Flock Safety and Automated License Plate Readers: Balancing Public Safety, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment: Part Three – Lower Courts and ALPRs: Applying the Fourth Amendment Framework
In the previous article, we examined the constitutional principles that provide the constitutional framework for evaluating automated license plate reader (ALPR) systems under the Fourth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court has never considered the constitutionality of ALPR or Flock Safety camera systems directly, its decisions in Katz v. United States, United States v. Knotts, United States v. Jones, Carpenter v. United States, and Chatrie v. United States established the legal doctrines that now guide lower courts when addressing these issues.[1] Those cases collectively define the boundaries between traditional visual surveillance and technology-enhanced monitoring, as well as when advances in technology may transform otherwise lawful police observations into a Fourth Amendment search.
Because the Supreme Court has not yet addressed ALPR technology specifically, the task of applying these constitutional principles has fallen to lower federal and state courts. In recent years, courts across the country have considered an increasing number of Fourth Amendment challenges involving ALPR databases, including systems operated by Flock Safety and similar vendors. Although the factual circumstances vary from case to case, the constitutional question has remained consistent: Does law enforcement’s warrantless access to historical ALPR data constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?
Courts have overwhelmingly concluded that accessing historical ALPR data does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search under the facts presented in the cases decided thus far. In reaching that conclusion, courts have repeatedly relied upon the same constitutional principles discussed in the previous article. They have emphasized that ALPR systems record vehicles traveling on public roads, capture only discrete observations rather than continuous monitoring, and generally reveal information that is knowingly exposed to public view. Consequently, most courts have concluded that existing ALPR technology remains fundamentally different from the comprehensive, long-term location tracking that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpenter.[2]
That does not mean every court has employed identical reasoning or reached its conclusions without some reservations. Defendants have advanced sophisticated constitutional arguments, relying on concepts such as the mosaic theory, aggregation of otherwise innocent observations, historical reconstruction of travel patterns, and pervasive technological surveillance. Although these arguments have thus far been unsuccessful, several courts have acknowledged that continued advances in ALPR technology, or dramatically expanded camera networks, could someday present a different constitutional question than the systems currently before the courts.[3]
This article examines how lower courts have applied the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment framework to ALPR and Flock technology. Rather than simply summarizing individual opinions, it identifies the common analytical themes emerging from these decisions, explains why courts have largely rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to current ALPR systems, and highlights the constitutional arguments that continue to shape this rapidly developing area of law.
I. Courts Holding ALPR Database Searches Are Not Fourth Amendment Searches
A. The Emerging Judicial Consensus
Courts across multiple federal districts, a federal circuit court of appeals, and a state appellate court have all confronted essentially the same constitutional question: Does a law enforcement officer conduct a Fourth Amendment search by querying a historical ALPR database to determine where a vehicle has previously been observed?
Although the cases arise from different jurisdictions and involve a variety of ALPR systems, they start from a common constitutional foundation and, almost without exception, reach the same conclusion.[4]
As discussed in the previous article, Fourth Amendment analysis begins by asking whether government conduct infringes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy or otherwise constitutes a search under established constitutional doctrine.[5] Thus, when defendants challenge the use of ALPR technology, courts do not begin by asking whether the technology is sophisticated, whether it is commercially operated, or whether it makes police investigations more efficient. Instead, they ask a much narrower constitutional question: What information did law enforcement actually obtain, and did the defendant possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in that information?
This analytical framework is evident throughout the developing ALPR jurisprudence. In United States v. Martin, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia framed the issue as whether the defendant possessed either a subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in photographs of his vehicle traveling on public roads that had been captured by Flock Safety cameras.[6] Likewise, the Virginia Court of Appeals in Robinson v. Commonwealth focused on whether the historical retrieval of images stored in Norfolk’s Flock camera system constituted a Fourth Amendment search.[7] The Fifth Circuit employed essentially the same analysis in United States v. Porter, concluding that the use of periodic license plate reader observations did not implicate a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.[8]
The same approach appears throughout the remaining cases. District courts in Ohio, Florida, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and California all evaluated ALPR challenges by asking whether accessing historical license plate reader data revealed information in which society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy.[9] Although each court addressed different factual scenarios, including different numbers of camera captures, different retention periods, and different investigative techniques, the constitutional inquiry remained unchanged.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of these decisions is what they do not do. None of these courts treated ALPR technology as constitutionally unique simply because it automates the collection of information. Instead, courts consistently evaluated ALPR systems by examining the specific facts of the case before them, comparing the information actually collected with longstanding Fourth Amendment principles governing visual surveillance, public observation, and the reasonable expectation of privacy. In other words, the constitutional analysis focused less on the technology itself and more on the nature of the information that the technology revealed.
