ELEVENTH CIRCUIT EXPLAINS REQUIREMENTS OF A FALSE ARREST CLAIM
On July 14, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Hernandez v. Sheriff of Manatee Cnty[i], which serves as an excellent review of the law related to false arrest. The facts, taken directly from the case, are as follows:
From August 2019 to May 2020, Manatee County Sheriff’s Office deputies arrested Hernandez four times—once in August 2019, once in January 2020, once in April 2020, and once in May 2020…
The April 2020 Arrest
A week after the charge was abandoned, on April 22, 2020, Hernandez was arrested, again, for driving with a suspended license and also for resisting arrest without violence. Deputy Jason Riley initially approached Hernandez to arrest him for driving with a suspended license based on the same warrant from the January 2020 arrest. Before the arrest, Hernandez told Deputy Riley that the driving-with-a-suspended-license charge had already been abandoned. But Deputy Riley arrested Hernandez anyway and also prepared a new affidavit swearing that Hernandez resisted arrest by failing to follow lawful orders. Deputy Riley’s new affidavit led to the State Attorney’s Office charging Hernandez with resisting arrest without violence. But the State Attorney’s Office later abandoned both charges.
The May 2020 Arrest
And finally, on May 13, 2020, Hernandez was arrested for burglary with an intent to commit battery. Deputy Jeff Cowling arrested Hernandez without a warrant. Before the arrest, Deputy Cowling interviewed the alleged victims—Hernandez’s in-laws—who told Deputy Cowling that Hernandez entered their home, struck them both, and took Hernandez’s children. Deputy Cowling did not interview Hernandez before arresting him. Three months later, Hernandez’s in-laws recanted their statement, and the State Attorney’s Office abandoned the burglary charge.[ii]
Hernandez sued Deputies Riley and Cowling for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the claims against each deputy and granted them qualified immunity. Hernandez appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
The court of appeals examined the false arrest claims. The court explained the requirements of such a claim and stated
An officer violates a person’s Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures if the officer arrests that person without probable cause[.]” Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted). So to plausibly allege a Fourth Amendment violation for false arrest, the complaint must “establish (1) a lack of probable cause and (2) an arrest.” Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180 (11th Cir. 2022).[iii]
The court further explained that, when an officer arrests a person based on a facially valid arrest warrant, the officer does not generally violate the Fourth Amendment.[iv] Specifically, the court stated
[A]n officer ordinarily does not violate the Fourth Amendment when he executes a facially valid arrest warrant, regardless of whether the facts known to the officer support probable cause.” See Williams, 965 F.3d at 1162 (citing Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568 (1971)). A warrant is facially valid when “the affidavit[] attached to the warrant[] provided probable cause to believe that [the suspect] committed the offense[] charged.” See Pickens v. Hollowell, 59 F.3d 1203, 1206 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 562 (11th Cir. 1984)[v]
The false arrest claims against Deputy Riley
Deputy Riley arrested Hernandez under a warrant for driving with a suspended driver’s license. Deputy Santana obtained the warrant and provided an affidavit with information that supported probable cause for the charge of suspended license. As such, when Deputy Riley arrested Hernandez, it was under a facially valid warrant. Thus, the court of appeals held that Hernandez failed to state a plausible claim for false arrest.
Hernandez argued that Deputy Riley lacked probable cause because he told Deputy Riley that the charge that was the basis for the warrant had already been abandoned by the prosecutor prior to this arrest. However, the court of appeals stated
[T]he fact that the charge had been abandoned by the prosecutor does not mean Deputy Riley lacked probable cause for the arrest. See Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000, 1005 (11th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 405 (2019) (explaining that “unilateral dismissal by the [prosecutor] of drug charges” did not “constitute[] conclusive proof of [the criminal defendant’s] innocence”). A prosecutor can abandon a charge for a multitude of reasons other than insufficient evidence of guilt. [vi]
Thus, the court stated that Hernandez’s explanation to Deputy Riley that the charge had already been abandoned by the prosecutor did not automatically negate probable cause.
