On July 12, 2024, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Rambert v. City of Greenville[i], in which the court examined whether an officer was entitled to qualified immunity when he shot an unarmed, suspected burglar who charged toward the officer. The relevant facts of Rambert are as follows:
On July 9, 2019, at around 4:00 a.m., an elderly couple reported a breaking-and-entering in progress at their Greenville, North Carolina residence. They reported hearing glass break and a male voice yelling in the background. The police department dispatched two officers to the scene. Johnson was working the night shift and happened to be in the area while on a break. Although Johnson was not dispatched, he heard the call on his radio. To assist, he then drove to the scene and arrived first. He knew that two officers who had been dispatched were five to seven minutes away. And from the dispatch, he knew that a breaking-and-entering was in progress with a report of glass breaking and a yell from a male voice.
Johnson parked his patrol vehicle out of view with his emergency equipment and lights off so that he would not be seen by the intruder. Wearing his Greenville Police Department short sleeve polo shirt and matching pants, he started walking up the sidewalk at about 4:08:35 a.m. J.A. 541-42, Ex. B. Johnson then heard a loud yell of a male voice. In response, he began running toward the sound and activated his body camera.
At about 4:09:00, the loud yelling continued. No words were discernable, just loud screaming. Johnson drew his weapon. At 4:09:02, he issued the first of eight commands to “get on the ground.” Although, due to the darkness, Rambert is not yet visible on the video, Johnson spoke into his radio to alert the dispatcher at 4:09:11 that “I’ve got one running at me.” At 4:09:13, Rambert appears on the video running at Johnson while continuing to yell indecipherably.
One second later, at about 4:09:14, Rambert had closed to within a short distance of Johnson. By this time, Johnson retreated from the sidewalk into the street, which was better lit by a streetlight. As Rambert continued to run at him and yell loudly, Johnson fired three shots at Rambert and then another almost immediately after that. Rambert fell forward to the ground. About the same time, Johnson tripped and fell on his back.
Three seconds later, at 4:09:18, Johnson was still on the ground. Rambert was in front of him, only a few feet away, trying to get up and continuing to yell. Rambert rose to his hands and knees and then to a standing position and attempted to advance towards Johnson. Around 4:09:20, Johnson, still on the ground, fired four more shots at Rambert.
The parties dispute whether Rambert made physical contact with Johnson, and the body camera video does not clarify this issue. But the video shows Johnson and Rambert on the ground in the same area, with shadows from their movement very close to one another. The audio captures sounds of their sudden body movements as well as groans, gasps and difficult to decipher words. At about 4:09:31, as the movement and sounds continued, Johnson managed to speak into his radio that shots had been fired. One second later, a flash of Rambert’s face appeared above Johnson on the video with the night sky in the background, indicating that Johnson’s back was still on the ground and that Rambert was above him. Three seconds later, at 4:09:35, the scuffling sounds continued.
Two seconds later, Johnson and Rambert were still on the ground only a few feet away from each other. At 4:09:39-40, both Johnson and Rambert were trying to get to their feet. As Rambert tried to use his elbow to rise up, Johnson fired two more shots. The last shot knocked Rambert on his back from a sitting position.
At 4:09:42, Johnson had risen to his feet. He trained his gun on Rambert, who had rolled over on the ground with blood around him. At 4:09:48, Johnson began backing away from Rambert then yelled, “show me your hands.” He reloaded his weapon but did not shoot. He also radioed for EMS. At 4:10:02, Rambert rolled over and tried again to get up, using his hands and knees to pull himself up. Johnson yelled again at Rambert to “get on the ground right now!” But Rambert still got up and took a few more steps toward Johnson before falling on the ground again. Johnson did not shoot in response to this movement. Rambert collapsed at 4:10:12 but continued to try to get up. At 4:10:25, Rambert sat up briefly before falling backwards and continuing to roll on the ground. At that point, other officers arrived on the scene.
Rambert later died from the gunshot wounds.[ii]
Rambert’s family filed suit in federal court and alleged that the officer used excessive force under the Fourth Amendment when he shot Rambert.[iii] The officer filed a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Ultimately, the district court denied the officer’s motion. The officer appealed the denial of qualified immunity to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In order to defeat qualified immunity a plaintiff must satisfy a two-pronged test. First, the plaintiff must show that the officer violated his constitutional rights. Second, the plaintiff must show that the law was clearly established such that a reasonable officer in the same situation would have had fair warning that his conduct was unconstitutional. The law is typically clearly established when there is case law, prior to the date of the incident, that is sufficiently factually similar to provide fair warning to officers that such conduct is unconstitutional. Regarding qualified immunity, the court stated
The protection applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact. Id. It gives “government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6, 134 S. Ct. 3, 187 L. Ed. 2d 341 (2013)[iv]
The Fourth Circuit then examined whether the officer violated the Rambert’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment when he shot him. The court of appeals first examined the relevant constitutional principles and stated
A police officer may use deadly force when the officer has sound reason to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985)). But deadly force in the absence of such a threat is unreasonable. Id.
