OFFICERS ARE NOT EXPECTED TO BE “LEGAL TECHNICIANS”, THEY MUST BE REASONABLE BASED ON TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES

On July 14, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Johnston v. Carlson[i], which serves as an excellent review of the law related to false arrest and arguable probable cause.  The facts, taken directly from the case, are as follows:

In November 2022, Nicole Johnston (“Nicole”)—Johnston’s wife at the time—obtained a domestic violence injunction against him. The couple were amid divorce proceedings, and the injunction prohibited Johnston from (1) contacting Nicole, (2) approaching within 500 feet of her residence, and (3) knowingly going within 100 feet of her vehicle. The injunction did not bar Johnston from visiting any other location or specify that he must remain a certain physical distance from Nicole.

On December 4, 2022, Johnston attended a Sunday morning service at Harborside Christian Church, both his and Nicole’s longtime place of worship. Johnston did not see Nicole or her vehicle when he arrived at the church, and he took a seat near the front of the sanctuary. Sometime later, Nicole arrived at the church, saw Johnston, and called the police. Deputy Carlson arrived at the scene, and Nicole presented him with a copy of the injunction. Deputy Carlson read the injunction and informed Nicole that it did not prohibit Johnston from attending the church. Nicole protested, arguing that the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office had told her that the injunction prohibited Johnston from coming within 500 feet of her. Deputy Carlson discussed the situation with his partner, Deputy Stickney, who had not read the injunction herself. In doing so he incorrectly stated that the injunction prohibited Johnston from coming within 500 feet of Nicole. The two deputies then arrested Johnston for willfully violating the injunction by “showing up and attending [a] church service at the same time” as Nicole, “despite knowing” that she would probably be there. Johnston spent the night in jail and was released the next day. Two weeks later, the state dropped the charge against him, concluding that the facts and circumstances did not warrant prosecution.

On February 19, 2023, Johnston attended Harborside Christian Church again. As before, Johnston did not see Nicole or her vehicle when he arrived. He entered the church and took a seat near the front of the sanctuary. A few minutes later, Nicole arrived, saw Johnston, and called the police. Deputy Maldonado answered the call, read the injunction, and arrested Johnston. Johnston spent a second night in jail, but two weeks later, the state again dropped the charge against him.[ii]

Johnston sued Deputies Carlson, Stickney, and Maldonado for violating his rights under the Fourth Amendment by arresting him without probable cause, also known as false arrest.  The deputies filed motions for qualified immunity. The district court granted the motions for qualified immunity and dismissed the case against the deputies.  Johnston appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

The court of appeals first noted that, in order to defeat the deputies’ motion for qualified immunity, the plaintiff must show that

(1) the officer’s conduct violated a constitutionally protected right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the misconduct. Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1185. “Clearly established” means that the state of the law was plain enough “that every reasonable official would understand what he [was] doing [was] unlawful.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018).[iii]

The court of appeals then noted that it is clearly established that arresting a person without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.  The court discussed probable cause and stated

Probable cause exists where generally trustworthy information is sufficient to indicate to a reasonable person that criminal activity is afoot. Id. We discern the presence of probable cause by looking to whether a reasonable officer in the situation of the defendant could have concluded that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity. See Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022).[iv]

The court then discussed the concept of “arguable probable cause” and how this is another way to consider whether the law is “clearly established,” as required for a plaintiff to defeat an officer’s qualified immunity in a false arrest case.  Specifically, the court stated

But in the context of a federal false arrest claim, an officer does not need to show that he had actual probable cause to obtain qualified immunity; he only needs to show that he had arguable probable cause. See Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (“Even law enforcement officials who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are entitled to immunity.”). “An officer has arguable probable cause if ‘a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests.'” Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 68). Put another way, “the arguable probable cause inquiry in a false arrest case is no different from the clearly established law inquiry in any other qualified immunity case. Unless the law ‘makes it obvious that the officer’s acts violated the plaintiff’s rights,’ the officer has qualified immunity.” Id. at 1187 (quoting Washington, 25 F.4th at 903) (alteration adopted).[v]

Simply put, even if an officer makes a mistake and arrests a person without probable cause, as long as another reasonable officer in the same situation could have believed there was probable cause, the officer is entitled to qualified immunity.  Thus, an officer “can be reasonably mistaken about the law and still be entitled to qualified immunity.”[vi]

Therefore, to defeat the deputies’ qualified immunity, Johnston must show that the deputies lacked arguable probable cause.

