SIXTH CIRCUIT EXPLAINS SCOPE OF A TRAFFIC STOP AND QUESTIONING UNRELATED TO THE STOP
On September 23, 2025, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided United States v. Moffitt,[i] in which the court examined whether an officer exceeded the permissible scope and duration of a traffic stop by asking questions unrelated to the reason for the stop. The facts, taken directly from the case, are as follows:
On the night of May 17, 2021, Moffitt was pulled over by law enforcement officers from the Simpson County Sheriff’s Office while driving along Nashville Road in Simpson County, Kentucky. One of those officers was Deputy Sheriff Wyatt Harper, whose activation of his patrol car’s emergency police lights prompted Moffitt to pull over to the side of the road. Once Moffitt pulled over and Harper parked his patrol car behind Moffitt’s vehicle, Harper exited the patrol car, approached Moffitt’s driver’s side door, and greeted Moffitt before remarking that Moffitt had been “swerving all over the place.” Ex. A (“Bodycam #1”), R. 21, at 0:00-0:19. Moffitt, who was retrieving his wallet from his pants pocket with his driver’s side window rolled down at the time Harper approached, then handed Harper two items, including his driver’s license, from his wallet while explaining that he had been attempting to use a GPS device prior to being pulled over. As Moffitt handed Harper the first item, Harper asked Moffitt where he was heading. Moffitt responded that he was driving to see his romantic partner in Franklin, Kentucky. After Moffitt handed Harper the items from his wallet, Harper asked Moffitt to pull into a nearby parking lot so that their vehicles would not obstruct traffic. Harper then returned to his patrol car, and he and Moffitt drove their respective cars to the parking lot.
After arriving at the parking lot, Harper directed a fellow officer to exit the patrol car, stand behind the bumper of Moffitt’s car, and observe Moffitt in case Moffitt was “trying to tuck stuff.” Id. at 1:25-1:32. Harper then used information from Moffitt’s driver’s license to run a search for outstanding arrest warrants. Harper’s search did not identify any arrest warrants for Moffitt. Harper then exited his patrol car and returned to the driver’s side window of Moffitt’s car. Once at the window, Harper asked Moffitt for his vehicle registration. Moffitt then leaned over to his car’s glove compartment, where he retrieved a clear plastic bag containing multiple pieces of paper. While Harper shined a flashlight inside Moffitt’s car, Moffitt emptied the bag’s contents onto his lap, retrieved his car registration from the documents, and handed the registration to Harper. Moffitt then proceeded to put the remaining pieces of paper back into the plastic bag.
While Moffitt put the documents into the bag, Harper, who was still holding Moffitt’s vehicle registration, asked Moffitt several questions. First, Harper asked Moffitt where his romantic partner lived. Moffitt responded to Harper by naming the street on which his romantic partner resided. After clarifying the street name, Harper next asked Moffitt if he previously lived in Springfield, Kentucky. Moffitt answered that he still lived in Springfield. Following that response, Harper asked Moffitt what he had been doing at a hotel before the traffic stop. Moffitt explained again that he had been entering an address into his GPS device prior to the traffic stop.
Immediately after Moffitt finished detailing his use of the GPS device, Harper, who remained in possession of Moffitt’s vehicle registration, asked Moffitt during the following colloquy if he had any illegal items in the car and if he would consent to a search of the car:
Harper: Is there anything illegal in the vehicle?
Moffitt: Nope.
Harper: None whatsoever?
Moffitt: Nope.
Harper: You have any issues with me searching it?
Moffitt: Um, no.
Harper: You don’t have any issues with it?
Moffitt: No.
Harper: I can search, is that what you’re saying?
Moffitt: Yeah, you can search.
Harper: Okay, alright—no weapons or anything?
Moffitt: Nothing.
Harper: Okay, hop out for me real quick, bud. I’ll make it quick for you.
