In 2023, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Sligh v. City of Conroe[i], in which the court examined whether deputies violated the Fourth Amendment when, a police canine was commanded to bite an emotionally disturbed woman who had attempted self-harm and then pulled away from an officer who attempted to handcuff her. The relevant facts of Sligh, taken directly from the case, are as follows:
At 1:39 a.m. on July 5, 2018, Plaintiff-Appellant Olivia Sligh’s partner called 911 to report that Sligh was suicidal, had hurt herself, and had left her house on foot. Sligh’s partner requested an ambulance, and he indicated that Sligh was unarmed and not a violent person. The Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office notified the City of Conroe of the emergency medical call and requested a canine officer if available. Tyson Sutton, a police officer employed by the City of Conroe, and Alexis Alias Montes, a deputy employed by the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, responded to the call. Sutton brought along Thor, a trained K9 police dog. These two officers, the City of Conroe, and Montgomery County are the Defendants-Appellees in this action.
The complaint alleges that when the officers located Sligh, Sutton shined a flashlight in Sligh’s face as Thor barked and lunged at her. Montes grabbed Sligh, who pulled away. Sutton then sicced Thor on Sligh, and Thor initially bit Sligh in the upper thigh. Sligh sat down, and Sutton continued to direct Thor to bite Sligh on the rear of her upper leg and her ankle. Sligh alleges that “Sutton used the dog to purposively attack and bite” her; that “Montes did not intervene in the multiple dog bites by words or actions even though the attack lasted one minute and some seconds”; and that she never resisted seizure, tried to escape, or assaulted Montes.
Sligh’s complaint is not the only account of what happened that night. Sligh’s complaint also repeatedly references Sutton’s bodycam footage (the “Video”), which was attached to Montgomery County and Montes’s motion to dismiss. In the Video, Sutton encounters Sligh and shines a flashlight at her. Sligh begins to approach Sutton, who loudly says: “Wait, wait, wait, don’t! Do not walk towards me! Do not walk towards me! The dog will bite you!” Sligh acknowledges Sutton before shouting a profanity at the officers. Montes commands Sligh to place her hands behind her back. Sligh responds with more profanities and, contrary to the complaint’s assertions that she never resisted, slaps at Montes’s arms while attempting to pull away. Sligh and Montes physically struggle for about 11 seconds, at which point Sligh breaks free from Montes’s grip. Sutton then releases Thor with a bite command, and Thor bites Sligh as Sutton commands her to get on the ground. Sligh falls to a seated position on the ground and cries out in pain. Beginning eight seconds after the bite command, Sutton repeatedly commands Thor to release Sligh, but Thor does not immediately comply. Sligh begins lying on her side. 36 seconds after giving the first bite command, Sutton grabs and pulls Thor’s collar. Thor releases Sligh around 64 seconds following the first bite command. While Thor was biting Sligh, Montes reaches to control Sligh’s hands and commands her to put her hands behind her back. Montes handcuffs Sligh after Thor’s release.[ii]
Sligh filed suit in federal court against the officers and municipalities and alleged (1) excessive force under the Fourth Amendment against Officer Sutton (the canine handler), (2) a failure to intervene claim against Officer Montes, (3) a municipal liability claim against the City of Conroe, and (4) various claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act for failure to accommodate against the City of Conroe and Montgomery County. The officers and municipalities filed motions to dismiss and the district granted the motions for qualified immunity regarding the claims against the officers and dismissed the claims against the city and county. Slight appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
[Note: This article will cover the municipal liability claims and ADA claims against the city and county.]
Municipal Liability Claim Against the City of Conroe
To sufficiently state a claim for municipal liability regarding the canine bite, the court of appeals stated
Sligh must identify “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” See Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)).[iii]
Slight argued that there are three theories of municipal liability, specifically (1) the City of Conroe had inadequate policies regarding police canines, (2) the city failed to adequately train Officer Sutton as a canine handler, and (3) the city ratified Officer Sutton’s actions by failing to discipline him or change department policy.
A. Inadequate Policy Claim
A plaintiff must satisfy four requirements to state a claim for inadequate policy. Specifically, the plaintiff must show (1) an official policy, (2) that was issued by an official policymaker, (3) the policy was moving force, or caused, the constitutional violation, and (4) the policy was implemented with “deliberate indifference” to the “known and obvious consequences” that it would cause constitutional violations. [iv]
To establish “deliberate indifference” a plaintiff is typically required to show a pattern of constitutional violations that put the policymaker on notice of the inadequate policy. If the policymaker ignores, or is deliberately indifferent, to the pattern of constitutional violations, then the deliberate indifference requirement is satisfied.