While courts discussed herein have acknowledged that ALPR technology represents a significant investigative advancement, they have overwhelmingly concluded that, under the specific facts before them, querying a historical ALPR database does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because accessing historical ALPR data generally does not invade a reasonable expectation of privacy.
B. Why Courts Distinguish ALPRs from Carpenter
Although defendants routinely rely on Carpenter v. United States when challenging ALPR evidence, lower courts have almost uniformly concluded that Carpenter does not control the analysis. The reason is straightforward. Courts view current ALPR technology as fundamentally different from the historical cell-site location information (CSLI) that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpenter.[10]
The distinction begins with the nature of the information collected. CSLI is generated continuously whenever a cellular telephone communicates with a provider’s network, allowing the government to reconstruct an individual’s movements over an extended period with extraordinary precision. By contrast, ALPR cameras record only isolated observations when a vehicle passes a fixed camera location. If a vehicle never passes a camera, no information is collected. If it passes a camera once, only a single observation is recorded. The resulting data consists of discrete snapshots rather than an uninterrupted record of a person’s movements.
Courts have repeatedly emphasized this distinction. Unlike CSLI, ALPR systems do not continuously follow a vehicle as it travels throughout a community. Instead, they simply record that a particular vehicle was observed at a particular location at a particular time. As several courts have observed, this no different from what a police officer standing beside the roadway, or even an ordinary citizen, could observe with his or her own eyes.[11]
The public nature of vehicle travel also plays a central role in the analysis. Motorists voluntarily operate their vehicles on public streets where their movements, license plates, and exterior appearance are knowingly exposed to public view. Indeed, every state requires license plates to be displayed for the very purpose of identifying vehicles traveling on public highways. Courts have therefore consistently concluded that drivers generally lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that is intentionally exposed to anyone who happens to observe the vehicle.[12]
For the same reason, courts have rejected the suggestion that ALPR technology becomes constitutionally significant merely because it automates what officers have long done manually. Before ALPR technology existed, officers routinely recorded license plate numbers, noted vehicle descriptions, conducted surveillance, and compared observations from multiple investigators. ALPR systems undoubtedly perform these tasks more efficiently and on a much larger scale, but courts have generally concluded that increased efficiency alone does not transform lawful observations into a Fourth Amendment search. As the Supreme Court cautioned in Carpenter, its decision was a narrow one and did not call into question “conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.”[13] Lower courts have repeatedly relied upon that limiting language when concluding that ALPR systems are more closely analogous to conventional visual surveillance than to the pervasive location tracking at issue in Carpenter.
This distinction explains why courts have consistently rejected attempts to equate ALPR systems with GPS monitoring or historical cell-site location information. Rather than viewing ALPR technology as continuously tracking an individual’s every movement, courts have characterized it as a network of stationary cameras that record only intermittent encounters with vehicles traveling on public roadways. Those limited observations, standing alone, have generally been viewed as insufficient to reveal the “whole of a person’s physical movements” that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpenter.[14]
That is not to say courts have ignored the rapid advancement of surveillance technology. Several opinions recognize that increasingly dense camera networks, longer retention periods, or substantially more comprehensive vehicle tracking could someday present constitutional concerns not implicated by today’s systems. Nevertheless, under the facts presented in the cases decided thus far, courts have consistently concluded that current ALPR technology remains distinguishable from the pervasive, continuous surveillance that drove the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter. Accordingly, most courts have held that accessing historical ALPR databases does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search requiring a warrant.
C. How Individual Courts Applied These Principles
Although the cases discussed in this article reach substantially the same constitutional conclusion, each opinion contributes something unique to the developing body of ALPR caselaw. Taken together, these decisions demonstrate that courts are not adopting a bright-line rule exempting ALPR technology from Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Rather, they are carefully examining the specific characteristics of the technology at issue, the quantity of information collected, and whether the resulting data resembles the type of pervasive location surveillance that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpenter. Viewed together, the cases illustrate why courts have consistently concluded that existing ALPR systems remain constitutionally distinguishable from GPS tracking or historical cell-site location information.
Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis to date appears in United States v. Martin, where the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered the use of Flock Safety cameras during an armed robbery investigation. The court emphasized the limited nature of the surveillance at issue. Over a thirty-day period, Flock cameras captured only three photographs of the defendant’s vehicle traveling on public roadways. The court concluded that these isolated observations did not reveal the “whole of [the defendant’s] physical movements,” as contemplated in Carpenter, and therefore did not invade any reasonable expectation of privacy. Equally significant, the court rejected the defendant’s invitation to adopt a balancing test that would measure the constitutionality of ALPR technology by weighing factors such as the ease, duration, or efficiency of surveillance. Instead, the court returned to the traditional Fourth Amendment inquiry, holding that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the exterior of his vehicle or its movements on public roads under the facts presented.[15]
The Virginia Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Robinson v. Commonwealth, the first reported state appellate decision addressing the constitutionality of Flock Safety cameras. Norfolk’s Flock system consisted of approximately 172 cameras positioned at intersections throughout the city. The system retained captured information, including license plate numbers, vehicle make, model, color, and distinguishing characteristics such as bumper stickers or roof racks, for thirty days. Detectives could search the database by license plate, location, or timeframe, but the system generally did not permit real-time tracking of vehicles. These operational characteristics proved important to the court’s analysis. Rather than viewing the system as continuously tracking motorists, the court characterized it as a historical database containing discrete observations of vehicles that happened to pass fixed camera locations. Because the information consisted of observations made on public roadways and did not amount to continuous surveillance, the court held that accessing the historical Flock database did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.[16]
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Porter further illustrates the distinction courts have drawn between ALPR technology and the location information at issue in Carpenter. There, the court considered a license plate reader system installed at ten fixed intersections in Gautier, Mississippi. When the defendant’s vehicle passed one of those intersections, the system generated periodic observations that ultimately led to an investigative alert. Rejecting the defendant’s reliance on Carpenter, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that ALPR technology records only intermittent observations at known locations rather than continuously documenting a person’s movements throughout the day. The court concluded that such periodic captures remain fundamentally different from the comprehensive location histories generated by cell-site location information and geofence information and therefore do not implicate the same Fourth Amendment concerns.[17]
Likewise, the Northern District of Ohio rejected a constitutional challenge in United States v. Sturdivant, even though investigators had obtained twenty-six photographs of the defendant’s vehicle over a six-week period. The defendant argued that the accumulation of these observations allowed law enforcement to reconstruct his movements in a manner comparable to the surveillance condemned in Carpenter. The court disagreed. Although recognizing the continuing advancement of ALPR technology, it concluded that the evidence, “unlike the ‘near perfect surveillance’ achievable through analysis of historical cell-site location information, the ALPR data in this case could not create ‘an all-encompassing record’ of Mr. Sturdivant’s whereabouts,” as addressed by the Supreme Court in Carpenter.[18]
The Middle District of Florida adopted much the same reasoning in United States v. Floyd. There, investigators used ALPR cameras to identify a vehicle associated with a series of robberies. In denying the defendant’s suppression motion, the court repeatedly distinguished between isolated “snapshots” of a vehicle’s location and the continuous monitoring associated with GPS devices or historical CSLI. The court concluded that, The court concluded that ALPR technology merely documents isolated moments when a vehicle passes a fixed camera location and therefore does not reveal the details of a person’s daily life that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpenter.[19]
Although United States v. Bowers involved a significantly greater quantity of ALPR data, specifically 106 separate camera detections over approximately four and one-half months, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania nevertheless reached the same constitutional conclusion. The court acknowledged that the volume of observations exceeded that found in many prior cases but concluded that the data still lacked the comprehensive and uninterrupted nature of historical cell-site location information. Even with more than one hundred camera observations, the defendant’s movements remained documented only when his vehicle happened to pass an ALPR camera. The resulting record, while substantial, did not approximate the near-continuous location monitoring discussed in Carpenter.[20]
