On January 28, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Smith v. City of Johns Creek[i], in which plaintiffs sued a private company, Lifeline Animal Project, Inc., which provides animal control services to the city, for violating their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The relevant facts of Smith, taken directly from the case, are as follows:
Defendant Lifeline Animal Project, Inc. is a Georgia corporation that, at least as of mid-2020, was under contract with Fulton County to provide animal control services. In June 2020, an unspecified Lifeline employee went to the joint residence of Plaintiffs Dwight, Catherine, and Bryant Smith in Johns Creek, Georgia, to “investigate” an alleged dog bite reported five days earlier. Before having any contact with the plaintiffs, the Lifeline employee called 911 to report being “threatened.” A Johns Creek police officer responded to the call.
Without a warrant, the Lifeline employee and the officer entered the property, passed “through a gated entrance on the deck[,] and knocked on the back door.” According to the complaint, there was a “no trespass” sign posted on the plaintiffs’ front porch, and “[t]he area” that the Lifeline employee and the officer walked through was “not visible to the public and considered the private curtilage.” None of the plaintiffs consented to the entry onto their property.
Plaintiff Catherine Smith answered the door, after which the Lifeline employee and the officer “interrogated [her] aggressively.” At some point, Catherine “called 911 and reported the incident.” She also asked the Lifeline employee and the officer if they had a warrant. After they responded that they did not, Catherine asked them to “vacate the property.” The Lifeline employee and the officer “refused” to do so until a police supervisor told them to leave.[ii]
The plaintiff’s sued the City, police department, officers, and “Fulton County animal control officers.” The plaintiffs amended their complaint to include Lifeline Animal Project, Inc. and ultimately voluntarily dismissed all defendants except Lifeline, whom they alleged violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment.
The district court dismissed the case against Lifeline, holding that the plaintiffs failed to properly state a claim for a violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the court first examined the legal principles relevant to the case. The court first noted that, to properly state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the constitutional violation was (1) committed by a person acting under the color of state law and (2) the violation deprived the plaintiff of their Constitutional rights or other rights under federal law.[iii] Individual officers can be held personally liable under §1983 for violating a plaintiff’s rights.
Additionally, the government entity that employs the officer can be liable under §1983. The court explained
Under Monell, “[a] county is liable under section 1983 only for acts for which the county is actually responsible.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (alteration adopted). There are “three ways” that a plaintiff can establish a county’s liability under Monell: “(1) identifying an official policy; (2) identifying an unofficial custom or widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with the force of law; or (3) identifying a municipal official with final policymaking authority whose decision violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Chabad Chayil, Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1229 (11th Cir. 2022). The identified policy or custom must be the “moving force behind the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Id. at 1235 (quotation omitted).[iv]
However, the court of appeals also noted that
A governmental entity “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).[v]
Simply put, this means that when an officer violates a person’s Constitutional rights, the government entity is not liable for the officer’s actions unless the plaintiff can show that the government’s policy, custom, or final policymaker’s decision caused, or was the moving force of, the violation.
The court also noted that a private entity, such as Lifeline, as well as its employees, can be considered as “state actors” in certain situations. Specifically, the court stated
[T]he Monell rationale applies to private entities acting in the place of [counties].” Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997); accord Craig v. Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011). In other words, where a private entity contracts with a county to perform what would otherwise be state action, and the plaintiff sues the private entity under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that that entity—not just the entity’s employee—violated the plaintiff’s rights. See Buckner, 116 F.3d at 452. After all, in such cases, the private entity “becomes the functional equivalent of” the county. Id.[vi]
With these principles in mind, the court of appeals stated that they would assume, without deciding, that the plaintiffs made an adequate showing that Lifeline’s employee that entered the plaintiffs’ property in response to the dog bite investigation, was acting under the color of law, as a “state actor.” Additionally, the court also assumed, without deciding, that Lifeline’s employee violated the Fourth Amendment when he entered the plaintiffs’ curtilage without consent and without a warrant.
Therefore, all that remains for the plaintiff to survive the motion to dismiss is that they must adequately show that a Lifeline, Inc. policy, custom, or final policymaker’s decision caused the Lifeline employee to violate the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.
The court of appeals then set out to determine if the plaintiffs’ sufficiently alleged that Lifeline had an “official policy” of permitting their employees to enter private premises in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiff failed to allege an official Lifeline policy permitted such acts.
The court next examined if the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Lifeline engaged in an
[U]nofficial custom or widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with the force of law.” Chabad Chayil, Inc., 48 F.4th at 1229.[vii]
While the plaintiff did allege that the Lifeline employee in their case violated their Fourth Amendment rights, the plaintiff did not provide allegations of a “custom or widespread practice” of similar violations that occurred prior to the incident at hand. The court stated
[A]bsent something more, “a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell.” City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791 (1985). [viii]
Lastly, the court of appeals also stated that the plaintiff failed to
[I]dentify a Lifeline official that had final policymaking authority whose decision violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.[ix]
For example, if a company official who had final policymaking authority made a decision that caused the employee that was investigating the dog bite to violate the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, the company could be liable under Monell. The court noted that the plaintiff alleged no facts showing that the person who entered their property had final policymaking authority.
As such, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court granting Lifeline’s motion to dismiss.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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[i] No. 24-10815 (11th Cir. January 28, 2025 Non-Argument)
[ii] Id. at 2-3
[iii] Id. at 7
[iv] Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added)
[v] Id.
[vi] Id. at 9 (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. at 10
[viii] Id. (emphasis added)
[ix] Id.