Hernandez also argued that Deputy Riley additionally charged him with “Resisting Arrest without Violence.” However, even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that the deputy lacked probable cause for that offense, as previously discussed, there was still probable cause to arrest him for the suspended license warrant. The court discussed the “any-crime rule” and stated
Under the “any-crime rule,” an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as he has probable cause to arrest the suspect for any crime, “even if it was not the crime the officer thought or said had occurred.” Id. (quoting Williams, 965 F.3d at 1158); see Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs of Alachua Cnty., 956 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The validity of an arrest does not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time of the arrest.”). To plead a Fourth Amendment violation for false arrest, then, Hernandez had to allege that Deputy Riley lacked probable cause to arrest him for any crime. See Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1187; Bailey, 956 F.2d at 1119 n.4.[vii]
Here, since Deputy Riley also arrested Hernandez under a facially valid warrant for driving with a suspended license, there was probable cause to arrest him for that offense. Therefore, under the any-crime rule, Hernandez has failed to establish a plausible claim.
The false arrest claim against Deputy Cowling
Deputy Cowling arrested Hernandez based on a statement by Hernadez’s in-laws that he entered their home, intentionally struck them, and caused them bodily harm. The court of appeals stated
Probable cause is not a high bar,” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57, and “exists when the facts . . . establish a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 898 (11th Cir. 2022)[viii]
Hernandez, in his civil complaint, alleged that his in-law advised Deputy Cowling “that Hernandez entered their house, struck them both, and took Hernandez’s children.”[ix] Based on this, the court of appeals stated
The in-laws’ statements gave Deputy Cowling probable cause to believe Hernandez committed battery because there was—at the very least—”a probability or substantial chance,” see Howard, 25 F.4th at 898, that Hernandez “intentionally . . . str[uck]” his in-laws, see Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a). Without facts showing Deputy Cowling arrested him without probable cause, Hernandez failed plausibly to allege that Deputy Cowling violated the Fourth Amendment. See Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1180.
Hernadez raised three arguments. First, Hernandez argued that he alleged sufficient facts to show the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for burglary. However, the court of appeals noted that, under the any-crime rule, Deputy Cowling had probable cause to arrest Hernandez for battery based on their statement that he intentionally struck them. Therefore, this argument failed.
Second, Hernandez argued that Deputy Cowling lacked probable cause because the in-laws, three months after the arrest, recanted their statement that Hernandez struck them. The court stated that
[W]e assess whether an officer has probable cause based on the “facts known . . . at the time of the arrest.” See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004); cf. Marx v. Grumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990) (“That a [suspect] is subsequently acquitted . . . is of no consequence in determining the validity of the arrest itself.”).
Thus, since the deputy had probable cause at the time of arrest, the later recant of the testimony does not invalidate the arrest.
Lastly, Hernadez argued that Deputy Cowling failed to interview him before arresting him, and if he had, Hernandez would have told him that he did not strike his in-laws and entered their house lawfully. He said this would have negated the probable cause. The court replied
The allegation that Deputy Cowling failed to interview Hernandez did not undermine his basis for probable cause because Deputy Cowling did not have to “rule out [Hernandez’s] innocent explanation for suspicious facts” before arresting him. See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 61. Officers “[a]re not required to forgo arresting [a suspect] based on initially discovered facts showing probable cause simply because [the suspect] offer[s] a different explanation.” See Marx, 905 F.2d at 1507 n.6.[x]
Thus, an officer is not required to believe the assertion of innocence from a suspect nor does such a mere assertion of innocence negate probable cause.
The court of appeals then held that the district court did not err in dismissing Hernandez’s claims because he failed to state a plausible claim in this case.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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[i] No. 24-10011 (11th Cir. July 14, 2025 Unpublished)
[ii] Id. at 2-4
[iii] Id. at 12 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 8
[v] Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added)
[vi] Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. at 15 (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. (emphasis added)
[ix] Id. at 16
[x] Id. at 18 (emphasis added)
