SEARCHES OF STUDENTS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

On September 30, 2025, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Johnson v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Schs.,[i] in which the court examined whether a school official who conducted two searches of a student, due to information the student had a gun and a subsequent threat, violated the Fourth Amendment.  The facts, taken directly from the case, are as follows:

During the relevant events in 2021, X.M. was a sixth-grade student at Mount Pleasant Public Schools who suffered from Attention Deficit Disorder, Obstruction Defiance Disorder, and severe depression. Because of these behavioral disabilities, X.M. received his education pursuant to an Individualized Education Plan (IEP). That IEP—which the school district created in consultation with X.M.’s mother, plaintiff Johnson—allowed X.M. to take breaks throughout the school day in a designated breakroom to help reduce his stress levels because when X.M. became stressed, he would often become angry and violent. The breakroom is a barren, windowless room that any student may use to take short breaks. None of this is disputed.

The gun incidents. One day in the fall of X.M.’s sixth-grade year, the school’s assistant principal, Matthew Walderzak, received a report from another student that X.M. had brought a gun to school. Taking that allegation seriously, Walderzak immediately went and asked Jason Russell—X.M.’s special-education teacher—to join him in his search of X.M.’s locker. Because the locker was completely empty, Walderzak and Russell went to X.M.’s classroom and took X.M. into the hallway. The two school officials then asked X.M. whether he had brought a gun to school that day, to which X.M. responded, “No.” Walderzak and Russell then asked X.M. to pat himself down and to show the inside of his pockets, which X.M. agreed to do. X.M.’s pockets were empty, and so, satisfied that X.M. had not brought a gun to school, the two officials sent X.M. back to class. None of this is in dispute.

The next day, X.M.’s math teacher overheard X.M. laughing with a classmate about that classmate’s hand-drawn picture of a gun. Then, when class ended, X.M.’s math teacher heard X.M. shout to another student in the hallway about how “lucky” that student was that X.M. did not have his gun on him that day. Given this gun threat, Walderzak and Russell again searched X.M.’s locker and belongings, but as with their search the day before, they found no gun. Walderzak sent X.M. back into the classroom. None of this is in dispute. And this is the critical fact: at this point, Russell had cause to believe that X.M. might have brought a gun to school, that the gun might be somewhere at the school, and that X.M. might use that gun to commit violence.

The parties dispute what happened next, but we ignore that dispute and consider only X.M.’s version. According to X.M.’s retelling, as soon as he and Russell went back into the classroom, Russell ordered X.M. to take off his pants and then proceeded to strip-search X.M to see if X.M. had a gun. By strip-search, X.M. means that Russell forced him to pull his trousers down and lift his shirt up—not that Russell ordered him to remove his underwear. While X.M. did not have a gun on his person, this would have been a very different case if he had.

The breakroom incident. A few days later, the school suspended X.M. for punching another student in the groin—a suspension that X.M. chose to serve in school the next day. This is not in dispute. The parties dispute what happened when X.M. arrived to serve his suspension, but we again ignore that dispute and consider only X.M.’s version. As X.M. tells it, as soon as X.M. walked into the classroom, Russell ordered him to sit in the designated breakroom and then locked him inside the breakroom for more than 20 minutes. Although the door to the breakroom does not have a lock, X.M. says that one of Russell’s assistants used a metal door stopper to jam the door shut from the outside. X.M. had his phone and contacted his mother.[ii]

Johnson, X.M.’s mother, sued Russell, the school district and other school officials for violating X.M.’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.  All defendants filed motions for summary judgment.  The district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the claims for all defendants except Russell.  The district court denied qualified immunity for Russell because it determined that there were disputed material facts that must be decided by a jury.  Russell appealed the denial of qualified immunity to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Qualified Immunity Standard

Qualified immunity applies to public school officials in the same manner it applies to law enforcement officers and other government officials.  The court noted that in order to defeat Russell’s motion for qualified immunity, the plaintiffs must establish that (1) Russell violated X.M.’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and (2) that the right was clearly established such that every reasonable school official in the situation faced by Russell would have known that he was violating the Fourth Amendment.

It is important to note that, on appeal for a denial of qualified immunity, the court must view disputed facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff which means the court must assume the plaintiff’s version of events is true.

The Fourth Amendment and School Officials

 The court examined the relevant legal principles in the incidents between Russell and X.M.  The court stated that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches applies not only to law enforcement officers, but also to public school officials.  However, as discussed by the court, the legal standard for searches conducted by school officials in a school setting is different than the standard applied to police officers in public or private premises.

The court of appeals then discussed the two-part inquiry set forth by the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O.[iii]  When analyzing a search conducted by a public-school official, the court explained

First, we decide whether the search was “justified at its inception,” id. (quotation marks omitted), which will be true whenever a school official believes that he or she has a “moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing,” Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009). And second, if the search was justified at its inception, we must then decide whether “the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (quotation marks omitted). The scope of a search will be permissible when “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Id. at 342 (footnote omitted).[iv]

Simply put, Russell’s search and seizure of X.M. will be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if (1) it was justified at its inception (meaning there was a moderate chance of finding wrongdoing) and (2) the search was reasonable in scope based on the nature of the infraction, in consideration of the age and sex of the student.  It is important to note that the first part of this test (whether the search was justified at its inception) does not rise to the level of probable cause; rather, it is similar to the reasonable suspicion standard.

