SEVENTH CIRCUIT DISCUSSES QUALIFIED IMMUNITY WHERE OFFICERS MISTAKENLY BELIEVE SUSPECT POINTED A GUN

On September 26, 2025, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Pam v. City of Evansville,[i] in which the court of appeals examined whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity if they mistakenly believed a suspect pointed a gun at them before they shot the suspect.  The facts, taken directly from the case, are as follows:

At around 8:18 pm on November 8, 2020, Heather Geier called 911 reporting that a Black man wearing a white shirt and red pants—a match of Pam’s appearance—was in her backyard brandishing a handgun. She told the dispatcher that the man, whom she did not recognize, had pointed the gun at the family dog, which was leashed in the yard, and then aimed the gun at her.

Body camera footage from the responding officers captured the bulk of the following events. Officer Cory Offerman of the Evansville Police Department responded first, while Geier was still on the line. When Offerman was around the corner from Geier’s home, dispatch relayed that Pam had shot Geier’s dog. Offerman acknowledged in his deposition that he could not hear any gunshots, despite being only 100 to 200 feet from Geier’s home at that time.1

Offerman got out of his patrol car in a back alley behind Geier’s home and pointed his rifle toward Pam, who was standing on the back porch. Offerman was approximately 50 to 75 feet from the home. He commanded Pam to “show me your hands” several times. At this point Geier’s dog began barking loudly. After roughly fifteen seconds without compliance, Offerman approached Geier’s home from the back alley and told Pam to “get on the ground.” Pam was visible on the back porch of the house trying to work the doorknob to the home with his right arm. He appeared slouched.

As Offerman entered the backyard, Pam appeared to give up on the door and walked alongside the back of the home toward the side yard. Offerman admitted at his deposition that he saw Geier’s unharmed dog in the yard, which helped him confirm he was at the right house. During this entire time, Offerman trained his rifle on Pam and continued to command Pam to get on the ground, without success.

Once Offerman was in the yard, Pam turned toward him and put his hands in his pockets. Offerman immediately yelled for Pam to remove his hands from his pockets, which he did. At that point, Officer John McQuay, also an Evansville police officer, rushed on the scene with his gun drawn shouting “I’m going to shoot your ass” at Pam. McQuay stood to the right of Offerman. Offerman continued to command Pam to keep his hands out of his pockets.

As McQuay shined his flashlight on Pam, Pam raised his left hand toward the officers and kept his right hand at his side. In response, McQuay fired. Offerman followed. Altogether, the officers fired multiple times within one second. Offerman was at the scene for approximately one minute before discharging his weapon; McQuay shot within approximately fourteen seconds of his arrival. Pam died at the scene.

As Pam fell to the ground, a black object rolled away from his body. Approaching Pam, the officers recognized this object as a handgun. At their depositions, both officers testified that they only fired after Pam produced a handgun from his pocket and began to raise it toward McQuay. During interviews with the Evansville Police Department’s internal affairs investigation, they both said Pam held the gun in his right hand. Nonetheless, Kevin Campbell, the officer who led the police department’s investigation of the shooting, testified that he did not see Pam holding a gun in his hand in the video.

As it turned out, Pam was extremely intoxicated at his time of death, registering a .310 blood alcohol content, almost four times the legal limit to drive in Indiana. See Ind. Code. § 9-30-5-1. Pam was drinking with a friend earlier in the day. Shortly before the shooting, they had driven to another friend’s house, who lived close to Geier’s home. Pam’s friend went inside, and when he returned to the car, Pam had wandered off. Footage from the American Legion behind Geier’s home showed Pam stumbling down the alleyway toward her house shortly before his death.[ii]

Pam’s estate filed suit and alleged that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using unreasonable force against Pam.  The officers filed motions for summary judgment.  The district court granted the officers’ motions for summary judgment and dismissed the suit, holding that Pam pointed a gun at the officers before they shot him.

Pam appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and argued that the video created a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Pam pointed the gun at the officers.  For example, the officer that led the shooting investigation for the police department testified that he did not see Pam holding a gun in the video of the incident.

On appeal, after a review of the video, “frame by frame”, the court of appeals stated

[W]e find the videos create a dispute over whether Pam raised a weapon before the officers shot him. While Pam definitely raised his left hand just before being shot, it is not clear he held a gun in that hand at the time. When speaking to internal affairs, both Offerman and McQuay said Pam held the weapon in his right hand, and the blurry video cannot put that possibility to rest.[iii]

The court of appeals then discussed qualified immunity and what a plaintiff must show to defeat an officer’s motion for qualified immunity.  The court stated

Qualified immunity protects government officials from lawsuits unless the plaintiff can show (1) the official violated his constitutional or statutory rights, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-56, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 188 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2014). We look to Supreme Court caselaw, our own precedent, and surrounding circuits when discerning whether a right was clearly established. Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir. 2017). Unless no reasonable officer could have thought they were acting lawfully, we must extend immunity. Abbott v. Sangamon County, Illinois, 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013).[iv]

Thus, to defeat an officer’s motion for qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show (1) that his rights were violated, and (2) that the right was clearly established such that every reasonable officer would have known he was violating the plaintiff’s rights.