Whether the force use was reasonable “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including [1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. The “calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97. The “objective standard adequately protects an officer who acts in good faith.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 399, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 192 L. Ed. 2d 416 (2015).[v]
The court of appeals then noted that the district court outlined facts that were undisputed Rambert’s case, as well as video and audio from the officer’s body camera in support of the undisputed facts. Since the facts were not in dispute, the question of whether the officer violated the Fourth Amendment was a question of law for the court, not a jury, to decide.
The court of appeals then discussed the relevant undisputed facts in Rambert’s case. First, the court observed
[The officer] was alone in the dark, responding to a reported in-progress breaking-and-entering after the homeowner reported hearing glass break and a male voice. So, a reasonable officer approaching the scene would have known that a potentially dangerous crime was in process with imminent threat to the people in the home. Such an officer would also know that a glass break during a breaking-and-entering could result from the use of some sort of weapon to gain entry.[vi]
Second, the court observed
[A]s [the officer] approached the home, [he] heard a male voice yelling. Remember that he also knew from the dispatch report that the residents who reported the breaking-and-entering had also mentioned hearing a man yelling. A reasonable officer may not have known if the yelling was from the suspect, a victim or someone else but could have viewed the yelling as additional evidence of danger.[vii]
Third, the court observed
[A]fter seeing Rambert running towards him continuing to yell, [the officer] ordered Rambert to get on the ground. Although [the officer] repeated this command eight times, Rambert never complied. Instead, he kept running directly at [the officer] while yelling. A reasonable officer could have viewed this noncompliant and [the] charging potential suspect as an imminent threat.[viii]
Fourth, the court observed
[The officer] retreated from the sidewalk into the street. But as [the officer] backed away, Rambert continued to charge. [The officer] did not shoot until Rambert ignored his eight commands to get on the ground and had moved close to Johnson. A reasonable officer could have believed that a man running at him from the site of a suspected breaking-and-entering who ignored commands to get on the ground and had closed to within a few feet posed an imminent threat to the officer.[ix]
Fifth, the court observed
[A]fter the initial shots, [the officer] tripped and fell backwards. [The officer] was on the ground with Rambert in close proximity. Despite falling to the ground after [the officer’s] initial shots, Rambert rose to a standing position and moved toward [the officer], who remained on the ground. At that point, a reasonable officer could have believed the threat posed by Rambert had not passed. To the contrary, a reasonable officer could have thought that his shots either missed Rambert or did not abate the threat he posed.[x]
Sixth, the court observed
[A]fter [the officer’s] initial shots, Rambert continued to move toward [the officer]. While [the officer] claims Rambert grabbed his leg, the video does not confirm or refute physical contact. But it shows that Rambert was very close to Johnson, at one point over him, with Johnson still on the ground. And the audio contains sounds of body movements and groans and gasps. Again, based on Rambert’s continued advancement, a reasonable officer could have believed that the threat Rambert posed had not subsided.[xi]
Seventh, the court observed
[B]efore [the officer’s] final shots, the video reveals that [the officer] achieved some separation from Rambert. But they remained within a few feet of each other and on the ground. Both tried to get up. [The officer] rose up from his back but had not managed to get to his feet. Rambert tried to use his elbow to rise up. At this point, a reasonable officer could have thought that Rambert continued to pose a threat. And only about 25 seconds elapsed from [the officer’s] first shot until the last. During that time, [the officer] was either on the ground or trying to get up, and Rambert was also on the ground in close proximity either moving towards [the officer] or trying to raise up.[xii]
Eighth, the court observed
[O]nce [the officer] managed to get on his feet, he backed away from Rambert. Even then, Rambert continued to try to get up and move toward him. Yet [the officer] did not fire his weapon again.[xiii]
The court of appeals then examined the undisputed facts of Rambert’s case in light of the three factors to consider from Graham v. Connor. The first factor is the severity of the crime(s) at issue. The court of appeals noted that the crimes here were severe, particularly the original dispatch was for a “breaking-and-entering with a glass break.” The court noted that a reasonable officer could believe that a weapon was involved.
