On May 9, 2025, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Moderson v. City of Neenah[i], in which the court examined whether the Fourth Amendment was violated when officers handcuffed and detained a man that escaped a hostage situation. The relevant facts of Moderson, taken directly from the case, are as follows:
At 8:56 a.m. on December 5, 2015, the City of Neenah Police Department alerted officers to a hostage situation at Eagle Nation Cycles. Initial reports indicated a long-haired, bearded man, dressed in a flannel shirt and armed with a MAC-10 submachine gun had taken two or three hostages. Police dispatch told the responding officers that a shot had been fired inside the building and the gunman said he would start killing hostages in five minutes.
The on-duty patrol officer, Lieutenant Shaun O’Bre, instructed the officers to form an “invisible containment” perimeter around the building to not give away the officers’ location. However, as the officers took their positions, a truck fled the scene. Dispatch advised the officers that the shooter was inside the truck, so some officers abandoned their positions and moved to intercept the vehicle.
Sergeant Angela Eichmann and another officer stopped the vehicle and identified the driver as Ethan Moderson. Ethan reported that a white male with long hair he did not recognize had held him hostage at gunpoint inside Eagle Nation, but he had escaped at the urging of his father, Plaintiff Ryan Moderson. Ethan also reported that his father was still in the building. Sergeant Eichmann questioned Ethan for approximately one minute before releasing him and returning to the perimeter.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant O’Bre learned that the individual fleeing in the truck was not the gunman, and the gunman remained inside Eagle Nation. In response, he assembled a team of officers to enter the building and free the hostages. The team prepared to breach the building believing that, because four minutes had already passed since the gunman threatened to kill hostages, people would die if the officers did not enter immediately.
The officers’ attempted rescue was met with chaos. Motorcycles and mechanical equipment frustrated their entry into the building. Once in, the officers shouted: “Police,” “Get down,” “Get on the ground now,” and “Show me your hands.” Although Plaintiffs dispute this, one officer reported seeing two individuals who did not appear in distress move in opposite directions, consistent with a flanking maneuver. Then, according to the officers, came a hail of gunfire during which a cloud of smoke erupted. One officer was struck in the helmet and yelled “I’m hit”; two more officers fell down an interior stairwell; and another officer—unable to determine the number or location of shooters—used “target-specific directed fire” to provide cover, allowing for the team’s retreat from the building. Back outside, the officers surmised based on the heavy gunfire and the subjects’ failure to comply with orders that they faced an ambush—not a hostage situation.
The officers then received word that two individuals were exiting the back door of Eagle Nation. The officers handcuffed both individuals, Plaintiffs Michael Petersen and Ryan Moderson. An officer transported Petersen to the Neenah Police Department and turned him over to an interview team. Meanwhile, an officer briefly interviewed Ryan Moderson before transporting him from the scene to the location of his son, Ethan. Both Modersons agreed to further interviews and voluntarily visited a nearby police station to provide written statements.
Then, three minutes after the officers retreated from Eagle Nation, another round of gunfire came from inside the building. Officers spotted an armed man, Michael Funk, run from the building, take cover behind a vehicle, and then run across the alley. Believing they had their hostage-taker, the officers shot and killed him. It turned out that Funk had been one of the hostages, not the hostage-taker.
Eventually, the hostage-taker, Brian Flatoff, exited the building and the officers arrested him. Officers also detained the final hostage, Plaintiff Steven Erato. Officers took Erato’s wallet, cell phone, vehicle key, and rosary, and transported him to the Neenah Police Department. There, Erato, accompanied by counsel, was advised he was not under arrest, he was not required to answer questions, and he was free to leave. He said he understood and agreed to an interview with police.[ii]
Ryan Moderson, Petersen, and Erato sued the City, several officers and Sergeant Eichmann for violating their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The suit against the city was dismissed, as the plaintiffs conceded they could not prove that claim. The claim against Sergeant Eichmann was dismissed by the district court because she was not involved in the detentions of the plaintiffs. The district court then granted summary judgment for the remaining officers, holding that they did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The plaintiffs appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when detained them after they escaped the hostage taker.