The second part of the test, whether the law is clearly established, is typically shown by caselaw from the Supreme Court, the circuit where the incident occurred or a robust consensus from other circuits, but can be shown without caselaw in situations that are plainly obvious due to the extreme circumstances of a case.

The court also noted that qualified immunity can be appropriate in situations where an officer was reasonably mistaken regarding certain facts.  The court stated

Qualified immunity extends not only to reasonable mistakes of law, but also reasonable misperceptions of fact. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S. Ct. 808, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2009). Translated to Fourth Amendment claims, an officer who could have mistakenly, but reasonably, believed certain facts exist to justify a given level of force is entitled to qualified immunity.[v]

Relevant Legal Principles

The court next examined the legal principles relevant to use of force and use of deadly force. The principles are as follows:

 

 

  • In all uses of force, including deadly force, the court should “consider the totality of the circumstances, ‘including [1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he [was] actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.’”Weinmann v. McClone, 787 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).[viii]

 

  • To evaluate a use of deadly force, the court must evaluate the threat the suspect “presented based on what the officers reasonably believed.” To be entitled to qualified immunity, officers “do not need to have correctly identified [the suspect] with a weapon; they needed to harbor a reasonable perception that he held one.”[ix]

 

Relevant Facts of Pam’s Case and the Impact of Those Facts

The court of appeals described the undisputed, relevant facts of the case, of which the officers could reasonably believe, as follows: (1) Pam refused to comply with officers’ commands for approximately 15 seconds prior to the shooting; (2) Pam pointed his gun at Geier (the complainant/911 caller); (3) Pam pointed his weapon at Geier’s dog; (4) Pam tried to enter Geier’s residence; (5) Pam put his hands in his pockets when he faced officers; and (6) Pam raised his left hand just before being shot by officers.[xi]  Based upon these facts, the court of appeals stated

[B]efore the fatal shot, the officers reasonably believed he produced a firearm and began to raise it toward McQuay. Certainly, some reasonable officers would have thought Pam posed an imminent serious threat in these circumstances, which would make the use of deadly force reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Reichle, 566 U.S. at 663-65.[xii]

The court of appeals explained that even if Pam did not point the gun at the officers, the officers could still reasonably believe that he did.  The court stated

Regardless of whether Pam actually held his firearm prior to the shooting, a reasonable officer could have thought it so. Even assuming Offerman and McQuay were mistaken that Pam held a gun, the confluence of dangerous circumstances, in conjunction with Pam’s furtive movements and the dim lighting, presented the “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” situation where “split-second judgments” are a must, and the law allows for reasonable errors. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. Given the evidence before us—noncompliance, a poorly lit yard at night, a 911 call stating Pam had a weapon, and hand movement into pockets—Pam’s actions give rise to a reasonable belief he held a gun. . . Moreover, nothing in the record undercuts this finding. Rather, the physical evidence corroborates it—a gun rolled a few feet in front of Pam’s body as he fell.[xiii]

Qualified Immunity Analysis – Prong 2 – Was the law clearly established?

 The court of appeals next examined whether there was caselaw that prohibited the officers’ use of deadly force in a situation such as Pam’s.  The caselaw would have to be factually similar enough to make clear to every reasonable officer that the use of deadly force in this situation would violate the Fourth Amendment.

The court of appeals noted that merely being in possession of a firearm does not automatically pose a threat to officers that would justify the use of deadly force. The court stated

An individual “does not pose an immediate threat of serious harm solely because he is armed.” Est. of Biegert v. Molitor, 968 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.) (quotation omitted). But when officers hold a reasonable belief that an individual is threatening them with a firearm, they may use deadly force without waiting until the last second before they are shot. See Sanzone v. Gray, 884 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2018); DeLuna v. City of Rockford, 447 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (7th Cir. 2006). That principle is even more applicable when someone changes the “status quo” of a confrontation by motioning for a weapon in response to police presence. Siler v. City of Kenosha, 957 F.3d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 2020).[xiv]

The court of appeals also examined caselaw from other federal circuits and stated

As we have said, and as our review of sister circuits reaffirms, “[w]hether a suspect is holding or touching a weapon when shot is . . . of great consequence.” Smith, 10 F.4th at 745; see also Est. of Valverde v. Dodge, 967 F.3d 1049, 1062 (10th Cir. 2020) (finding no violation of clearly established right when officers shot after suspected drug dealer removed gun from his waistband); Valderas v. City of Lubbock, 937 F.3d 384, 390, 774 Fed. Appx. 173 (5th Cir. 2019) (stating officer justified in firing after seeing suspect pull a gun from his waistband because he “was not required to wait to confirm [the suspect] intended to use the gun before shooting“); Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 821-22 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he law does not require officers in a tense and dangerous situation to wait until the moment a suspect uses a deadly weapon to act to stop the suspect.“(quotation omitted)); Elliott v. Leavitt, 99 F.3d 640, 644-45 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[n]o citizen can fairly expect to draw a gun on police without risking tragic consequences” and acknowledging suspect was pointing weapon at officers at time of shooting).[xv]