Similarly, the District of New Jersey in United States v. Graham emphasized not simply what ALPR systems collect, but what they do not collect. The court explained that license plate reader data “does not reveal intimate details of an individual’s daily life, nor does it track a person’s every movement” in the manner contemplated by Carpenter. Unlike historical CSLI, ALPR records generally do not reveal where a person sleeps, whether they attended a medical appointment, visited a place of worship, met with an attorney, or engaged in other constitutionally sensitive activities. Instead, the system records only that a particular vehicle passed a specific location at a specific time. Because the information remained limited to public observations of a vehicle traveling on public roads, the court concluded that no reasonable expectation of privacy had been infringed.[21]
Finally, United States v. Rubin the District Court for the Northern District of California similarly held that no search under the Fourth Amendment occurred when an investigator used an ALPR search to identify the vehicle and license plate number of an armed robbery suspect’s vehicle. The court rejected the argument that the ALPR search should be controlled by Carpenter because in this case, the investigator conducted one query for only the time of the robbery to identify the license plate. Further, the single entry revealed nothing about the suspect’s movements, as did the search in Carpenter. The court stated, “until a database of this sort ‘evolves to provide comparable location information to the records at issue in Carpenter,’ holding that the search of an ALPR database “requires a warrant currently based on the future risk of a violation . . . would be folly.”[22]
Taken individually, these decisions involve different camera networks, different retention periods, different numbers of observations, and different criminal investigations. Viewed collectively, however, they reveal a consistent constitutional principle. Courts have focused less on the sophistication of ALPR technology than on the nature of the information it actually collects. Whether the database contained three photographs over thirty days, twenty-six photographs over six weeks, or more than one hundred observations over several months, courts have repeatedly concluded that intermittent observations of vehicles traveling on public roads do not resemble the pervasive and comprehensive location surveillance that drove the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter. For that reason, each court discussed herein has concluded that querying a historical ALPR database does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
II. The Arguments Raised by Defendants
As ALPR technology has become more sophisticated and more widely deployed, so too have the constitutional arguments advanced by criminal defendants. Early Fourth Amendment challenges often focused simply on whether the collection of license plate information constituted a search. More recent litigation, however, reflects a far more nuanced understanding of modern surveillance technology. Rather than arguing that a single ALPR image is constitutionally protected, defendants have increasingly contended that the true constitutional concern lies in the government’s ability to aggregate thousands of otherwise innocent observations into a detailed record of a person’s movements.
These arguments draw heavily from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United States v. Jones and Carpenter v. United States. Defendants argue that while any one observation of a vehicle traveling on a public roadway may be constitutionally insignificant, the cumulative effect of hundreds or thousands of observations fundamentally changes the analysis. According to this theory, technology enables law enforcement to assemble a comprehensive picture of a person’s life that no human officer could realistically create through traditional surveillance.
To date, courts have generally acknowledged the legitimacy of these privacy concerns while concluding that current ALPR systems, as presented in the cases before them, simply have not reached that constitutional threshold.
The theories discussed below are all closely related but will be discussed separately.
A. The Mosaic Theory
One frequently advanced constitutional argument is the so-called mosaic theory of Fourth Amendment privacy. Under this theory, individual observations that are constitutionally insignificant when viewed in isolation may become constitutionally significant when aggregated over time. Like individual pieces of a mosaic, each observation reveals very little standing alone. Once assembled, however, those individual pieces may create an entirely different picture.
Applied to ALPR technology, defendants argue that no single camera capture invades a reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, the constitutional problem arises when hundreds or thousands of camera captures are combined into a searchable historical database capable of reconstructing months of travel. The concern is not the individual observation, but the government’s ability to aggregate those observations into an extensive record of a person’s movements.