The second factor is whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the officer or others. The court of appeals, as stated above, noted that a reasonable officer could believe a weapon was involved in the breaking-and-entering with a glass break. Additionally, the court noted that, before Rambert was shot, he very aggressively pursued the officer and that “placed [the officer] in imminent danger” and “posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officer.”[xiv]
The third factor is whether the suspect was actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight. The court noted that Rambert “ignored eight commands to get on the ground and charged at the lone officer on the scene.”[xv] As such, Rambert was actively resisting.
Based upon the above eight facts and the analysis under Graham v. Connor, the court of appeals held
[A]n officer’s use of deadly force in response to an obvious, serious and immediate threat to his safety is not excessive. See Elliott, 99 F.3d at 643 (“The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to wait until a suspect shoots to confirm that a serious threat of harm exists.”). Even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Ramberts, Rambert posed an obvious, serious and immediate threat to Johnson. At the time of each of Johnson’s shots, a reasonable officer would have viewed that threat as continuing. As a result, the force Johnson used was not excessive, and his conduct was not objectively unreasonable.[xvi]
Thus, the court held that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment when he shot Rambert. Therefore, the plaintiffs were unable to establish the first prong of the test to defeat the officer’s qualified immunity, particularly that his constitutional rights were violated, and as such, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.
The plaintiffs argued that the facts in the record showed that Rambert was unarmed and experiencing a mental health episode and, as such, the officer should have “holstered his gun and used pepper spray to subdue” him.[xvii] To this the court of appeals stated
It is true that Rambert was not brandishing a weapon and, in fact, did not even possess one. But [the officer] did not know whether Rambert was or was not armed when Rambert charged at him, at which point [the officer] had mere seconds to judge the risk and determine how to respond to Rambert’s aggressive and non-compliant approach. In these circumstances, Rambert’s lack of a weapon did not make [the officer’s] use of force unreasonable. See McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e do not think it wise to require a police officer, in all instances, to actually detect the presence of an object in a suspect’s hands before firing on him.”). Also, there was a known weapon at the scene, [the officer’s] gun. For all [the officer] knew, Rambert could have been rapidly and aggressively approaching [the officer] to try to take it.
Nor did any mental health episode Rambert might have been experiencing make [the officer’s] use of force unreasonable. First, we question whether the record supports the Ramberts’ argument that [the officer] knew Rambert was experiencing the effects of a mental illness. No one—not the homeowner, police dispatcher, Rambert or anyone else—told or insinuated to [the officer] that Rambert was in the midst of a mental health episode. But even if Rambert were in mental distress, he was a potential breaking-and-entering suspect who charged at [the officer] at full speed while yelling and ignoring [the officer’s] commands to get on the ground, ultimately reaching a proximity where he might have been able to grapple with [the officer] and seize his gun. And Rambert continued to advance aggressively even after being shot by [the officer]. Whether or not he was experiencing the effects of mental illness, Rambert posed an imminent threat to [the officer]. And with respect, the Ramberts’ argument that [the officer] should have holstered his gun and used pepper spray in response to Rambert’s conduct defies the reality of the situation. “Th[e] suggestion that the officer[] might have responded differently is exactly the type of judicial second look that the case law prohibits.” Elliott, 99 F.3d at 643.[xviii]
Thus, the court of appeals was unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s arguments related to Rambert being unarmed and having a mental health episode.
Even though the officer was entitled to qualified immunity since the plaintiff failed to establish a constitutional violation, the court of appeals also examined the caselaw provided by the plaintiff in support of plaintiff’s assertion that law was clearly established that the officer’s use of force was unconstitutional. The court of appeals disagreed and held the cases provided did not clearly establish the law based on the undisputed facts of Rambert’s case.
Therefore, the decision of the district court denying qualified immunity for the officer was reversed.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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Citations
[i] 107 F.4th 388 (4th Cir. 2024)
[ii] Id. at 394-395
[iii] Note: This article will not discuss claims under state law.
[iv] Id. at 398 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 397 (emphasis added)
[vi] Id. at 399 (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. (emphasis added)
[ix] Id. (emphasis added)
[x] Id. (emphasis added)
[xi] Id. (emphasis added)
[xii] Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added)
[xiii] Id. at 400
[xiv] Id.
[xv] Id.
[xvi] Id. (emphasis added)
[xvii] Id.
[xviii] Id. at 400-401 (emphasis added)