Each of the cases examined above involved a suspect removing a gun from the waistband or drawing or holding the weapon in “tense and dangerous” situations.  In Pam’s case, it is disputed whether he was holding or pointing the gun at officers.  However, as previously discussed, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity in situations such as the one involving Pam if the officer mistakenly believed Pam was drawing or pointing the weapon as long as the mistake was reasonable.  The court of appeals stated

We stress that we rest our analysis on the facts viewed from the vantage point of reasonable officers on the scene. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. It matters only tangentially whether Pam actually held the firearm. See Sabbe v. Wash. County Bd. of Comm’rs, 84 F.4th 807, 827-28 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Where an officer’s particular use of force is based on a mistake of fact, we ask whether a reasonable officer would have or should have accurately perceived that fact.” (quotation omitted)). Rather, our decision hinges on the determination that reasonable officers could have concluded that Pam had recently aimed his firearm at a person and an animal, and critically, pulled out a gun in response to police orders in the moments before the officers fired.[xvi]

The court of appeals also noted that the Plaintiffs have not cited any case involving deadly force used in a tense situation with facts similar to Pam’s incident where a court held that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force.

Therefore, the court of appeals determined the law was not clearly established such that deadly force was prohibited in Pam’s case, and as such, the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the second prong of the test to defeat the officers’ qualified immunity.

Do Officer McQuay’s tactics impact qualified immunity?

 The court of appeals noted that Officer Offerman was the first officer on the scene with Pam and he, for about one minute, repeatedly ordered Pam to surrender.  The court stated that Officer Offerman “appeared to make genuine attempts to deescalate the situation.”[xvii]  Then, when Officer McQuay arrived, he immediately “shouted that he would shoot Pam if Pam did not comply.”[xviii]  Approximately 15 seconds after McQuay’s arrival, the officers shot Pam.

It should be noted that the court did not offer an opinion as to whether Officer McQuay’s tactics were unwarranted, but for the sake of rendering an opinion in this case, they assumed the tactics were unwarranted to determine if that assumption would impact the outcome.  The court stated

Even if we assume McQuay’s tactics were unwarranted here, this does not change our conclusion.  The Supreme Court has not addressed whether or how to weigh any “unreasonable police conduct prior to the use of force that foreseeably create[s] the need to use it.” County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420, 429 n.*, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 198 L. Ed. 2d 52 (2017); Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 145 S. Ct. 1353, 1360, 221 L. Ed. 2d 751 (2025) (declining to address “whether or how an officer’s own creation of a dangerous situation factors into the reasonableness analysis” (quotation omitted)). And under this Court’s precedent, an officer’s “bad tactics” do not violate the Fourth Amendment unless the actions fall “so far outside the bounds of reasonable behavior that the deadly force was almost entirely a result of the officers’ actions.” Biegert, 968 F.3d at 698. For example, in Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1993), we declined to apply qualified immunity to a police officer who stepped in front of a fleeing car and then, to avoid being hit by the car, shot the driver. Here, neither officer’s conduct crossed a similar line.[xix]

Therefore, the court of appeals held that both Officer Offerman and Officer McQuay were entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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1 Geier later explained to the police that she mistakenly believed Pam shot her dog amidst the frenzied situation.

[i]No. 24-2286 (7th Cir. September 26, 2025)

[ii] Id. at 1-5

[iii] Id. at 7

[iv] Id. at 10 (emphasis added)

[v] Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added)

[vi] Id. at 13 (emphasis added)

[vii] Id. (emphasis added)

[viii] Id. (emphasis added)

[ix] Id. at 14 (emphasis added)( See, e.g., Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 965-66 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting the question is whether officers held mistaken but reasonable misperception of situation); Pollard v. City of Columbus, 780 F.3d 395, 403 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding officers reasonably, but mistakenly, believed plaintiff posed deadly threat when he “made gestures suggesting he had a weapon”); A.K.H. by and through Landeros v. City of Tustin, 837 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he relevant question for purposes of qualified immunity is whether [an officer] could reasonably have believed that [a suspect] posed” a threat sufficient to use deadly force).

[x] Id. (emphasis added)

[xi] Id. at 7, 16

[xii] Id. at 16 (emphasis added)

[xiii] Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added)

[xiv] Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added)

[xv] Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added)

[xvi] Id. at 18 (emphasis added)

[xvii] Id. at 19

[xviii] Id.

[xix] Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added)