The plaintiff argued that Russell violated the Fourth Amendment when he strip-searched X.M. by having him lower his pants and by locking him in the breakroom for 20 minutes, allegedly wedging the door shut.

The court of appeals then set out to examine whether Russell was entitled to qualified immunity.

The Strip-Search

 The court of appeals applied the two-part test from New Jersey v. T.L.O. to determine if the strip-search violated X.M.’s rights under the Fourth Amendment.  Regarding the first part of the test, whether the search was justified at its inception, the court stated

Russell’s conduct—as Johnson and X.M. describe it—did not violate X.M.’s constitutional rights. First, there can be no doubt that Russell’s decision to search X.M. was justified at its inception. Indeed, consider that (1) X.M. was a student with established behavioral issues (that demanded an IEP on that basis) and a documented history of violence towards others; (2) X.M. told another student about how “lucky” that student was that X.M. did not have his gun with him that day; and (3) this gun threat occurred only one day after a separate student reported that X.M. had brought a gun to school. Given all this, Russell reasonably believed that he had a “moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing” when he strip-searched X.M. See Safford, 557 U.S. at 371. In fact, Russell had reason to believe he might find a gun.[v]

While the Sixth Circuit has not decided a case similar to the incident involving X.M., the court did examine cases from other circuits that have found searches justified at the inception under similar circumstances.  For example, in Wofford v. Evans, the Fourth Circuit held that school officials had reasonable suspicion to conduct a search when a student reported that another student had a gun at school.[vi]  Additionally, the court cited Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. Of Miami-Dade Cnty., in which the Eleventh Circuit held that school officials had reasonable suspicion after a student made “violent drawings and used threatening words.”[vii]

The court of appeals also noted that the plaintiff in X.M.’s case offered no argument suggesting Russell did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that X.M. had a gun.

Accordingly, the court found that Russell satisfied the first part of the test from T.L.O.

Regarding the second part of the test, whether the search was reasonable in scope considering the nature of the violation and the age and sex of the student, the court stated

[G]iven the facts here—as presented by Johnson and X.M.—and the state of our caselaw, it was not clearly established that Russell had exceeded the permissible scope of his search for a gun in a school when he ordered X.M. to take off his trousers. Indeed, Johnson cannot point to a single decision from either this court or the Supreme Court that forbids school officials from directing a student to remove his pants when those officials have reasonable suspicion to believe that the student may have a gun—a failure that dooms Johnson’s claims.[viii]

The court of appeals noted that the district court relied upon a Supreme Court decision (Safford v Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (1985)), which held that school officials cannot search a student’s underwear for a pain reliever medicine where there was no evidence that it was possessed and passed around in large quantities.  [Note: The medicine at issue in Safford was ibuprofen (Motrin/Advil) and naproxen (Aleve).]  The court of appeals noted that this was not similar to the facts of X.M.’s case.  However, the court also noted, in Safford

[T]he Supreme Court went on to explain that school officials can search a student’s intimate body parts if those officials have a “reasonable suspicion of danger.” Id. at 377.[ix]

The court of appeals noted that Safford involved a strip-search for over-the-counter pain reliever medicine, while, in contrast, X.M.’s incident involved a search for a gun.  Thus, since Russell searched under X.M.’s pants for a gun, which is a weapon that presents an obvious, serious danger in school, Safford did not clearly prohibit X.M.’s search.

As such, Russell was entitled to qualified immunity on the unreasonable search claim.

Claim for being locked in a breakroom for 20 minutes

 The plaintiff also alleged that Russell violated X.M.’s rights under the Fourth Amendment when he locked X.M. in a breakroom for 20 minutes.  It is noteworthy that X.M. was allegedly locked in the breakroom after he punched another student just days after Russell reasonably suspected that X.M. had brought a gun to school.

The court of appeals noted that they have not decided a case that is similar to the facts of X.M.’s case that would have put Russell on notice regarding appropriate or inappropriate conduct here.  Neither did the court find a “robust consensus” of similar cases from other federal circuits.  Thus, the law was not clearly established and Russell was entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

 

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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[i]No. 24-1739 (6th Cir. September 30, 2025)

[ii] Id. at 2-5

[iii] 469 U.S. 325 (1985)

[iv] Johnson at 8 (citing T.L.O. 469 U.S. 333) (emphasis added)

[v] Id. at 14

[vi] Id. (citing See Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 318, 326 (4th Cir. 2004))

[vii] Id. at 15 (citing Cuesta v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 285 F.3d 962, 968-70 (11th Cir. 2002))

[viii] Id. at 15

[ix] Id. at 16 (emphasis added)