Id. at 3:40-3:56. Moffitt then opened the driver’s side door and exited his car. Harper subsequently directed Moffitt to the back of the car so that another deputy sheriff could frisk Moffitt to detect potential weapons. After frisking Moffitt, the officer directed Moffitt to the rear of the patrol car, which was parked behind Moffitt’s car. While at the rear of the patrol car, Moffitt spoke with the officers who were not searching his vehicle. At one point, Moffitt asked one officer if he wanted Moffitt to open his car’s trunk to aid the search. The officer deferred, stating, “That’s up to you, man. If [Harper] wants to look in there, he’ll ask.” Ex. A (“Bodycam #2”), R. 31, at 3:01-3:05.
Meanwhile, after Moffitt had exited his car, Harper began searching inside the vehicle, including by shining his flashlight in the car’s interior, opening crumpled napkins on the car’s seats, and rummaging through the contents of the glove compartment and a small bag located in the front of the car. After searching the interior of Moffitt’s car for approximately five minutes, Harper eventually proceeded to the front of the car, where he lifted the car’s hood. After lifting the hood, Harper located a bag containing a nine-millimeter pistol in the car’s engine compartment. Following his discovery of the pistol, Harper walked to the patrol car, where Moffitt was standing with another law enforcement officer, and directed the other officer to handcuff Moffitt. Moffitt then asked if he had an outstanding arrest warrant, to which Harper responded that Moffitt had a gun under the hood of his car. Harper next walked back to the hood of Moffitt’s car before returning to where Moffitt stood, now handcuffed, by the rear of the patrol car. Harper and Moffitt then had the following exchange:
Harper: Alright, I’m going to read you something real quick.
Moffitt: I thought you said you wanted to search my car, though?
Harper: I did. Isn’t the hood a part of the car?
Moffitt: I guess, if that’s what you want to say. Bodycam #1, R. 21, at 9:37-9:53. Harper then advised Moffitt of his rights to counsel and to remain silent.[ii]
Moffitt filed a motion to suppress and argued that the officer prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time needed to investigate the traffic violation and issue a citation. Ultimately the district court denied the motion to suppress. Moffitt pleaded guilty with the right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. He then filed a timely appeal with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals first examined the legal principles relevant to whether the officer prolonged the traffic stop, or in other words, exceeded the scope of the stop. The court explained
Traffic stops are typically constitutional initially if supported by reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred. United States v. Jordan, 100 F.4th 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2024). “Yet even where a traffic stop is originally predicated on the requisite reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, the stop’s duration may still exceed constitutional limits.” United States v. Williams, 68 F.4th 304, 307 (6th Cir. 2023). To stay within those constitutional limits and “prolong a traffic stop beyond its original ‘mission,’ police must have reasonable suspicion of additional wrongdoing,” Jordan, 100 F. 4th at 718 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492 (2015)), because “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354.[iii]
The court further explained
Traffic stops are only constitutionally permissible when “limited in scope and duration.” United States v. Taylor, 121 F.4th 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Whitley, 34 F.4th at 529). In etching the durational bounds of constitutional traffic stops initiated upon reasonable suspicion of traffic violations, we have advised that such stops may last “as long as it takes to perform routine traffic-violation tasks, such as asking a few questions, inspecting the driver’s license and registration, and issuing a ticket.” Jordan, 100 F. 4th at 718. With respect to the type of questions that officers may reasonably pose to drivers following the initiation of a valid traffic stop, we have recognized that “[q]uestions relating to travel plans, the driver’s authority to operate the vehicle, or the safety of the officer are the sorts of classic context-framing questions directed at the driver’s conduct at the time of the stop that rarely offend our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 770 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, “[e]ven minor police actions aimed at ‘detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing’ or any purpose beyond addressing the traffic infraction are not tasks incident to the stop.” United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919, 924 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355). As we will explain, a few questions unrelated to a suspected traffic infraction may be permissible in limited circumstances. As to the permissible duration of a traffic stop, however, “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350.[iv]
The court of appeals then examined the officer’s questions posed to Moffitt in light of the above rules. The court noted that the officer’s questions regarding Moffitt’s destination were properly related to the traffic stop. Moffitt did not dispute this; rather, he argued that the questions concerning illegal items and the request for consent to search improperly extended the traffic stop. The court of appeals agreed, noting that at the time the officer asked these questions, he had already checked Moffitt’s driver’s license, checked for warrants, asked about his destination and erratic driving and had possession of Moffitt’s vehicle registration.