The court of appeals discussed the legal principles relevant to this case. First, the court discussed investigative detentions, also known as Terry stops. The court stated
[I]nvestigative stops, also known as Terry stops, are seizures for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (“The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 9)). Officers use stops when they lack probable cause for arrest but nonetheless have reasonable suspicion that the suspect may be engaged in criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-23. In doing so, an officer may briefly detain a suspect to verify or dispel his suspicion. Id. Only when an investigative stop morphs into an arrest is probable cause required. United States v. Olson, 41 F.4th 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2022).[iii]
Second, the court discussed how they assess whether a detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. First, the court considers “whether the detention is justified at the outset.”[iv] In this case, the officers seized the plaintiffs (Moderson, Petersen and Erato) during a violent hostage incident where officers believed multiple shooters were involved. The court of appeals stated that, in this circumstance, the officers were “justified in temporarily detaining Plaintiffs after they escaped the building.”[v]
The plaintiffs argued that dispatch and witnesses reported that there was one suspect/shooter, and the officers had no reason to believe there may be more. To this, the court of appeals replied
We cannot conclude that, faced with the chaotic situation unfolding at Eagle Nation, the officers had to bet their lives on the accuracy of reports about a lone gunman. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 685-86 (7th 2013) (explaining officer’s stop of suspect was justified despite discrepancies between 911 call and scene upon arrival). Even if the officers relied on initial descriptions of the hostage-taker and did not believe Plaintiffs were hostage-takers or shooters, the danger inherent in the situation justified Plaintiffs’ detentions. Est. of Biegert v. Molitor, 968 F.3d 693, 699 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Restraining an individual may be appropriate in ‘inherently dangerous situations,’ even where the officers do not suspect the restrained individual of a crime.”) (citation omitted). [vi]
As such, the court held that the seizure was justified at its inception, thus, the first requirement for a reasonable detention was met.
The second factor considered when assessing if a detention was reasonable involves examining whether “the manner of execution unreasonably infringes on the detainee’s constitutional rights.”[vii] The court of appeals further stated
For example, a seizure may become unlawful “if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [its] mission.” Id.; see also Matz, 769 F.3d at 524 (explaining that the seizure must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20)); United States v. Howard, 729 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that detention is reasonable when the “intrusion on individual liberty is marginal and is outweighed by the governmental interest in conducting legitimate police activities safely and free from interference“).[viii]
In this case, the officers argued that they used the investigatory stops for three purposes: (1) to determine the identity of the people leaving the scene; (2) to determine if anyone else had firearms; and (3) to investigate the situation without interference from the persons they stopped.[ix]
The court of appeals then set out to determine whether the seizure of each plaintiff “extended beyond the time necessary to accomplish the mission.”
The court of appeals began by evaluating the detention of Ryan Moderson. Ryan Moderson and Petersen were detained and handcuffed as they were exiting the back door of Eagle Nation. Petersen was transported to the Neenah Police Department and turned over to other officers for an interview. Ryan Moderson was questioned by an officer on-scene and then transported to the location where his son, Ethan, was located. Both Ryan and Ethan Moderson agreed to be interviewed by detectives. They were released and voluntarily visited the police station to provide written statements.
The court first noted that Ryan Moderson’s detention began when the officers handcuffed him and ended when they reunited him with his son. The court also noted that the plaintiff provided no evidence to suggest that the officers detained him longer than needed to confirm or dispel their suspicion that Moderson could be a suspect. Further, Moderson’s visit to the police station after he was released was considered a consensual encounter rather than a detention, as he presented no evidence to suggest that he was compelled or not free to decline to do so.
As such, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s holding that the officers did not violate Ryan Moderson’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, and as such, were entitled to summary judgment.
Regarding plaintiffs Petersen and Erato, the court of appeals stated that their appeal was “underdeveloped” or unsupported, and as such, their appeal was considered waived. Thus, the court did not render a decision on their appeal but rather affirmed the decision of the district court granting the officers summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims.
Lastly, the court of appeals considered the claim against Sergeant Eichmann. The court first noted
A defendant cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation if she did not cause or participate in the alleged violation. Hildebrandt v. Ill. Dep’t Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003).[x]
The court observed that Sergeant Eichmann only participated in the detention of two people, Ethan Moderson (Ryan’s son) and George Fuerte, and neither is a party in this lawsuit.
The plaintiffs argued that Sergeant Eichmann was a supervisor “in charge of the operation.” They alleged that she failed to “relay the description of the hostage-taker she received from Ethan Moderson to the officers at Eagle Nation.” To this argument, the court of appeals stated that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence to support their “information-chain theory” and failed to provide evidence that Sergeant Eichmann was involved in the decision to detain plaintiffs in this case. Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court dismissing Sergeant Eichmann from this case.
In summary, the court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for all defendants in this case.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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[i] No. 24-4076 (4th Cir. April 30, 2025)
[ii] Id. at 1-3
[iii] Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 8 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 9
[vi] Id. (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. at 10 (emphasis added)
[ix] Id.
[x] Id. at 14 (emphasis added)