The court also examined court precedent related to arguable probable and stated

Police officers are often forced to make quick decisions, and sometimes the application of a statute is unclear. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 67 (2014) (“A law prohibiting ‘vehicles’ in the park either covers Segways or not, but an officer will nevertheless have to make a quick decision on the law the first time one whizzes by.” (citation omitted)). So long as an officer’s mistake is reasonable, arguable probable cause exists, and he does not lose the protection of qualified immunity. See Washington v. Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2019) . . .; Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1558 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that an officer’s reasonable mistake in estimating the number of patrons in a restaurant established arguable probable cause for an arrest based off a building code violation); Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that officers’ mistaken arrest of plaintiff who shared the same name of—and had a similar appearance to—a suspect was “arguably reasonable” and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity).

Thus, in situations where the meaning of a criminal statute is unclear an officer may be entitled to qualified immunity if he or she misinterprets the statute, makes an arrest, and it is later determined the officer did not have probable cause.

Did the deputies have arguable probable cause to arrest Johnston?

The court of appeals set out to determine if the deputies had arguable probable cause to arrest Johnston.  The court examined the statute under which Johnston was twice arrested, specifically Florida Statute section 741.31(4)(a), pertaining to willfully violating a domestic violence injunction.  The court stated

That provision makes it a misdemeanor to willingly violate a domestic violence injunction by, among other things, “[g]oing to, or being within 500 feet of, the petitioner’s residence, school, place of employment, or a specified place frequented regularly by the petitioner and any named family or household member.” Fla. Stat. § 741.31(4)(a)(2).

The court next examined each arrest.  Regarding the first arrest, Deputies Carlson and Stickney were dispatched to a call at the church.  They arrived and saw that Johnston, who was the subject of a domestic violence injunction, was in the same room as the victim in that injunction.  The victim, Nicole, showed Deputy Carlson the twelve-page injunction that stated in bold letters that Johnston could have “No Contact” with the victim, unless otherwise provided.  Deputy Carlson discussed the injunction with Deputy Stickney and they arrested Johnston.

Regarding the second arrest, Deputy Maldonado was dispatched to the church where he found Johnston was in the same room with the victim, Nicole.  Nicole showed him the injunction and the deputy arrested Johnston.

The court of appeals stated

While up for debate, we cannot say that the deputies’ interpretation of the injunction and the statute was objectively unreasonable. As the district court explained, law enforcement officers are often called upon to make quick judgments, and usually do not have the luxury of pondering the applicability of statutes in a calm environment. See Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) (“In making probable cause decisions, law enforcement officers are not charged with knowing legal technicalities and nuances, but with ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'” (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949))).[vii]

Thus, officers are not expected to be “legal technicians,” or lawyers; rather, they must act as a “reasonable and prudent” person, in consideration of the facts “and practical considerations of everyday life.”

In Johnston’s case, the court noted that the officers had (1) an injunction that stated “No Contact” with the victim, Nicole, and (2) they found Johnston and Nicole in the same room.  The court stated

Between the injunction’s “No Contact” provision, and the unintuitive language of section 741.31(4)(a), the deputies could have reasonably concluded that they had probable cause to arrest Johnston. See Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186 (“An officer has arguable probable cause if ‘a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time of the arrests, [viii]could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests.'” (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 68)). As the district court observed, this decision is supported by the fact that three different deputies, two on one occasion, and a third on another, made the same mistake of law.[ix]

Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court and held that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity, as they had arguable probable cause to arrest Johnston.

Note:  Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions.  As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases.  This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.

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[i] No. 24-10862 (11th Cir. July 14, 2025 Unpublished)

[ii] Id. at 1-3

[iii] Id. at 6 (emphasis added)

[iv] Id. at 6-7 (emphasis added)

[v] Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added)

[vi] Id. at 8

[vii] Id. at 11 (emphasis added)

[viii] Id. at 11 (emphasis added)

[ix] Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added)