The court of appeals also found that the officer extended the stop by repeating questions he had already asked and by asking Moffitt what he was doing at a hotel prior to the traffic stop. Additionally, when the officer asked Moffitt if he had illegal items in the car, “he was no longer asking questions reasonably related to the purpose of the traffic stop.”[v]
The government argued that the questions unrelated to the stop do not violate the Fourth Amendment if they do not “measurably extend the duration of the stop.”[vi] The court stated
This is true because “the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that d[o] not lengthen the roadside detention.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009) (“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”). For that reason, that Harper’s questioning did not relate directly to Moffitt’s alleged traffic infraction does not amount to a per se violation of Moffitt’s Fourth Amendment rights.[vii]
Thus, just because questions exceed the scope of the traffic stop by being unrelated to the reason for the stop, they will only violate the Fourth Amendment if the questions also exceed the duration required of the stop.
The court of appeals discussed the standard for determining the proper duration of the stop and stated
Determining whether the questions also fell outside the proper duration of the traffic stop requires a context-specific analysis because “[t]he maximum acceptable length of a routine traffic stop cannot be stated with mathematical precision.” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008). Therefore, we must heed the Supreme Court’s directive that, absent reasonable suspicion of additional wrongdoing, individual traffic stops “may ‘last no longer than is necessary'” to address the traffic infraction, Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion)).[viii]
The court then examined Sixth Circuit cases where an officer’s questions exceeded the scope of the stop in that they were unrelated to the purpose of the stop, but the court nonetheless determined that the questioning did not extend the duration of the stop. For example, in United States v. Garrido-Santana, the court held that, when an officer questioned a driver about contraband, the officer “did not exceed the time necessary to complete the original purpose of the traffic stop because the officer was still filling out [a] courtesy citation and . . . waiting for the return of the computer check on the vehicle’s license plate.”[ix] Additionally, in United States v. King, the court held that an officer did not unreasonably prolong a traffic stop by asking about illegal drugs because the questioning occurred when the officer was in the process of checking the driver’s license.[x]
Thus, an officer can ask questions unrelated to the original purpose of the stop without violating the Fourth Amendment as long as he or another officer is actively conducting the business of the stop, such as waiting for computer checks, reading registration documents or rental agreements or writing a citation.
Applying the above rule to Moffitt’s case, the court of appeals noted that the officer had already checked Moffitt’s license, checked for warrants, asked questions regarding the reason for the stop, and obtained Moffitt’s vehicle registration, which he was holding as he asked questions about illegal items and requested consent to search. The court also noted that there was no evidence that the officer was reviewing the vehicle registration as he was asking these questions.
The court of appeals then held
Here, for the reasons explained above, Harper’s question concerning illegal items in Moffitt’s car was not tied to the traffic infraction that led to the traffic stop. While Harper posed that question shortly after asking Moffitt questions permitted by our caselaw, “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, even the briefest of detentions is too long if the police lack a reasonable suspicion of specific criminal activity.” United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Williams, 68 F.4th at 309 (“[A]ny time (no matter the duration) added to a traffic stop beyond what was reasonably necessary to investigate the original cause for the stop must be grounded in independent reasonable suspicion.”); Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A]ny extension of a traffic stop absent independent reasonable suspicion is improper.”). Such is the case here, where Harper, through his questioning regarding Moffitt’s activities at the hotel, moved beyond the scope of the traffic stop and began probing Moffitt’s unrelated actions. Because this probing of unrelated actions occurred at a time when no investigatory tasks tied to the original traffic infraction were ongoing, the traffic stop was extended in contravention of Moffitt’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court’s conclusion to the contrary is erroneous. [xi]
Therefore, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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[i]No. 24-5536 (6th Cir. September 23, 2025 Unpublished)
[ii] Id. at 2-6
[iii] Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 15
[vi] Id.
[vii] Id. (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. at 16 (emphasis added)
[ix] Id. at 17 (citing 360 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004))
[x] Id. at 18 (citing No. 24-1089, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 19403, 2025 WL 2172432, at *6 (6th Cir. July 31, 2025).
[xi]Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added)