This argument appeared in varying forms throughout many of the recent ALPR cases. In United States v. Martin, an officer conducted a 30-day query, looked at 2,500 photographs and only located three photographs of the defendant’s vehicle. The defendant argued that the court should look beyond the three individual Flock photographs obtained during the investigation and instead consider the broader surveillance capabilities made possible by interconnected camera systems. The court declined to adopt that approach, explaining that the constitutional analysis must be grounded in the actual surveillance that occurred rather than hypothetical capabilities of future technology.[23]
Likewise, the defendant in Robinson v. Commonwealth argued that Norfolk’s citywide network of approximately 172 Flock cameras effectively created a system capable of tracking motorists throughout the city. Although acknowledging the breadth of the network, the Virginia Court of Appeals stated that the camera network was not as intrusive as the cell towers in Carpenter, nor did it amount to “near perfect surveillance.” The court also noted that “the cameras did not continuously monitor all of his travels around the city and did not create an “intimate window” of Robinson’s overall movements and associations.” [24]
Similar arguments were raised in United States v. Sturdivant and United States v. Porter. In each case, defendants contended that the accumulation of multiple ALPR observations transformed otherwise lawful public observations into something resembling the comprehensive surveillance condemned in Carpenter. Both courts rejected that argument, concluding that the evidence before them still reflected only intermittent encounters between a vehicle and fixed camera locations rather than continuous monitoring of a person’s movements.[25]
Significantly, none of these courts rejected the mosaic theory as a matter of constitutional principle. Instead, they concluded that the facts before them simply did not present the type of comprehensive surveillance necessary to trigger its application. In other words, the theory itself remains alive even though defendants have thus far been unsuccessful in applying it to existing ALPR systems.
B. Aggregation of Innocent Observations and Movement History
Closely related to the mosaic theory is the argument that law enforcement may violate the Fourth Amendment by aggregating numerous otherwise innocent observations into a comprehensive picture of a person’s life.
This argument finds its strongest support in Carpenter, where the Supreme Court, referring historical cell-site location information, stated:
As with GPS information, the time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. These location records “hold for many Americans the ‘privacies of life.’”[26]
Thus, the Court recognized that individual location points may reveal little by themselves, however, considered together, those same points expose a person’s habits, routines, associations, political activities, religious practices, and medical appointments.
Defendants argue that historical ALPR databases present the same constitutional concern. Although each individual camera capture merely records that a vehicle passed a particular location at a particular time, the aggregation of hundreds or thousands of such observations may allow investigators to reconstruct travel patterns over weeks, months, or even years. From that perspective, the constitutional injury arises not from any individual observation but from the government’s ability to combine those observations into a comprehensive movement history.
Thus far, the lower courts have considered this argument but have declined to equate existing ALPR systems with the historical CSLI examined in Carpenter. The recurring theme throughout these opinions is that current ALPR databases are unable to reveal the detail about a person’s life that is revealed by CSLI. Cameras observe only vehicles that happen to pass their locations. Large portions of a driver’s daily travel remain entirely unrecorded. Unlike a cell phone, which continuously communicates with nearby towers regardless of where its owner travels, ALPR cameras remain fixed in place and capture information only when a vehicle passes directly in front of them.
Consequently, courts have consistently concluded that aggregating a limited number of public observations does not necessarily produce the type of comprehensive surveillance that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpenter. The constitutional inquiry therefore focuses not simply on the number of observations collected but on whether those observations collectively reveal the “whole of a person’s physical movements.”
C. Why Courts Have Rejected These Arguments—For Now
The consistent rejection of these constitutional challenges should not be misunderstood as judicial indifference to privacy concerns. To the contrary, many of the opinions devote considerable attention to the implications of advancing surveillance technology. Courts simply conclude that the ALPR systems before them have not yet crossed the constitutional line identified in Carpenter.
Several common themes emerge from these decisions.
First, current ALPR systems remain geographically incomplete. Even jurisdictions with extensive camera networks contain substantial areas where no cameras exist. Unlike cellular networks, which continuously generate location information as a phone communicates with nearby towers, ALPR systems collect no information unless a vehicle passes directly in front of a camera.[27]
Second, the collection of ALPR data remains intermittent rather than continuous. The systems record discrete observations separated by potentially lengthy periods during which no information is collected. In contrast, CSLI information is compiled automatically when a cell phone is connected to a tower. This distinction appears repeatedly throughout the cases and represents perhaps the single most important reason courts have declined to extend Carpenter to existing ALPR technology.[28]
Third, courts continue to emphasize that license plates and the exterior appearance of vehicles are knowingly exposed to public view. Motorists voluntarily travel on public roads where any passing officer, or any member of the public, may lawfully observe the same information recorded by an ALPR camera. The technology may automate those observations, but it generally does not reveal information that was previously concealed from public view.[29]
Fourth, courts have relied heavily upon the Supreme Court’s own limiting language in Carpenter. The Court expressly stated that its decision was “a narrow one” and did not call into question “conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.”[30] Courts have stated that ALPR technology remains more analogous to conventional visual surveillance than to historical CSLI.