In Sligh’s case, she alleged that a policy that was not applicable to her situation was inadequate. However, the policy she referenced referred to when a police canine may be released off-leash, specifically when a suspect is evading arrest. This was not the situation with Sligh, thus the policy she cited could not be the “moving force” of her constitutional violation because that policy was inapplicable to her situation.
Sligh also alleged that the city’s canine policies were deficient. The court disagreed and noted that Sligh also failed to show a pattern of constitutional violations that would put the policymaker on notice that the policies were defective or deficient. The court of appeals then held
Because the City’s actual canine policy was not a “moving force” behind Officer Sutton’s constitutional violation, and because Sligh has not alleged facts indicating that the City was deliberately indifferent to a known or obvious risk that its canine policies would result in constitutional violations, we find that the district court did not err in holding that Sligh failed to adequately allege an inadequate policies claim against the City of Conroe.[v]
B. Failure-to-Train Claim
The court discussed the legal requirements of a failure-to-train claim. The court stated
A failure-to-train theory of municipal liability requires Sligh to show that “(1) the [city] failed to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” See Peña, 879 F.3d at 623 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001)).[vi]
The court also stated that
A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” (quoting Brown, 520 U.S. at 409)).[vii]
The court noted that Sligh failed to show a pattern of incidents prior to her incident that would put the city on notice that it failed to properly train its officers regarding the proper use of police canines. Rather, she relied solely upon her incident to attempt to prove deliberate indifference. As such, the court of appeals held that the district court did not err in dismissing this claim.
C. The Ratification Claim
The court stated
Concerning ratification, if “authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification [is] chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.” World Wide Street Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 755 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S. Ct. 915, 99 L. Ed. 2d 107 (1988)). “The theory of ratification, however, has been limited to ‘extreme factual situations.'” Id. (quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Therefore, unless the subordinate’s actions are sufficiently extreme—for instance, an obvious violation of clearly established law—a policymaker’s ratification or defense of his subordinate’s actions is insufficient to establish an official policy or custom.” Id.[viii]
In Sligh’s case, the court previously held that this was not a case where it was obviously clear that Officer Sutton violated the Fourth Amendment, nor was the law clearly established that his use of his canine violated the Fourth Amendment. It was also not an “extreme” situation. Therefore, the court held that this claim also failed.
II. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims
Regarding the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, Sligh appeared to make a claim that the city and county failed to accommodate her disability. The court explained the requirements of such a claim and stated
To succeed on a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential limitations were known by the covered entity; and (3) the entity failed to make reasonable accommodations.” Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 n.9 (5th Cir. 2015). “Plaintiffs ordinarily satisfy the knowledge element by showing that they identified their disabilities as well as the resulting limitations to a public entity or its employees and requested an accommodation in direct and specific terms.” Smith v. Harris County, 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020). “When a plaintiff fails to request an accommodation in this manner, he can prevail only by showing that ‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant agents.” Id. at 317-18 (quoting Windham v. Harris County, 875 F.3d 229, 237 (5th Cir. 2017)).[ix]
The court assumed, without deciding, that Sligh was a “qualified individual” with a disability under the ADA. Even assuming she met the definition of a qualified individual, under the ADA, Sligh did not allege that she (1) identified her disabilities to the officers or the city/county, and (2) did not allege that she requested any accommodations “in direct and specific terms” to the officers.[x] The court noted that the officer’s video confirmed that Sligh did not request any specific accommodations. As such, Sligh would have to show that her disabilities were “open, obvious, and apparent.” However, she did not attempt to make this showing in her complaint. The court then held
Because Sligh has not shown that her disability and limitations were known by the municipalities, her failure-to-accommodate claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act are inadequate and were appropriately dismissed.[xi]
Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, dismissing all claims against the city and county.
Note: Court holdings can vary significantly between jurisdictions. As such, it is advisable to seek the advice of a local prosecutor or legal adviser regarding questions on specific cases. This article is not intended to constitute legal advice on a specific case.
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[i] 87 F.4th 290 (5th Cir. 2023)
[ii] Id. at 296-297
[iii] Id. at 301 (emphasis added)
[iv] Id. at 302 (emphasis added)
[v] Id. at 303
[vi] Id. (emphasis added)
[vii] Id. (emphasis added)
[viii] Id. (emphasis added)
[ix] Id. at 304-305 (emphasis added)
[x] Id. at 305
[xi] Id.
