]
As such, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court in granting the motion to dismiss on this claim.
The Bottom Line:
- A supervisor is liable for the action of his subordinates (1) if the supervisor directly participates in the unconstitutional actions or (2) if the supervisor is aware of an employees propensity to engage in a specific type of unconstitutional conduct and the supervisor takes no action to discipline and/or train that officer such that the future risk posed the officer is mitigated. This failure to take action is said to be “deliberately indifferent” to the rights of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff will allege that the deliberate indifference caused the violation.
- Generally, if a supervisor takes action to mitigate the risk posed by the employee, even if that action later turns out to be ineffective, the supervisor will not be held to be deliberately indifferent and will not be liable for the actions of the subordinate [see Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th 1994) holding although [the supervisor’s] actions may not have been the most effective and although he might have done more, such a rule is not the standard by which we judge [the supervisor’s] conduct. In short, [the supervisor] simply did not exhibit the “‘tacit authorization’ of or ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional injuries” required for § 1983 supervisory liability].
- Under Shaw v. Stroud, the Fourth Circuit described three elements of supervisory liability as follows:
- “The plaintiff must show (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices,” and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.”
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] 818 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2016)
[ii] Id. at 16-17
[iii] Id. at 18
[iv] Id. (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 20 (emphasis added)