Taken together, these considerations explain why courts have consistently rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to current ALPR systems. The decisions do not suggest that ALPR technology is immune from constitutional scrutiny. Nor do they establish a permanent rule that expanding surveillance networks can never implicate the Fourth Amendment. Instead, they reflect a more limited conclusion: the systems presently before the courts remain materially different from the pervasive, comprehensive location tracking that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpenter.
That final point is perhaps the most important takeaway for law enforcement professionals. Although courts have rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to current ALPR systems, many of the opinions acknowledge, either expressly or implicitly, that continued technological advancement could eventually present a different constitutional question. More cameras, longer retention periods, greater interoperability among jurisdictions, artificial intelligence capable of identifying travel patterns, or the ability to reconstruct nearly every movement of every vehicle could alter the constitutional analysis. Those questions, however, remain for the future.
______________________________________________________
[1] Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); Chatrie v. United States, 225 L. Ed. 2d 793 (2026)
[2] See United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454 (E.D. Va. 2024); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. App. 262, 927 S.E.2d 822 (2026); United States v. Porter, 170 F.4th 381 (5th Cir. 2026); United States v. Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (N.D. Ohio 2025); United States v. Floyd, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2025); United States v. Bowers, No. 2:18-cr-292, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196899 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2021); United States v. Graham, No. 21-645, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163818 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2022); United States v. Rubin, 556 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2021)
[3] See Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454; Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1098; Porter, 170 F.4th 381.
[4] United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454 (E.D. Va. 2024); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. App. 262, 927 S.E.2d 822 (2026); United States v. Porter, 170 F.4th 381 (5th Cir. 2026); United States v. Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (N.D. Ohio 2025); United States v. Floyd, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2025); United States v. Bowers, No. 2:18-cr-292, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196899 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2021); United States v. Graham, No. 21-645, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163818 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2022); United States v. Rubin, 556 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
[5] Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012)
[6] United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454 (E.D. Va. 2024)
[7] Robinson v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. App. 262, 927 S.E.2d 822 (2026)
[8] United States v. Porter, 170 F.4th 381 (5th Cir. 2026)
[9] United States v. Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (N.D. Ohio 2025); United States v. Floyd, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2025); United States v. Bowers, No. 2:18-cr-292, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196899 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2021); United States v. Graham, No. 21-645, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163818 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2022); United States v. Rubin, 556 F. Supp. 3d 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2021).
[10] Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018)
[11] See United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454 (E.D. Va. 2024); United States v. Floyd, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2025); United States v. Bowers, No. 2:18-cr-292, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196899 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2021).
[12] See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. App. 262, 927 S.E.2d 822 (2026); United States v. Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (N.D. Ohio 2025).
[13] Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 314
[14] Id. at 309
[15] United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454, 470-475 (E.D. Va. 2024)
[16] Robinson v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. App. 262, 272 (2026)
[17] United States v. Porter, 170 F.4th 381, 387 (5th Cir. 2026)
[18] United States v. Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1112 (N.D. Ohio 2025)
[19] United States v. Floyd, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2025)
[20] United States v. Bowers, No. 2:18-cr-292, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196899 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2021)
[21] United States v. Graham, No. 21-645, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163818, *12-14 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2022)
[22] United States v. Rubin, 556 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1128-1129 (N.D. Cal. 2021)
[23] United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454 (E.D. Va. 2024)
[24] Robinson v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. App. 262, 271-272 (2026)
[25] United States v. Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (N.D. Ohio 2025); United States v. Porter, 170 F.4th 381 (5th Cir. 2026).
[26] Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 311 (2018) (internal citations omitted)
[27] United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983); United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454 (E.D. Va. 2024)
[28] United States v. Porter, 170 F.4th 381 (5th Cir. 2026); United States v. Sturdivant, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1098 (N.D. Ohio 2025); United States v. Bowers, No. 2:18-cr-292, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196899 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2021).
[29] New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); United States v. Martin, 753 F. Supp. 3d 454 (E.D. Va. 2024); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 87 Va. App. 262, 927 S.E.2d 822 (2026).
[30] Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 316 (2018)
